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ABSTRACT 
Committees of experts are critical for decision-making in engineering systems. This is because the 
complexity of these systems requires that information is pooled from across multiple specialties and 
domains of knowledge. The social elements of technical decision-making are not well understood, 
particularly among expert committees. This is largely due to a lack of methodology for directly 
studying such interactions in real-world situations. This thesis presents a method for the analysis of 
transcripts of expert committee meetings, with an eye towards understanding the process by which 
information is communicated in order to reach a decision. In particular, we focus on medical device 
advisory panels in the US Food and Drug Administration. The method is based upon natural language 
processing tools, and is designed to extract social networks in the form of directed graphs from the 
meeting transcripts which are representative of the flow of information and communication on the 
panel. Application of this method to a set of 37 meetings from the FDA's Circulatory Systems Devices 
Panel shows the presence of numerous effects. Prominent among these is the propensity for panel 
members from similar medical specialties to use similar language. Furthermore, panel members who 
use similar language tend to vote similarly. We find that these propensities are correlated – i.e., as panel 
members' language converges by medical specialty, panel members' votes also converge. This suggests 
that voting behavior is mediated by membership in a medical specialty and supports the notion that 
voting outcome is, to some extent, dependent on an interpretation of the data associated with training, 
particularly when a small number of interpretations of the data are possible. Furthermore, there is 
some preliminary evidence to suggest that as clinical trial data ambiguity and difficulty of decision-
making increases, the strength of the mediating effect of medical specialty decreases. Assuming a 
common decision is reached, this might indicate that committee members are able to overcome their 
specialty perspective as the committee jointly deals with hard problems over longer periods of time. In 
cases where the panel’s vote is split, a lack of linguistic coherence among members of the same 
medical specialty correlates with a lack of linguistic coherence among members who vote the same 
way. This could be due to the presence of multiple interpretations of the data, leading to idiosyncratic 
or value-based choice. We also find that voting outcome is associated with the order in which panel 
members ask questions – a sequence set by the committee chair. Members in the voting minority are 
more likely to ask questions later than are members in the voting majority. Voting minority members 
are also more likely to be graph sinks (i.e., nodes in a social network that have no outflow) than are 
voting majority members. This suggests an influence mechanism on these panels that might be 
associated with framing – i.e., later speakers seem to be less able to convince other panel members to 
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discuss their topics of interest contributing to these members’ minority status. These results may have 
some relation to FDA panel procedures and structure. Finally, we present a computational model that 
embodies a theory of panel voting procedures. Model results are compared to empirical results and 
implications are drawn for the design of expert committees and their associated procedures in 
engineering systems. 
Thesis Supervisor: Christopher L. Magee 
Title: Professor of the Practice of Mechanical Engineering and Engineering Systems 
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C h a p t e r  1  
INTRODUCTION 
<<Diodore de Sicile [marg: lib.2. Biblioth. Hist.] explique l’invention des Langues de cette 
maniere. Les hommes faisant leurs premiers coups d’essai pour parler, prononcerent d’abord des 
sons qui ne signifioient rien: puis, aprés qu’ils se furent appliqués à ces sons, ils en formerent 
d’articulés pour exprimer mieux leurs pensées. La raison corrigea la nature, & accomoda les 
mots à la signification des choses…La necessité où les hommes étoient de parler les uns aux 
autres, les obligea d’inventer des mots à proportion qu’on trouvoit de nouvelles choses... Ce fut la 
raison pourquoi il fallut inventer de nouveaux mots, lors qu’on bâtit cette fameuse Tour de 
Babylone: & on ne doit pas s’étonner s’il y arriva tant de confusion, d’autant qu’il se présentoit 
quantité de choses qui n’avoient pas encore leurs noms. Chacun les exprimoit à sa maniere; & 
comme la nature commence ordinairement par ce qui est de plus simple & de moins composé, on 
ne peut pas douter que la premiere Langue n’ait été tres-simple & sans aucune composition.>> 
“Diodorus of Sicily explains the invention of languages as follows. Men, in making their first 
attempts to speak, initially pronounced sounds that signify nothing: then, after applying 
themselves to these sounds, they formed articulations to express their thoughts. Reason corrected 
nature & adapted the words to the significance of things…The need for men to speak to one 
other obliged them to invent words in proportion to their finding new things…This is the reason 
why they were required to invent new words while building the famous Tower of Babylon & one 
should not be surprised if there was so much confusion because they were presented with so many 
things that didn’t yet have their names. Each one expressed himself in his own manner & 
because nature ordinarily starts with what is the most simple and the least complex, one cannot 
doubt that the first Language was not simple and without complexity.” 
– Richard Simon (b. 1638 – d. 1712), Histoire Critique du Vieux Testament (1678), trans. 
French, on the dangers of miscommunication associated with complex technical innovation 
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We live in a world of increasing technical complexity. Large-scale engineering 
systems now dominate the landscape of our society. Examples of such system 
include multi-modal transportation, military acquisitions, and health care delivery, 
touching upon just about every domain of modern human experience.  
As technical complexity increases, organizational complexity must necessarily 
follow since the detailed operations of the system begin to exceed a single 
human’s cognitive capacity (Conway 1968). More individuals will therefore be 
required to construct, maintain, and understand the systems upon which we rely 
for our way of life. The communication and aggregation of relevant knowledge 
among these individuals could conceivably benefit from an explicit design effort 
to ensure that the right knowledge is possessed by, and shared among, the 
appropriate people.  
A traditional engineering organization in the United States typically responds to 
complexity via specialization. In other words, individuals are trained, recruited 
and paid to focus on a particular subsystem. Knowledge of, and experience with, 
the inner workings of system components is spread among expert specialists. Any 
large-scale engineered system must also receive the approval of several 
stakeholders of the system and its functionality, many of whom have different 
perceptions and hence, different requirements. Examples include design reviews 
that large-scale engineered systems must pass (consider, for example, the PDR 
and CDR cycles within the aerospace domain). These approval activities bring 
additional expertise to bear on improving the ultimate design. Highly experienced 
specialists develop expertise which is then communicated to mid-level managers, 
who are responsible for aggregating experts’ recommendations and passing this 
information to upper-level management. For this procedure to work, problems 
faced by the decision-making organizations must be quickly diagnosed as relevant 
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to a particular specialty. The appropriate specialist must then possess the correct 
knowledge if s/he is to make a decision that is in the best interests of the 
organization.  
Different experts, having been trained in different areas or components, will tend 
to pay attention to those elements of the system that they find consistent with 
their professional training – i.e., cognitively salient (Douglas 1986). The 
mechanisms by which this training is achieved include acculturation within 
specific professional specialties, and require learning that professional institution’s 
language and jargon. By institution, we mean a set of social norms to which a 
particular community adheres. This leads to a situation wherein individual experts 
develop different views of the system. In such cases, the system becomes a 
boundary object (cf. Carlile and Schoonhoven 2002), knowledge about which 
must be jointly constructed by the experts in question.  
In the committees that concern us in this thesis, information must be aggregated 
from multiple expert specialists. Evaluating committee decision processes 
requires a means of understanding the interaction between the social and 
technical specifics of the system in question. For example, (Jasanoff 1987) notes 
that disagreements between technical experts regarding whose expertise is most 
appropriate might lead to “boundary conflicts”, wherein each expert attempts to 
define the problem in such a way as to make it consistent with his or her realm of 
expertise. The decision of what information is important and how it should be 
interpreted is the subject of exchange up until the time that each committee 
member casts a vote. That different experts hold different perspectives and values 
makes it more likely that additional aspects of a problem will come under 
consideration. Nevertheless, this does not guarantee consensus on the 
interpretation of data. 
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There is much evidence to suggest that decisions that are informed by a diversity 
of viewpoints are superior (e.g., Hong and Page 2004). This is because different 
experts will bring different domains of knowledge to bear on solving the problem 
at hand, potentially leading to a better-informed decision outcome. Modern 
technical organizations therefore require a capacity for lateral (i.e., non-
hierarchical, or informally hierarchical) communication, especially if the 
organization is to respond quickly to uncertain future states (Galbraith 1993). 
Nevertheless, with specialization comes acculturation – we have noted that 
specialists, having been differentially trained, view the system differently. Thus, 
with acculturation may come difficulty in communication across specialty 
boundaries. This might be due to disagreement on goals (i.e., local vs. global 
optimization) or a simple inability to comprehend the jargon of specialists from 
other disciplines. This motivates three main questions driving our research 
endeavor:  
1. How can we study, in a repeatable, consistent manner, the flow of 
communication among technical experts in committee decisions?  
2. How do technical experts’ decisions change as they learn and interact 
during the decision-making process?  
3. How might we design committee procedures so as to enable desirable 
behavior on the part of technical expert committees? 
The question of how to design decision-making processes that successfully 
leverage different perspectives is one that is extensible to a range of technology 
and policy activities across both public and private sectors. We differ from 
previous analyses in our use of an empirical quantitative methodology based upon 
analysis of meeting transcripts. Such a methodology can be extended to similar 
studies in other domains of interest to engineers, managers and social scientists.  
  24 
This thesis presents an empirical method aimed at extracting communication 
patterns through a computational analysis of committee meeting transcripts. A 
computational approach is used for its consistency and reliability across meetings. 
Furthermore, an algorithmic approach enables any potential biases that might be 
present in the analysis to be minimal and transparent. Indeed, the process of 
developing such a methodology is an exercise in making such biases explicit and 
then, systematically attempting to eliminate those that are unjustified.  
In particular, we use a modification of the Author-Topic Model (Rosen-Zvi et al. 
2004), a Bayesian inference tool used in the field of machine learning to discover 
linguistic affinity between committee members.  We find that the resulting output 
may be used to construct social networks representing patterns of 
communication among panel members. Analyses of these networks are then 
performed. Finally, a computational model is constructed that points the way 
forward for theory development. 
Thesis Outline 
Decision-making by groups of experts is an area that touches on a number of 
different disciplines within the social sciences. In Chapter 2, we review the 
literature on decision-making in small groups across economics, political science, 
social psychology, sociology and anthropology. This review motivates the need 
for a methodology that can analyze real-world decision-making by committees of 
experts.  
Chapter 3 identifies the FDA Medical Device Advisory Panel committees as a 
relevant data source and reviews the structure of the panel decision-making 
process.  
Chapter 4 introduces an empirical methodology which generates directed social 
networks from meeting transcripts based on Bayesian Topic Modeling.  
  25 
Chapter 5 analyzes the networks generated from a set of 37 meetings of the 
Circulatory Systems Devices Panel and presents empirical findings.  
In Chapter 6, we present a computational model that embodies a theory of panel 
voting procedures. Model results are presented and compared to empirical results, 
and directions for future modeling work are outlined.  
Finally, Chapter 7 concludes by drawing implications from the empirical and 
modeling results for the design of expert committees in engineering systems. 
  
C h a p t e r  2  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
“Siquidem pene totum humanum genus ad opus iniquitatis coierat: pars imperabant, pars 
architectabantur, pars muros moliebantur, pars amussibus regulabant, pars trullis linebant, pars 
scindere rupes, pars mari, pars terra vehere intendebant, partesque diverse diversis aliis operibus 
indulgebant; cum celitus tanta confusione percussi sunt ut, qui omnes una eademque loquela 
deserviebant ad opus, ab opere multis diversificati loquelis desinerent et nunquam ad idem 
commertium convenirent. Solis etenim in uno convenientibus actu eadem loquela remansit: puta 
cunctis architectoribus una, cunctis saxa volventibus una, cunctis ea parantibus una; et sic de 
singulis operantibus accidit. Quot quot autem exercitii varietates tendebant ad opus, tot tot 
ydiomatibus tunc genus humanum disiungitur; et quanto excellentius exercebant, tanto rudius 
nunc barbariusque locuntur.”  
“Virtually all of the human race had united in this iniquitous enterprise. Some gave orders; 
some did the planning; some raised the walls; some straightened them with rule and line; some 
smoothed mortar with trowels, some concentrated on cutting stone and others on transporting it by 
land and sea. Thus diverse groups applied themselves in various ways, when they were struck by 
Heaven with so great a confusion that though all had been using the same language in their 
work, made strangers to one another by the diversity of tongues, and never again succeeded in 
working together. Only each group that had been working together on one particular task kept 
one and the same language: for example, one for all the architects, one for all the stone movers; 
for all the stone-cutters, and so on with every trade. And now as many languages separated the 
human race as there were different kinds of work; and the more excellent the type of work, the 
more crudely and barbarically did they speak now.”   
– Dante Alighieri (b. 1265 – d. 1321), De Vulgaris Eloquentia (1302-1305), Book I, 
Section 7, 6-7. trans. Latin, M. Shapiro (1990), on the origin of language and technical jargon 
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Chapter 1 noted the necessity for information aggregation in order to make 
decisions within engineering systems. The primary means by which this occurs is 
via the expert committee – a body charged with the review and approval of 
complex projects. The committee is a common means by which experts pool 
their knowledge in an attempt to reach a consensus decision about a complex 
system or process. A successful committee will be able to integrate the disparate 
knowledge and viewpoints of its members so as to make a decision that is as well-
informed as possible (moderate success will involve coming to a better decision 
than a randomly informed decision maker). An unsuccessful committee can fail in 
a number of ways – for example with decisions that are less than optimal but still 
quite good, or with very poor decisions. Lack of success can hold for many 
reasons. These include, but are not limited to, the absence of relevant technical 
expertise; the inability of committee members to communicate (e.g., across 
disciplinary boundaries); and personality conflicts (see Boffey 1976, for an 
example of these challenges in the early FDA drug and medical device approval 
committees).  
Pooling and communication of information across specialty boundaries is not 
straightforward. Committees are social entities and are therefore affected by a 
number of mechanisms recorded in the social sciences. Our challenge is to 
determine which of these are likely to be encountered by committees of technical 
experts and to evaluate how they might impact upon decision outcomes. To do 
this, we review a number of bodies of academic literature that are concerned with 
committee decision-making, motivating the methodological approach outlined in 
Chapter 3.  
Rational Choice  
A natural place to begin a review of literature on committee decision-making is in 
the rational choice tradition where we find the most precise theoretical constructs 
  28 
due to well-developed mathematical machinery. This literature typically follows 
the utilitarian philosophy of Jeremy Bentham, arguing that individuals seek to 
maximize their individual utilities in any decision-situation (Bentham 1988/1780). 
This individual behavior then aggregates to often-unexpected group behaviors. 
The advent of utility theory by von Neumann and Morgenstern (2007/1947) 
provided one mathematical framework for this approach which was ultimately 
developed into the body of literature now known as Game Theory. Economists 
and political scientists have applied this theory to committee decision problems, 
most notably those of bargaining, (Rubinstein 1982), organizational structure (Sah 
and Stiglitz 1988), coalition formation (Aumann and Dreze 1974; Baron and 
Ferejohn 1989), and recently, ritualized common knowledge (Chwe 2003). These 
models are highly appropriate for their political science context (e.g., in legislative 
bodies) where individuals frequently behave in a manner aimed to maximize the 
interest of their own constituents, even when cooperation and exchange of 
expertise is required (cf. Broniatowski and Weigel 2006). Therefore, a major focus 
of this work is strategic and payoff-focused, and therefore does not incorporate 
to the technical specifics of the question that the committee is considering. 
Furthermore, decision-makers are treated as homogeneous, whereas decision 
rules are instead made to vary. More recent work has begun to focus explicitly on 
committees of experts (Visser and Swank 2007). Although theoretically 
compelling, this work has not yet incorporated the notion that experts may be 
qualitatively different from one another (e.g., with access to different sources of 
information or different value structures). This work recognizes different levels of 
ability among experts, but not different kinds of knowledge or expertise.  Such an 
approach could therefore be augmented by an incorporation of heterogeneity 
among the knowledge and beliefs of decision-makers.  
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Social Choice 
Social choice is a second strand of modeling literature within the traditions of 
economics and political science. Unlike rational choice, social choice does not 
require algebraic utility functions, instead relying on simple ordering among 
preference alternatives (Gaertner 2009). Assuming the existence of at least three 
alternatives, Arrow (1963) demonstrated the logical impossibility of generating a 
stable preference ranking under a set of conditions that have been generally 
accepted as reasonable namely: 
1. Non-dictatorship: The preference ordering for the group must not 
depend solely on the preference ordering of only one individual. 
2. Unrestricted domain: All preference alternatives of all individuals should 
be included in the ranking, and no comparison among pairs of 
alternatives is invalid a priori. 
3. Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives: Changes in an individual’s 
preferences between decision alternatives that are not included in the 
group preference ordering will not change the group preference ordering. 
4. Monotonicity: An increase (decrease) by an individual in his/her 
preferences such that one alternative is ranked higher (lower) than it had 
been previously can not result in a lower (higher) ranking for that 
alternative in the group preference ordering. 
5. Non-imposition: Every group preference order could be attained by 
some set of individual preference orders. 
Arrow’s theorem would seem to suggest that a rational (i.e., non-cyclical) 
aggregated preference ranking is impossible. Nevertheless, if one were to impose 
a domain restriction on the preferences of individuals (i.e., relaxation of 
  30 
assumption number 2) one could generate stable preference orderings (Black 
1948). One possible source of a domain restriction could be “empirical reality” 
(Frey et al. 2009), which would prevent certain inconsistent interpretations of a 
given decision-situation, and hence, certain preference orderings. In principle, as 
more information becomes available to committee members, they should 
converge on the right choice. Indeed, consensus in the presence of large amounts 
of information might be one definition of expertise (cf. Romney 1986). Work 
performed by Whitman Richards and his colleagues has shown that creation of a 
“shared knowledge structure”, i.e., a socially shared set of relations among 
preference alternatives, greatly increases the likelihood of a stable preference 
ordering (Richards et al. 2002). This suggests that the creation of a shared 
interpretation of the data representing a given system under analysis is critical for 
the committee to reach some kind of agreement, even in the absence of common 
preferences. Even without definitive data, committee members from the same 
specialty or discipline might share such an interpretation a priori due to commonly 
held assumption, beliefs and training (Douglas 1986). Furthermore, as a 
committee becomes more diverse, we would expect more possible interpretations 
to become available. In the absence of a shared interpretation the committee 
might be unable to agree – this should be particularly true when there are multiple 
possible interpretations and the data is sufficiently ambiguous to rule out few of 
them (March 1994). Furthermore, very complex systems may be most likely to 
lend themselves to multiple viable interpretations. In the absence of clear 
communication (e.g., learning across disciplinary boundaries), we should expect a 
tradeoff between a panel’s diversity and its capacity to reach consensus. If 
communication is flawless, i.e., learning always occurs, agent-based modeling 
work by Scott Page has shown that, a diverse group that is individually less expert 
will outperform a homogeneous group of individuals who are each more expert 
(Page 2008). This is because each expert in the diverse group can bring a different 
set of perspectives and heuristics to bear upon solving a common problem. Once 
  31 
that expert has reached his/her local optimum, another expert takes over. 
Underlying Page’s model is an assumption that there exists a global optimum for 
all decision-makers. This assumption provides a domain restriction in the sense of 
Arrow’s theorem that is consistent with the notion of an empirical reality. The 
assumption of perfect communication among committee members further 
supports this shared outcome; nevertheless, it is not always realistic. Page’s work 
suggests that, if useful communication can be established in committees, we 
might expect better outcomes. We therefore turn to the empirical social 
psychology literature for insight into communication patterns in small groups. 
Social Psychology 
One of the foundational researchers in social psychology, Leon Festinger, 
outlined a theory of social comparison processes based upon the notion that 
individuals within a small-group setting constantly compare their performance 
with other group members (Festinger 1954). These comparisons are based on 
social and physical comparisons that depend on meeting context, e.g., 
demonstrated expertise in a committee meeting. The implication is that similar 
individuals may be driven to behave in a way that emphasizes their value to the 
group. As a particular trait or opinion becomes elevated in importance, there is a 
“pressure toward uniformity”, when group members, in trying to demonstrate 
their value, become less willing to deviate from the opinions expressed by their 
peers. This is one explanation for the phenomenon commonly known as 
“groupthink”. Festinger’s theory has implications for expert committees because 
it suggests that individual members might not be willing to reveal important 
information if it would lead them to draw a conclusion differing from that 
espoused by the majority. Festinger further noted that social comparisons 
decreased in importance as similarity decreased between group members. This 
indicates a second benefit of diversity, suggesting that there are ways in which 
diversity promotes, rather than inhibits, communication. 
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Festinger’s theory does not consider actual expertise and provides no information 
regarding whether it is equally plausible that committee members might converge 
on a correct interpretation of the data as on an incorrect one. Thus, we might ask 
the circumstances under which a panel that does reach consensus is likely to 
achieve the correct outcome. Experiments run by Bottger (1984) suggest that a 
distinction can be made between actual expertise and perceived influence. Using a 
simulated NASA mission, Bottger found that group members were most 
influenced by the correct statements of panel members – experts were not 
ignored. On the other hand, when asked to rate which group member was the 
most influential, other group members frequently identified those who spoke 
most often. Bottger concluded that groups often do not attribute influence 
correctly to their members. Furthermore, groups make the best decisions when 
actual expertise and perceived influence (i.e., air-time) covary. In the absence of 
this covariance, actual experts do not have the opportunity to contribute their 
useful knowledge. In other words, experts must be given the opportunity, and 
inclination, to express their views. Bottger’s findings supplement Festinger’s 
theory by providing information about task performance, while emphasizing the 
importance of focusing group efforts in the right direction. 
A much referenced paper by Stasser and Titus (1985) showed that in situations in 
which individual students possessed different information regarding a group 
decision, conversation and recall were both dominated by shared information – 
i.e., group members tended to discuss information that everyone else already 
knew. The implications of this result for group decision-making suggested that 
specialized information, e.g., due to expertise, was unlikely to be shared, thus 
resulting in an outcome biased towards shared information. Not only did 
discussion fail to promote information exchange, it succeeded in promoting a 
biased viewpoint. Stasser and Titus (1987) confirmed this result in a second 
experiment which showed that unless group members shared very little 
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information to begin with (i.e., had very diverse information sets), shared 
information dominated the discussion and perpetuated the associated bias, even 
though individual group members had access to more information that 
contradicted the group’s decision. This suggests that group diversity might lead to 
better communication. Stasser (1988) explained this result with a computational 
model, called “DISCUSS” which posited that individual group members sampled 
information items uniformly. Shared information was much more likely to be 
discussed simply because each group member had access to it. Using the 
DISCUSS model, Stasser showed that no explicit bias was necessary in order to 
explain his earlier results – i.e., group members did not have to behave 
strategically to create groupthink. In a second paper Stasser (1992) used 
DISCUSS to show that increasing the salience (i.e., probability of discussion) for 
an unshared item did not significantly change the probability of that item’s being 
mentioned except for very small groups (four members or fewer). The results 
presented by Stasser and Titus would seem to suggest that learning among group 
members is unlikely, even in the absence of the social comparison processes 
identified by Festinger.   
One major limitation of the early work of Stasser and Titus is its empirical 
reliance on samples of undergraduate students. In particular, this literature suffers 
from a problem of external validity. Although decision-makers are not assumed 
to be homogeneous as in the rational choice literature, they only differ in the 
information in which they possess. The experimentally-controlled knowledge 
shared among groups of undergraduates does not constitute domain expertise of 
the sort that we would expect among committees of technical experts. This 
suggests that the generalization of these findings to real-world scenarios might 
not hold. This motivates the need for an analysis of actual group decisions by 
technical experts, rather than experiments run on groups of students. 
Furthermore, no group member is aware of the knowledge possessed by other 
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members. A seminal paper by Wegner (1987) introduced the concept of 
“transactive memory” – the notion that a group requires meta-knowledge in 
order to perform efficiently. Group members must know who else in the group 
holds what knowledge. When transactive memory is present, group members are 
able to assign specialists appropriately and learn from one another. It stands to 
reason that this capacity would be of particular value on a committee of technical 
experts. Indeed, even when groups of students were tested, Stasser et al. (1995) 
found that the public assignment of expert roles led to the sharing of otherwise 
unshared information. Stasser et al. attributed the success of their scheme to a 
“cognitive division of labor” of the sort described by Wegner. This paper 
overturned the probabilistic conception of information sharing found in (Stasser 
1992), but did not tender a new computational model to explain it. It is 
interesting that the findings of Stasser et al. (1995) are consistent with Festinger’s 
social comparison theory – in particular, individuals who have publicly recognized 
expert roles may be perceived, and may perceive themselves, as different from 
other panel members. This would decrease the strength of their “pressure toward 
uniformity”. It further suggests that that, on expert committees, each expert 
should be assigned a public role consistent with the knowledge that that expert is 
expected to convey. Although decision-making groups might be ad hoc, the roles 
of their members should not be. It seems possible that the association of experts 
with known specialties may provide this function in real groups. For example, 
public knowledge of the biographies of other panel members would promote 
meta-knowledge of the sort described by Wegner. 
Acknowledging the external validity problems inherent in generalizing from 
laboratory conditions to real-world expert committees, the findings of Stasser et 
al. (1995) are encouraging if the expertise necessary to solve a problem is known. 
In cases of deeper uncertainty where there is no objective standard of expertise, a 
group might still be able to reach a consensus. Kameda et al. (1997) show that the 
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key to this is “cognitive centrality,”  a concept related to breadth of expertise. A 
group member is cognitively central if they share at least one information item 
with many other group members. This implies that their knowledge is socially 
validated. Such group members come to be viewed as credible sources of 
expertise by others, thereby creating an effect very similar to pre-existing meta-
knowledge. Kameda et al. showed that because cognitively central members 
possess more shared information, they are more often able to change the 
preferences of their peers. They are also more resistant to preference change 
under influence from others. The relation between shared information and 
perceived expertise is further confirmed by Winquist and Larson (1998) who 
propose a dual-process model in which individuals discuss shared information so 
as to build their perceived expertise, whereas changes in actual preference only 
occur as a result of discussion of unshared information. This finding mirrors that 
of (Bottger 1984) with perceived expertise corresponding to the discussion of 
shared knowledge and actual influence corresponding to the discussion of 
unshared knowledge. Thomas-Hunt et al. (2003) suggest that this dynamic might 
also be linked to social validation with their experiments showing that socially 
connected members tend to focus more on shared information, whereas socially 
isolated members tend to focus more on unshared information. Furthermore, 
socially-connected group members evaluated the contributions of others 
positively when they followed this scheme and negatively otherwise. Although 
actual influence and perceived expertise are separate, it seems that concerns about 
social validation in small groups may cause perceived expertise to drive individual 
behavior. These results also tend to confirm Festinger’s social-comparison theory 
in that individuals are more likely to mention a shared topic if other, comparable, 
group members have done so. The implication for committees of experts is that, 
when possible, clear roles should be assigned to committee members so as to 
avoid these effects. In the absence of clear knowledge regarding which sources of 
expertise are appropriate for decision-making (e.g., under conditions of high 
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ambiguity), group members with a breadth of expertise, able to validate the 
knowledge of others via the expression of shared information, are likely to serve a 
key role. Shared information, therefore, serves a similar role as a “shared 
knowledge structure” (Richards et al. 2002). This suggests that breadth of 
expertise might be particularly valuable under conditions of ambiguity because it 
might enable more knowledge sharing to a wider population. If group members 
are very specialized, they will be unable to communicate with one another. On 
the other hand, if a group member can communicate across specialties, deeper 
information that was otherwise unshared might be shared after the broad expert 
first mentions it. Furthermore, the broad member’s expertise is recognized by 
other group members, giving him/her significant influence. However, if there are 
too many group members that are too broad, there is likely to be a large amount 
of shared information. This may create an incentive for these members to focus 
on the information that they share in common at the expense of the valuable 
unshared information that they might otherwise elicit from other group members 
who possess a depth, rather than a breadth, of expertise.  
Sociology of Small Groups 
We note that certain members are more likely to speak than are other members. 
A cognitively-central member of a group will likely be setting the agenda, 
although this might occur through a focus on knowledge that is already shared. 
Ideally, an expert would identify and discuss relevant topics and issues, and 
members who are less expert would follow. If the members who utilize the most 
air-time are not experts, it not impossible that the necessary expertise might not 
be revealed. Within the literature on the sociology of small groups, propensity to 
speak is commonly referred to as “status”. Given Bottger‘s finding that perceived 
and actual expertise must covary in order to generate a well-informed meeting 
outcome, a deeper understanding of the determinants of status would be 
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enlightening. We therefore turn to the literature on the sociology of small groups 
in order to better understand status effects in expert committees.  
Expectation States 
Foundational work by Báles et al. (1954) found that unstructured small groups 
(three to ten people) consistently generated hierarchies among group members.  
This finding was robust across a range of domains and groups. This manifested 
as a strict ranking where the person at the top of the hierarchy spoke most often 
and was most often addressed by others. The next person was ranked second in 
terms of his/her total number of utterances generated and received, etc. This 
finding is quite robust within the sociology literature, and perhaps reflects the 
distribution of perceived influence as in Bottger (1984). If such is the case, then 
actual expertise should be made to covary with these characteristics through the 
institution of procedures that embody this perceived expertise. This raises the 
question of how to determine a priori the hierarchy that seems to emerge 
organically in a small group. Hare and Bales (1963) found that status is often 
correlated with physical location in a group, such that members who are central 
display a higher propensity to speak, and that members who are physically distant 
will be less likely to interact. Furthermore, personality testing showed that when 
seats were not assigned, more dominant personalities tended to choose more 
central seating locations. Such results suggest that attention paid pre-meeting to 
procedural variables, such as seating location, could strongly impact on the 
information that is shared and, consequently, on the ability of the panel to 
successfully pool information. 
Other research within sociology has found that the status hierarchies identified 
above are associated with the personal attributes of speakers, including their age, 
race, and gender. In a foundational paper for what came to be known as the 
“expectation states” paradigm in small group research, Berger et al. (1972) 
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provided an extensive overview of the literature on status characteristics in small 
groups, and then proposed a theory to account for it. Berger et al. propose status 
as an explanatory variable which determines “…evaluations of and performance-
expectations for group members and hence the distribution of participation, 
influence, and prestige.” (Berger et al. 1972). Furthermore, Berger et al follow 
Festinger in noting that “a status characteristic becomes relevant in all situations 
except when it is culturally known to be irrelevant” (Berger et al. 1972). Status is 
therefore proposed as an abstract hidden variable which explains the hierarchies 
identified by Báles et al. Skvoretz (1981) extends expectations states theory with a 
mathematical formulation of this concept based upon data from a psychiatric 
hospital. He identifies two dimensions of status – namely, position in the hospital 
hierarchy and clinical competence. It is interesting that, in this context, the two 
dimensions of status are unrelated to age, race and gender, as specified by Berger 
et al., and are instead related to expertise. Recognizing that external social 
relations often contribute to the formation of status hierarchies within groups, 
Fararo and Skvoretz (1986) introduced “E-state structuralism” – a mathematical 
synthesis of the expectation states literature outlined above and the structuralism 
of the social network literature in order to explain the change over time of 
dominance relations in small groups, including groups of animals. Smith-Lovin et 
al. (1986) tested Skvoretz’s (1981) mathematical formulation and found that it did 
not explain the participation rates of six-person task oriented groups of 
undergraduates that were explicitly designed to vary along the dimension of 
gender. This is because they found a large degree of variation within gender 
groups. They proposed a two-dimensional refined model that first segmented 
each group by gender and then, within each gender, explained status 
characteristics using Skvoretz’s approach. Skvoretz (1988) further tested this 
finding by systematically varying the gender composition of six-person groups, 
finding that none of his models sufficiently explained his data. These results 
would seem to indicate the importance of gender as a status characteristic in small 
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groups. Fişek et al. (1991) reviewed the data collected by Skvoretz (1988) and 
Smith-Lovin et al. (1986), noting an “undeniable gender effect” and introduced a 
mathematical model based upon expectation-states theory and the presence of 
external status characteristics. Nevertheless, it is important to note that Smith-
Lovin et al. (1986) did not examine groups of experts as did Skvoretz (1981). 
Indeed, there seemed to be little else that could differentiate these undergraduates 
from one another since all other potential status characteristics were controlled 
for. These results suggest that, only in the absence of an existing hierarchy, such 
as that defined by the social structure of a hospital, or by mutually recognized 
expertise, might gender be an adequate explanatory variable. This interpretation is 
consistent with Festinger’s notion that group members will differentiate 
themselves on the basis of characteristics that are relevant to the task at hand 
(1954). 
Conversation Analysis 
Parallel to the expectation-states literature is conversation analysis – a tradition 
that traces its roots to the ethnomethodology of Garfinkel (e.g., 1984), the 
observations of Goffman (e.g., 1981) and the work of Sacks, Schegloff and 
Jefferson (e.g., 1974) and is focused on generating a qualitative understanding of 
how the unspoken rules of conversation drive the content communicated. 
Maynard (1980) identifies topics as a key feature of conversations, arguing that 
changes in topic are non-random occurrences that can be related to the structure 
of the group that is discussing them. Okamoto and Smith-Lovin (2001) extend 
the insights of conversation analysis into the expectation states literature, with a 
focus on how status characteristics, of the sort identified above, impact on an 
individual’s capacity to change the topic of conversation. Gibson (2003) notes 
that because only one person can generally speak at a time, external status 
characteristics manifest in conversation as participation-shifts and often as topic 
shifts. Gibson (2005) verifies this statistically, by linking network structure to 
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participation shifts. This shows a mechanism by which external status 
characteristics impact upon what is discussed, and is perhaps the first quantitative 
result in the conversation analysis tradition. These results suggest that an analysis 
of the speech of committee member participants might provide some deep 
insight into the dynamics of group decision-making, even among committees of 
experts.  
Appreciative Approaches  
The above literature still assumes that group members can perfectly understand 
information that has been communicated, regardless of its source. If such is the 
case, then a correct structuring of a given committee should, as Page predicts, 
lead to selection of the best solution to the problem being studied given the 
information available. Nevertheless, literature relating language and culture 
suggests otherwise. This literature notes that language, beyond being simply a 
means of exchanging information, is also an expression of identity. This idea 
began as a philosophical concept, perhaps most strongly connected with the 
German Idealists (von Herder 2002/1767, von Humboldt 1997/1820), who 
argued that national language both reflects culture and shapes patterns of 
thought. According to this tradition, different national languages represent 
different world-views that are incommensurable. The implication is that it is 
impossible to truly translate from one language to another – some element of the 
original concept must be lost, a question of great interest to literary criticism (e.g., 
Benjamin 1969; Eco and McEwen 2001). This idea was formalized within 
linguistics as the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis – the notion that linguistic structure and 
usage places limits on the cognition of its users (Sapir and Mandelbaum 1947; 
Whorf et al. 1998). Although the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis had fallen out of favor 
in linguistics, it has begun to be rehabilitated by the work of Lera Boroditsky – a 
cognitive scientist who has tested the effects of Chinese and English language on 
cognition (Boroditsky 2002). 
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Work within the anthropology and Science, Technology and Society (STS) 
literatures extends this notion to the realms of professional and institutional 
cultures. In particular, the penetrating analyses of Mary Douglas note that group 
membership may affect perception of data (Douglas 1986). Membership is 
conferred upon those individuals who group features of the world into categories 
that are consistent with group norms. This is reflective of a wider principle in 
anthropology that different professional or institutional cultures will selectively 
direct individuals’ attention to the elements that are salient within their group 
structures. Among technical experts, this is reflected in the fact that each specialty 
possesses its own unique language and jargon, which carries with it an implicit 
scheme for categorizing perceived phenomena (Brown 1986). On the other hand, 
an outsider to the group, who is unfamiliar with the jargon used, may be unable 
to understand the discourse. This is because the specific jargon refers to 
commonly held sensory and social experiences that a member of another 
institution is unlikely to have directly encountered. This is particularly true in 
medical and academic disciplines, where conceptual precision is required to 
communicate within the specialty. One could argue that just as Whorf’s Eskimo 
has many different words for snow, and therefore a deeper capacity to categorize 
these types, a technical specialist has jargon that is specific to their specialty and, 
most importantly, to their experience. Communicating this experience is a classic 
dilemma in the knowledge management literature, largely because many of the 
important elements are tacit (Polanyi 1958; Nonaka et al. 2000). Nelson notes the 
importance of written and oral language as a means of encapsulating and 
transferring tacit knowledge (Nelson 2005). On the other hand, an outsider to the 
institution may be unable to understand the discourse because they lack the 
underlying shared experience. The STS literature extends this notion by noting 
that language is used as a cognitive mechanism to delineate professional 
boundaries. This directs the attention of experts within a specialty toward a given 
interpretation of a problem that is consistent with that expert’s training, while 
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simultaneously directing that attention away from other possible interpretations 
(Cohn 1987; Mulkay et al. 1987; Rapp 2000; Winner 1986). The same groups that 
drive selective perception and word choice also confer a sense of identity. March 
notes the dialectic between decision-making as rational choice based on a 
consequentialist pursuit of preferences and identity-based rule-following, 
ultimately noting that each viewpoint supplements the other, particularly under 
conditions of low ambiguity when roles are clear (March 1994).  We may 
therefore expect preferences to be correlated with group membership and, by 
extension, its associated jargon. Furthermore, this literature suggests that even 
when each speaker is given the appropriate amount of time to discuss their 
viewpoints, a listener might have trouble understanding or assimilating all of the 
implications of the information being shared. Communication within a group 
should be relatively easy, whereas communication across groups may be more 
difficult. This strongly motivates the presence of at least one interdisciplinary 
panel member who can act as a translator so as to be able to assimilate 
information from members of other specialties, and as a teacher, so as to be able 
to communicate with members of the same specialty.  
Strategic Behavior within Groups 
In addition to the difficulties in comprehension that might exist across group 
boundaries, literature in political science and STS suggests that group loyalty 
could possibly lead individuals to focus on group goals over those of the 
committee as a whole. Casting “organization [as] the mobilization of bias”, (Elder 
& Cobb 1983) recognizes institution-specific symbolism in language, noting that 
the choice of terminology in defining a problem may be seen as a means of 
mobilizing support. Furthermore, the linguistic definition of a problem dictates, 
to some extent, its solution. Choosing to use specialized technical words serves to 
narrow the range of subjective meaning of otherwise ambiguous terminology 
(such as “safety” or “efficacy” in FDA’s context) thereby implicitly redefining the 
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problem according to a given speaker’s particular interest. This can be viewed as 
an example of “agenda-setting” behavior, which is common in political discourse. 
Here, the major concerns are related to framing and issue-redefinition (Cobb and 
Elder 1983). In the worst case, if a given interpretation of data is favored by one 
group over another, that group may try to promote a particular interpretation 
rather than attempting to learn from one another. This worst-case scenario would 
be an example of contested boundaries among groups of experts in science policy 
(Jasanoff 1987). However, this sort of behavior need not be strategic among 
committees of experts and could instead be a way of expressing the knowledge 
inherent in a particular specialty’s training scheme. Experts may try to learn from 
one another even though they state their positions. Learning could become a 
particularly difficult problem under conditions of ambiguity (March 1994; 
Lawson 2008). Furthermore, the more a given pair of interpretations are equally 
plausible, the more likely that the committee will be unable to rule one of them 
out, potentially leading to a preferential selection according to group membership. 
In such a case, learning may not occur – instead the majority group within the 
committee may decide policy. Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) further note that 
different individuals are likely to have different values. Under conditions in which 
group norms are clear, these values may not be evident. March notes that under 
conditions of ambiguity, values (e.g., sacred values, cf. Tetlock 2003) become 
more important in driving behavior (March 1994). Even if individuals share the 
same perspective, agreement on an appropriate course of action may be unlikely 
if questions of values or identity (e.g., ethical or other moral dilemmas) are 
involved. This last point is particularly important for complex engineering 
systems, in which lives and livelihood frequently depend on the correct operation 
of the system. 
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C h a p t e r  3  
CASE STUDY: FDA ADVISORY PANELS 
תואמטהו תורהטה תונוממ יניד ,לודגה ןמ ןיליחתמ ;תושפנ ינידו , ןמ ןיליחתמ
.דצה 
“…in legal matters involving money, and ritual purity and impurity, we begin 
with [the opinion of] the greatest [of the judges]; whereas in legal matters 
involving capital charges, we begin with [the opinion of] those on the side 
[benches]…” 
– Mishna Sanhedrin 32a, trans. Hebrew. 
“According to the Oral Tradition, we learned that with regard to cases 
involving capital punishment, we do not ask the judge of the highest stature to 
render judgment first, lest the remainder rely on his opinion and not see 
themselves as worthy to argue against him. Instead, every judge must state 
what appears to him, according to his own opinion.”  
– Rabbi Moshe ben Maimon (Moses Maimonides), b. ca. 1137 – d. 1204, 
Hilchot Sanhedrin V'HaOnshin Hamesurim Lahem, (The Laws of the Courts and the 
Penalties placed under their Jurisdiction), Chapter 10, Par. 6, trans. Hebrew, Rabbi S. Yaffe, 
on the impact of procedure in group decision-making 
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The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) advisory panel meetings are a 
committee evaluation of a complex engineered system involving different 
specialties. Furthermore, transcripts of these meetings are generated by a court-
recorder and are available to the public as stipulated by the American Federal 
Advisory Committee Act. The transcripts of these panel meetings therefore 
provide a rich data source from which we may study technical decision making by 
committees of experts (Sherman 2004). Decisions made by technical expert 
committees in the FDA are analogous to those that must be made by committees 
of technical experts within other complex engineered systems. As explained 
above, different experts may possess varying interpretations of data, potentially 
leading to alternate, but equally legitimate, readings of uncertain evidence. 
Reaching a design decision requires that information from these different 
specialties be aggregated in some way. Ideally, the ultimate decision would be 
well-informed by all perspectives in the room.  
Multi-Stakeholder Environment 
As in a decision involving multiple stakeholders in a complex engineered system, 
the FDA decision-making process is embedded in a policy environment. The task 
of approving medical devices for the US market falls to the Food and Drug 
Administration’s Center for Devices and Radiological Health (CDRH). CDRH 
classifies each device into one of the classes, grouped by risk (see Figure 1).  










Class I Devices: Compliance with GMP required
Example: Surgical Gloves





Figure 1: Medical devices are classified 
into three categories based upon risk 
to the patient. PMA = Pre-Market 
Approval; GMP = Good 
Manufacturing Practices. 
Figure 2, sourced from (Maisel 2004), provides an overview of the process by 
which a device is reviewed for approval by CDRH.  
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Figure 2: Medical devices are classified 
into three categories based upon risk 
to the patient. Diagram sourced from 
(Maisel 2004). 
The grant of a 510(k) or Pre-Market Approval (PMA) by the FDA allows a 
device to be marketed in the United States. These approvals often act as de facto 
monopolies for the device involved because any competitor must demonstrate 
additional safety or efficacy of the new device as compared to the initial baseline 
in order to receive approval. Advisory panels review devices “as needed” 
(Parisian 2001).  Devices brought to committees for review are generally those 
which the FDA does not have the “in-house expertise” to evaluate. As such, the 
devices under evaluation by the committees are likely to be the most radical 
innovations facing medical practice, and those facing the most uncertainty. 
Furthermore, advisory panel members are “by definition, the world’s experts who 
are engaged in cutting-edge bench science, clinical research and independent 
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consulting work” (Sherman 2004). Advisory panels therefore serve to bring 
needed expert knowledge and political credibility with industry and consumer 
advocate groups to the FDA device approval process. In practice, a very small 
proportion of all devices submitted to FDA for approval are reviewed by the 
panel. Audience members will include representatives of the media, consumer 
advocate groups, the financial community, and competitor companies, all of 
whom are looking for information regarding how the medical device might 
perform on the market (Pines 2002). Therefore, panel recommendations and the 
judgments and statements of individual members carry significant weight both 
inside and outside the FDA.  
Panel Procedures 
A typical FDA advisory panel meeting follows a number of sequential procedural 
steps, as follows: 
1. Introduction and Conflict of Interest Statement 
In this part of the meeting, each panel member is introduced and the Executive 
Secretary reads a statement regarding the degree and source (sponsor or 
competitor) of a given panel member’s potential financial conflict of interest. 
Panel members are seated at a U-shaped or V-shaped table with the committee 
chair located at the apex. A representation of this arrangement is shown in Figure 
3 (FDA 1994). 
























Figure 3: Standard Layout for FDA 
CDRH Advisory Panel Meeting. 
2. First Open Public Hearing 
In this stage, any member of the public can make a presentation to the panel. 
3. Sponsor Presentation 
In this stage, the device sponsor (usually a medical device company) presents 
their review of clinical trial results to the panel. Individual panel members may 
ask questions at the discretion of the committee chair.  
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4. FDA Presentation 
In this stage, the FDA review team presents their review of clinical trial results to 
the panel. Individual panel members may ask questions at the discretion of the 
committee chair. 
5. Panel Questions  
In this stage, the panel members ask questions to the sponsor and FDA 
representatives. The phase will often begin with presentations by one or two 
panel lead reviewers, followed by questions asked by panel members at the 
discretion of the chair. In practice, the committee chair typically chooses one 
person to begin asking questions (e.g., sitting adjacent to a lead reviewer, or sitting 
at one end of the table). Other panel members proceed to ask questions in order 
around the table. 
6. Open Discussion 
After each panel member has had an opportunity to ask questions of the FDA 
and sponsor, there is an open discussion session in which each panel member 
may ask additional questions and discuss the device application. This discussion is 
often guided by questions asked to the panel by the FDA Executive Secretary 
regarding recommendations for approval. 
7. Open Public Hearing  
A second open public hearing is held to allow members from the public to speak.  
8. Panel vote 
Panel members move for approval, approval with conditions, or non-approval of 
a device. Although panel members might bargain over which conditions of 
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approval to include, this often occurs implicitly during panel discussion. Panel 
members then vote in an order determined by the executive secretary (i.e., 
sequentially or simultaneously). Finally, panel members express their reasons for 
their votes. The committee chair then adjourns the meeting. The meeting 
typically has breaks for lunch between stages three and four or between stages 
four and five. In addition, the committee chair can call for a coffee or restroom 
break at his/her discretion. 
Within the health-care domain, there has been a movement towards “evidence-
based medicine” (Sackett et al. 1996). Although aimed at integrating clinical 
expertise with experimental findings, this movement has often been interpreted 
by practitioners as privileging population-level experimental results over the 
expertise of individual practitioners. It is in response to this narrow definition that 
Gelijns et al. (2005) note that decisions cannot be strictly “evidence-based” for 
the following reasons: 
1. A given data-set may be interpreted differently by different experts, 
especially in the presence of high uncertainty. Unless these experts can 
learn from one another, good decision-making might be impaired. 
2. Patterns of technological change are difficult to predict, particularly when 
innovations are ultimately used for different purposes than originally 
intended. 
3. Even in the case of clear evidence, decision-makers may disagree on its 
implications due to differing value systems. 
These are all reasons why expertise must be integrated with evidence; not 
replaced by it. Although referring to health care, these caveats apply equally to 
any engineering system. Unless experts can learn from one another, good 
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decision-making will be impaired. This suggests that a device’s determination as 
safe or efficacious depends strongly on factors that are not within the purview of 
“evidence-based” decision-making, narrowly defined.. Douglas (1986) argues that 
these are largely shaped by the perceptions, and hence, the knowledge and 
expertise, of risk assessors. Groups that might impact decision-making include 
membership in a particular profession, specialty, or bureaucratic organization. 
When combined, the diversity of viewpoints arising from these different groups 
may lead to a better decision outcome than that reached by one limited 
interpretation of the evidence. 
Collaborative Technical Decision-Making in the FDA 
As in any complex engineered system, technical experts in the FDA may not have 
an explicitly political aim. Nevertheless, their decisions may be perceived as 
biased by those who believe they would have made a different decision in their 
place. Although FDA advisory committees are aimed at producing “evidence-
based” recommendations, differential interpretation of the evidence allows room 
for debate, and concomitant accusations of bias. Panel members’ professional 
experiences might allow for intuition that can seem to go against the indications 
shown by the data. (Friedman 1978) expressed a concern that this constitutes a 
form of “specialty bias,” especially when multiple medical specialties are involved. 
On the other hand, this view presupposes that a reading of the data that is 
entirely uninformed by past experience is best, which obviates the role of 
expertise in advisory panel decision making. A distinction must be drawn 
between decision-making that is based on evidence and decision-making that is 
driven by one “orthodox” reading of the evidence. Others argue that financial 
conflicts of interest should be mitigated in advisory panels. On the other hand, a 
prominent study recently found only a minor correlation between conflict of 
interest and voting patterns with no actual effect on device approval (Lurie et al 
2006).   
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Data availability  
One of the primary advantages to using the FDA Advisory Panels as a case study 
is the availability of data. There are 20 different panels whose transcripts are 
recorded over a period of ten years. This leads to the possibility of examining 
hundreds of committee meetings – a sufficiently large number that generalizable 
findings may be inferred. If the study were to expand to include the drug-
approval committees within the FDA, the number of cases upon which we could 
draw would number in the thousands1. Furthermore, all panel transcripts are 
transcribed by a court-recorder, ensuring a standard of quality that is admissible 
in a court of law. 
The empirical analysis mentioned above requires data in the form of committee 
meeting transcripts. These are often not recorded in textual form, or are 
proprietary to the organization that commissioned the committee. We therefore 
turn to transcripts of expert committee meetings that are a matter of public 
record. The ideal data source must have the following attributes: 
1. Analysis or evaluation of a technological artifact 
2. Participation of multiple experts from different fields or areas of 
specialization 
3. A set of expressed preferences per meeting(such as a voting record) 
4. Multiple meetings, so as to enable statistical significance 
These requirements are met by the Food and Drug Administration’s medical 
device advisory panels. 
                                                 
1 Transcripts of FDA committee meetings are open to the public and located at: 
http://www.fda.gov/AdvisoryCommittees/default.htm 
  
C h a p t e r  4  
METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
ארבדכ ארבא 
Transliteration: “Abra Cadabra.” 
“I will create as I speak”, trans. Aramaic. 
This thesis is aimed at developing a deeper understanding of how communication 
on committees of technical experts impacts upon multi-actor decision-making 
through an analysis of the language used by each speaker in the discussion. The 
most direct way of deepening our understanding is to attempt to cluster speakers 
by the co-occurrence patterns of words in their discourses. In particular, this 
thesis presents an empirical quantitative methodology based upon a 
computational linguistic analysis of meeting transcripts. 
A major challenge to the use of linguistic data for the analysis of social behavior 
on expert committees stems from the strong assumption that such dynamics are 
entirely reflected in language, and that differences in language necessarily indicate 
differences in perception. Another similar concern is absence of data that might 
result if a particular voting member of the committee remains silent or says little. 
Neither can strategic attempts by actors to hide preferences and thereby avoid 
revealing personal information be explicitly captured in this representation. 
Indeed, work by Pentland (2008) has shown that much social signaling occurs 
through body language and vocal dynamics that are not able to be captured in a 
transcript. It should, therefore, be clarified that this thesis does not claim that all 
social dynamics are manifest in language – rather, word-choice provides one 
source of insight into a complex, multi-modal process. The extent and severity of 
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this challenge is mitigated somewhat by the work of Boroditsky (2002, 2003), a 
cognitive scientist who has found evidence to indicate that not only does thought 
express itself through language, but that language use shapes patterns of thought. 
If such is the case, then differential use of language due, for example, to assigned 
roles, may reflect a salient role-based difference between decision-makers that is 
worth studying on its own merits (e.g., Simon 1964).  
The approach presented here may be viewed as an extension of “latent coding” – 
one type of formal content analysis prevalent in the social sciences. The most 
important limitations of latent coding, and other hand-coding methods, are the 
inability to scale to large numbers of documents. This limitation stems from a 
dependence on the coder’s knowledge, leading to inter-rater reliability concerns 
(Neuman 2005). Furthermore, hand-coding is labor-intensive, often requiring that 
teams of several coders be trained. The motivation behind using a computational 
approach is therefore to create a method that is automatic, repeatable and 
consistent. Quinn et al. (2006) provide a compelling justification for the adoption 
of computational text analysis techniques by social scientists. Furthermore, a 
computational method requires that the assumptions underlying the application 
of the methodology presented here are explicit, which enables a cumulative 
research paradigm. The work presented here therefore fits squarely in the 
tradition of statistical analysis of texts such as Network Text Analysis (Roberts 
1997). Prominent examples in this tradition include cognitive mapping (Axelrod 
1976) – a non-computational method for analyzing relations among causal 
structures, AutoMap (Carley 1992; Carley 1997; Diesner and Carley 2004) – a 
computational method currently under development, for extracting, analyzing 
and comparing mental models from texts based upon inferred and pre-defined 
conceptual categories, and Centering Resonance Analysis (Corman et al. 2002) – a 
method designed to identify and link important words within a discourse. Unlike 
these methods, in which the dominant paradigm is the representation of relations 
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among concepts, the ultimate goal of the method presented here is the analysis of 
relations among individual panel members.  
Chapter Outline 
We take the approach that a method which would accomplish the goals described 
above should aim for simplicity without being overly reductive. For example, one 
might simply count the number of each type of word that a particular speaker 
uses. This is a common approach favored by many users of latent coding 
methods. Due to the context-specific nature of the meetings analyzed, it is 
difficult to identify, a priori, words that might be important and thus, it is difficult 
to know which words to count or compare. We therefore begin our analysis with 
a method known as “Latent Semantic Analysis” (LSA), a natural language 
processing tool which was developed for purposes of information retrieval and 
topic grouping (Deerwester et al. 1990; Landauer et al. 1998). LSA was chosen 
because of its ability to identify a reduced number of putative concepts within a 
corpus. Two speakers who share similar concepts might therefore be related in 
some fashion. A preliminary study was performed with the goal of exploring the 
applicability of LSA to the problem space outlined above. Distributional 
assumptions underlying the application of LSA were found to introduce 
limitations that restricted its methodological applicability. These limitations were 
addressed using Latent Dirichlet Allocation (Blei, Ng, et al. 2003), a probabilistic 
model that circumvents many of the distributional assumptions underlying LSA. 
In particular, a variant of LDA, known as the Author-Topic (AT) model (Rosen-
Zvi et al., 2004) was used, because of its ability to aggregate data from multiple 
speakers. For each transcript, the AT model was used to identify topics of interest 
to each speaker with the ultimate goal of constructing multiple probabilistic social 
affiliation network among topics. These networks were then aggregated to 
generate a representation of each meeting. Finally, for each meeting, temporal 
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information was incorporated. The final output is a directed graph, which may be 
interpreted as representing the flow of communication and influence within a 
given panel meeting. 
Latent Semantic Analysis 
One of the simplest computational approaches for analyzing terminology in 
context, is Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA) – a natural language processing tool 
which was developed for purposes of information retrieval and topic grouping 
(Deerwester et al. 1990; Landauer et al. 1998). LSA was initially created to address 
the issue of synonymy in information retrieval. Synonymy refers to the use of 
different words to represent the same concept (e.g., spice and seasoning). LSA 
addresses the synonymy issue through the use of Singular Value Decomposition 
(SVD), a technique from linear algebra that is aimed at determining a set of 
mutually orthogonal dimensions which describe the variance within a given set of 
data. When text data are analyzed, SVD tends to associate together words that 
have similar meanings. This is due to the empirical fact that words which have 
similar meanings tend to appear within the same contexts; i.e., words with similar 
meanings will co-occur either with each other or with the same sets of words. For 
example, one might encounter the following pair of sentences: 
d1: Pepper and salt add seasoning to the salad. 
d2: Pepper and salt are the two spices found most often in American restaurants. 
These two sentences both contain the words “pepper” and “salt”. From a brief 
overview of both documents, we would be able to infer that pepper and salt are 
seasonings (as in the first document), and that pepper and salt are spices. We 
would like to be able to infer that spices are seasonings.  
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The LSA Algorithm 
Consider a corpus of documents, D, containing n documents d1…dn. Consider, as 
well, the union of all words over all documents, W. Suppose there are m>n 
words, w1…wm. We may therefore construct a “word-document matrix”, X, with 
dimensions m x n, where each element in the matrix, xjk, consists of a frequency 
count of the number of times word j appears in document k.  
We conceive of the original word-document matrix as a “noisy” representation of 
word-word similarity (or document-document similarity). One source of this 
“noise” is the use of multiple words to represent the same concepts. We would 
therefore like to recover the original concepts implicit (or latent) in each word. 
Singular value decomposition with dimensionality reduction is a commonly used 
algorithm for the reduction of statistical noise. Using the above analogy, LSA 
performs noise reduction on the original word-document matrix. 
The Singular Value Theorem in linear algebra states that any matrix may be 
represented as the product of three matrices, X = W S DT, where X is the word-
document matrix derived above. In this case, W is an m x m matrix of singular 
unit vectors, each of which are, by definition, mutually orthogonal.  Each of these 
singular vectors corresponds to a word. Similarly, D is an n x n matrix of mutually 
orthogonal singular unit vectors. Each of the singular vectors in D corresponds 
to a document. Finally, S is an m x m diagonal matrix of decreasing, non-negative 
singular values, with each element corresponding to a linear combination of 
weights associated with each singular vector.  
Without loss of generality, let r be the rank of X. In order to reduce the noise in 
X, we would like to reduce the rank of X such that r’ < r corresponds to the 
number of latent concepts within the corpus. We therefore set the smallest (r-r’) 
singular values to 0, generating S’. The value of r’ must be chosen by the user, 
although values of r’ between 100-300 seem to work well for information retrieval 
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purposes (Landauer et al. 1998). The resulting matrix, X’ = W S’ DT , is a rank r’ 
approximation of X that can be represented as having r’ mutually orthogonal 
singular vectors. Words and documents, which were previously represented by 
linear combinations of r mutually orthogonal singular vectors, are now 
represented as linear combinations of r’ mutually orthogonal vectors, such that 
the locations of words and documents in the vector space represented by X’ 
approximate the corresponding locations of words and documents in X in a least-
squares sense. If we were to treat X’ as a Euclidean space, the normalized inner 
product of (i.e., the cosine between) two word-vectors (represented as rows of 
the matrix W S’) can be thought of as the projection of each word upon a set of 
axes, each of which corresponds to a latent concept. Therefore, this value would 
correspond to the two words’ degree of synonymy (or similarity for documents). 
LSA is therefore able to capture higher-order relations between synonymous 
words (e.g., words that do not directly co-occur, but that mutually co-occur with 
a third word as in the spice/seasoning example above).  
LSA Implementation 
LSA was implemented in Python 2.5 and MATLAB. Python 2.5 was used to 
parse an FDA Advisory Panel meeting into a word-document matrix, which was 
then imported into MATLAB. One possible source of measurement error 
includes the existence of various forms of word conjugation (e.g., patient vs. 
patients) that might be classified as different words. In general, syntactic 
information is not captured by the “bag-of-words” representations of corpora 
used in this thesis. The use of stemmer algorithms (such as PyStemmer2) are 
aimed at eliminating some of this error. Finally, frequently-occurring, but non-
content-bearing words (such as “the”, “and”, “a”, etc.,) can skew results. Error 
due to this problem is eliminated through the incorporation of a “stop list”, 
which automatically removes these words. The stop list used for the analyses in 
                                                 
2 Available at: http://sourceforge.net/projects/pystemmer/ 
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this thesis was compiled by the Semantic Indexing Project 
(http://www.knowledgesearch.org) and is shown in Appendix 1. In the LSA 
approach, remaining error associated with non-content-bearing words is managed 
by the use of log-entropy weighting3 (Dumais 1991).  Singular value 
decomposition and log-entropy weighting were executed using built-in MATLAB 
functions, generating an LSA space. Finally specialized functions were written to 
perform the coherence analyses described below. These approaches are typical in 
natural language processing (Manning and Schütze 1999).  
Other applications of LSA have included automated student essay evaluation 
(Landauer and Dumais 1997), measurement of textual coherence (Foltz et al. 
1998), knowledge assessment (Rehder et al. 1998), information visualization 
(Landauer, Laham et al. 2004), the quantitative analysis of design team discourses 
(Dong et al. 2004), and the construction of a theory of human learning and 
cognition (Landauer and Dumais 1997). In particular, Dong (2005) has used LSA 
to study conceptual coherence in design and the process by which members of a 
design team agree upon a common design representation. This work begins by 
extending Dong’s techniques to the realm of advisory committee decision-
making, and is ultimately meant to contribute a data-driven methodology that 
may provide insight into the effects of institutional background on decision-
making for complex engineered devices and systems.  
Committee Textual Coherence as a Metric  
The use of LSA to measure textual coherence can provide insight into the extent 
to which different speakers within an advisory panel meeting are using 
                                                 
3 Log-entropy weighting is applied to a word-document matrix in order to improve its information-retrieval 
performance. This has the effect of emphasizing words that are unique to a given speaker, thereby enabling  
a focus on his/her unique language characteristics. The formula consists of two coefficients: the term 
weight, t, is simply log(1+f), where f is the frequency of a specific word in a given document; the global 
weight, g, is p*log(p), where p is the ratio of times that a specific word appears in a given document to the 
number of times that word appears in all documents. The log-entropy weight is simply t*g.  
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terminology in the same way. Coherence analysis was first implemented in (Foltz 
et al. 1998), and extended to design teams in (Dong 2005). In a design team, 
designers must be “on the same page”. This means that they must be speaking in 
words that are sufficiently similar as to be comprehensible to each other, i.e., 
speaking similar professional languages. LSA does allow for the analysis of 
relative linguistic homogeneity, thereby enabling a determination of the extent to 
which designers are “on the same page” relative to one another through a 
coherence metric.  
Medical advisory panels may be equivalently viewed as teams (McMullin and 
Whitford 2007). Although they are not designing an artifact, as in Dong’s work, 
such panels must produce a policy recommendation that will have a strong 
impact upon the success or failure of the technical system under review and thus 
have an overall common objective. Our approach is to use LSA to study mutual 
understanding within medical advisory panels by studying the respective 
coherence of one actor as compared to another. Given that committee members 
vote, voting records provide a measurable source of data against which to 
compare LSA performance, a test not available to Dong in his studies of design 
teams. 
Preliminary Results from LSA 
Shown below are the results from a preliminary analysis of a meeting of the 
Circulatory Systems Devices Advisory Panel Meeting held on April 22, 2005 
using LSA. In this panel meeting, the Circulatory System Devices Advisory Panel 
discussed and made recommendations regarding the approval of the “PAS-port”, 
a device aimed at reducing the risk of stroke inherent in coronary artery bypass 
(Maisel 2005). This device was under review for 510(k) approval when its 
predicate device was pulled from the market. This had the effect of prompting 
the FDA to create new requirements for similar devices. Since the predicate 
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device was now invalid, the PAS-Port device was brought to the advisory for 
review despite the fact that the sponsors had initially not planned to execute full-
fledged clinical trials. The device’s sponsors used observational data from two 
clinical trials conducted outside of the United States, and therefore, under 
different conditions than those which might have been required by the FDA had 
they been conducted under an Investigational Device Exemption (IDE) for a 
PMA. As a result, there were several questions regarding the viability of the data 
(and hence, the sponsor’s contention that the device was safe). Among these were 
the following: 
1. The sponsor’s presentation attempted to combine the results of two clinical 
trials conducted under different conditions. Thus, there was a question of 
whether the data could be pooled to yield meaningful results. 
2. Following the failure of the predicate device, the FDA increased the lower 
bound for the confidence interval surrounding a proposed device’s patency 
rate (i.e., the rate at which a vein graft would remain un-blocked). This 
implied that a statistical test with higher power was required. Nevertheless, 
these new requirements occurred after the sponsor had already run the 
clinical trials. 
3. The data were collected outside of the United States, and therefore, were not 
supervised by the FDA. Rather, the studies were designed for European 
clinical trial reviewers. 
4. The device under study was improved between clinical trials, thereby 
leveraging the experience of the designers to improve its safety and efficacy, 
but simultaneously contributing to the non-comparability of the two trials. 
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Examination of Top Five Log-Entropy Words 
In order to determine whether different actors do use substantively different 
terminology, we examined the top five log-entropy-weighted stemmed words for 
each speaker. Table 1 demonstrates the results of this analysis. A qualitative 
analysis of this table shows that different speakers’ unique terminology relates to 
their roles in the meeting. For example, the chairman seems to use largely 
procedural rules, the executive secretary is using words associated with conflict of 
interest regulations, etc.  
Table 1: Listing of  the top five log-
entropy weighted words for each 
speaker. 
Speaker Occupation Word 1 Word 2 Word 3 Word 4 Word 5 
Chairman 'jeff' 'move' 'norm' 'session' 'afternoon' 
Executive Secretary 'waiver' 'compet' 'firm' 'conflict' 'particip' 
FDA 
Representative 'landscap' 'stori' 'krucoff' 'stratifi' 'agenc' 
Cardiologist  'late' 'surrog' 'inpati' 'prevent' 'fitzgibbon' 
Cardiologist 'overt' 'iter' 'concept' 'flesh' 'engin' 
Cardiologist 'ultim' 'lumenolog' 'behavior' 'concord' 'behav' 
Statistician 'variabl' 'henc' 'certainti' 'school' 'weight' 
Cardiac Surgeon 'censor' 'cleveland' 'wider' 'precious' 'obliqu' 
Cardiologist 'draw' 'extrapol' 'feasibl' 'popul' 'electrocardiogram' 
Cardiac Surgeon 'room' 'vote' 'forth' 'esteem' 'variabl' 
Pharmacologist 'gray' '75' 'zone' 'noncompar' 'variat' 
Cardiac Surgeon 'handl' 'stroke' 'calcifi' 'unfortun' 'val' 
Cardiologist 'cath' 'old' 'anybodi' 'struck' 'catheter' 
Cardiac Surgeon 'shower' 'disturb' 'biggest' 'hole' 'clamp' 
Industry 
Representative 'agenc' 'salvag' 'therapeut' 'vice' 'proxima' 
FDA 'feedback' 'track' 'premarket' 'piec' 'cdrh' 
FDA 'gore' 'approv' 'program' 'recommend' 'pma' 
Sponsor CEO 'endotheli' 'japan' 'surfac' 'amount' 'tool' 
Sponsor Clincian 'remain' 'convert' 'literatur' 'sequenti' 'stenosi' 
Sponsor Statistician 'adjust' 'valu' 'strata' '26' 'bucket' 
Sponsor Surgeon 'connector' 'saphen' 'sutur' 'spot' 'endoscop' 
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FDA 'preclin' 'element' 'stainless' 'implant' 'flang' 
FDA 'pivot' 'covari' 'visit' 'intraop' 'itt' 
FDA 'undertaken' 'recruit' 'sutur' 'input' 'pivot' 
FDA 'side' 'ophthalm' 'yue' 'lili' 'variabl' 
Consumer 
Representative 'decreas' 'cool' 'aw' '61' 'deployt' 
 
Cluster Analyses 
Prior to the execution of the Latent Semantic Analysis, individuals’ utterances 
were grouped together into speaker-specific vectors. This was accomplished by 
adding together the vectors for each of their utterances. A k-means clustering 
algorithm was then run on these vectors in an attempt to separate the actors into 
two clusters. This generated clusters that corresponded to advisory panel 
members and FDA or sponsor representatives. Table 2 outlines the results: 
Table 2: "Confusion Matrix" for 
stakeholder cluster analysis. (p = 9.97 
x 10-5; χ2 = 15.14; df = 1) 
 FDA or sponsor reps. Panel Members 
Cluster 1 2 14 
Cluster 2 9 1 
Some meaning might be imputed to these clusters. Cluster 1 is largely made up of 
the Panel Members who can be thought of as “non-partisans” whereas cluster 2 
largely consists of potentially “partisan” FDA or sponsor representatives.  The 
“non-partisan” who was incorrectly classified corresponds to the panel’s 
executive secretary, whose primary role at the end of the meeting was to read 
questions posed by the FDA. On the other hand, the two “partisans” who were 
incorrectly classified were the sponsor’s statistician, who interacted directly with 
the panel, and the FDA representative to the advisory panel, who serves a dual 
role as panel member and whose job it is to oversee the advisory panel 
proceedings.  
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Attempts to separate actors into more clusters resulted in other subdivisions of 
the group which could be explained in terms of combinations of formal roles, 
training (e.g., statisticians, cardiologists, etc.), partisanship, frequency of speech, 
and random assignment due to noise. Often, a clustering algorithm would yield a 
small number (5 or less) of clusters roughly corresponding to identifiable groups, 
with most other clusters assigned randomly or by frequency of speech. Therefore, 
the ability of the cluster analysis to reliably perform fine divisions among panel 
members is questionable.  
Coherence Analysis 
 Following (Dong 2005), an LSA-based coherence analysis of the meeting was 
performed. Figure 4 shows an analysis of the meeting described above. For the 
purposes of this analysis, actors were categorized into four bins: Voting members; 
FDA; Sponsors; and Non-Voting Members. Each time series represents the 
running average of the semantic coherence of a particular group, measured with 
respect to the final semantic coherence of the voting members. Running average 
semantic coherence, c(τ) =cos(θ), where θ is the angle between two vectors s(τ), 
the running average centroid of speaker s at time τ, and v, the centroid of the 










= , where u(t) is the 
location of utterance t in the semantic space, and n(τ) is the number of utterances 
spoken by speaker s at time τ. In this case, each “speaker” is actually a group of 
speakers, constituting the FDA representatives, the voting members, the non-
voting members, and the sponsors.  The sponsor’s coherence with respect to the 
voting members’ final position (the dashed line) drops dramatically around 
utterance number 200, hitting its minimum at utterance number 218, as indicated 
by the large, negative slope for the sponsor’s coherence time-series curve.  Note 
that the FDA’s coherence (the dashed and dotted line) also drops with respect to 
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the voting members. This is likely due to the fact that the voting members did not 
focus on all of the FDA representatives’ arguments.  
 
Figure 4: Coherence of group centroid 
with respect to final centroid of voting 
members. The horizontal axis, 
representing the utterance number in 
the discourse, represents progress 
through the discourse. The vertical 
axis is coherence as measured with 
respect to the final position of the 
voting members. Each curve 
corresponds to a different group 
present at the meeting (Non-voting 
panel members, FDA representatives, 
sponsors, and voting members). 
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Figure 5: Breakdown of  sponsor’s 
presentation by speaker/section. Each 
curve corresponds to a different 
speaker, each of  whom presented a 
different phase of  the sponsor’s talks 
(introduction, clinical data, statistical 
method, and physician endorsement).  
Figure 5 further examines the sponsor’s coherence measured with respect to the 
final position of the voting members in semantic space. The greatest drop occurs 
at the time of the presentation of the data, at utterance 218. This is consistent 
with a focus on the data that is different from that used by the panel members. 
Although there was some disagreement regarding the viability of pooling the two 
clinical trials together (captured in the Statistical Methods Presentation), most of 
the later discussion focused on the interpretation of the data rather than on the 
methods used to reach that interpretation.  
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Analyses of other meetings yield results that are qualitatively very similar, 
suggesting that the LSA approach outlined above is not actually extracting 
information that is specific to each meeting – rather, it is reflecting the procedural 
aspects of the meeting. In particular, it stands to reason that the sponsors and the 
FDA would use very different language than the panel members would, simply by 
virtue of their role. Hence, this analysis requires a tool that is more sensitive to 
individual differences between speakers. As an introduction, an overview of some 
of the limitations of the LSA approach is therefore essential. 
Limitations of the LSA approach 
Construction of LSA Metrics 
Differences between Dong’s and Foltz’s approaches in studying coherence 
highlight some of the limitations of using LSA for representing coherence in 
design teams. Whereas Foltz studied individual students writing essays about a 
well-defined topic, Dong studied interactions between multiple people attempting 
to discuss a design that has not yet been produced. Therefore, Foltz pre-trained 
LSA on domain-relevant materials, whereas Dong explicitly did not do so 
because it would bias the outcome in favor of a particular design or method 
(Dong 2007, personal communication). Group coherence, as defined above, is a 
relative measure.  
Representing group coherence over the course of a discussion is challenging. 
Because coherence is defined as a distance metric between two utterances, there 
is no natural baseline against which to evaluate the coherence of a particular 
statement. Dong uses the group document Euclidean centroid as this baseline. 
This has suspect validity because the group document centroid is not necessarily 
representative of the instantaneous coherence between two adjacent utterances at 
any point in time. Indeed, as the overall coherence of the design discussion 
decreases, we may consider the document centroid to be an increasingly worse 
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representation of the group’s “shared mental model”, presuming one exists. An 
assumption that group members share a mental model stands in contrast to an 
analysis of differences in perspectives on committees of technical experts. 
Furthermore, the use of a running average metric has a tendency to 
overemphasize early statements and damp out later ones because early points in 
the time series carry more weight when compared directly with the group 
document centroid than do later points. Later points are averaged with all of the 
earlier points and therefore may lose important dynamics. This leads to a result 
that always converges, by definition, to unity. This can impart a significant bias on 
the time series results since later statements will tend to have a higher coherence 
than do earlier ones, giving the potentially false impression that the conversation 
is converging when it may not be. The comparison of individuals’ utterances 
against the group centroid shows how an individual may be converging to the 
ultimate group decision, although it provides little information about how 
individuals interact with one another.  
Choice of Document Size 
There are many different ways of dividing a discourse, each of which might yield 
slightly different results. Use of a court-recorder’s discretion in defining the 
boundaries of an utterance typically ensures conceptual coherence, at the cost of 
a potential source of subjectivity. Furthermore, very short utterances might make 
less of a contribution to the analysis than do longer utterances. An ideal approach 
would incorporate both temporal information and authorship information 
sources. The former would enable some insight into meeting dynamics, whereas 
the latter would allow for sufficient data to enable a statistically meaningful 
characterization of a given speaker’s position relative to others. 
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Dimensionality Selection 
There is currently no theoretically optimal number of dimensions for a latent 
semantic analysis. Foltz and Dong used different dimensionality reduction 
choices when calculating their respective LSA spaces. Foltz, possessing a training 
set against which to measure, kept 300 latent dimensions (i.e., r’ = 300) using LSA 
as described above. Dong, on the other hand, kept dimensions 2-101, a technique 
first used in (Hill et al. 2002) that removes the largest-weighted singular value. 
This seems to under-emphasize effects due to word frequency and direct word 
co-occurrence, and over-emphasize higher-order co-occurrence. This difference 
highlights the fact that there is currently no theoretical optimum for determining 
the appropriate number of dimensions in an LSA analysis. Attempts to calculate 
such an optimum suggest that it may be highly dependent on the structure of the 
individual discourse and the nature of the query (Dupret 2003).  
Polysemy  
Although LSA is largely successful in reducing the synonymy problem by 
grouping words together that appear in the same context, the polysemy problem 
– encountered when two words have the same spelling but different meanings 
(compare “bat” the animal vs. “bat” in the context of baseball) – is not well 
addressed by this specific methodology. This is because polysemous words are 
typically represented as weighted averages between any number of document 
vectors. Rather than being assigned multiple times to different 
meanings/contexts, polysemous words are represented inaccurately as the 
weighted average of those contexts. Among these is the assumption that words 
are embedded within a Euclidean “semantic-space”. This particular assumption 
breaks down when comparing words that are polysemous. LSA represents the 
location of these words in the Euclidean semantic space as the average over the 
two separate locations – an incorrect representation. LSA is known to be 
vulnerable to problems of polysemy. As such, use of LSA to analyze 
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conversations is likely to be susceptible to this weakness. Medical device approval 
committee meetings may tend to avoid polysemy because of the use of highly 
specialized and well-defined professional terms by the physicians, statisticians and 
health policy experts performing the evaluation. On the other hand, those words 
that are most likely to be ambiguously defined, and thus most interesting, are de 
facto polysems. Such words as “safety” and “efficacy”, whose meanings must be 
defined relative to a device during these FDA meetings are likely to be sources of 
debate. This is a major limitation of LSA, that has been overcome by existing 
algorithms designed to solve problems associated with polysemy (Blei et al. 2003; 
Dhillon and Modha 2001; Hofmann 2001). 
Unrealistic modeling assumptions 
Papadimitriou et al. (2002) explain the empirical success of LSA by formulating it 
as a probabilistic model. In the process, the authors make explicit the statistical 
distribution assumptions that underlie the LSA approach. LSA assumes linearity 
for a set of latent dimensions underlying a Euclidean semantic space. 
Furthermore, each word’s location in the Euclidean space is linearly-distributed, 
an assumption that introduces increasingly more distortion into the analysis as a 
given speaker uses fewer words. These limitations make it difficult to resolve the 
linguistic attributes of individual speakers, particularly in the absence of extensive 
speaker data within a given meeting. Furthermore, the latent dimensions of the 
LSA feature space, which nominally correspond to latent concepts of a discourse, 
are often difficult to interpret.  
Bayesian Topic Models  
The leading alternative to LSA is Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA), a Bayesian 
“topic model” (Blei et al. 2003). For an excellent comparison of LSA to Bayesian 
models of text analysis, see (Griffiths et al. 2007). Approaches based on Bayesian 
inference, such as Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA), provide a platform that may 
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be used to avoid many of the limitations noted above. Of particular interest are 
topic-modeling approaches to studying social phenomena in various contexts. 
Topic models have been applied to the social sciences in a limited fashion, with 
examples having largely taken the form of studies of the evolution of specialized 
corpora (Hall et al. 2008), analysis of structure in scientific journals (Griffiths and 
Steyvers 2004), finding author trends over time in scientific journals (Rosen-Zvi 
et al., 2004), topic and role discovery in the Enron email networks (McCallum et 
al. 2007), analysis of historical structure in newspaper archives (Newman and 
Block 2006), and group discovery in socio-metric data (Wang et al.,  2005). Topic 
models have also been applied to other fields, using, for example, genomic data as 
input.  
Topic Models address the limitations of LSA 
Unlike LSA, which uses a continuous Euclidean metric space representation, 
LDA assumes probabilistic assignment of each word to a discrete topic. Each 
topic is assumed to be exchangeable, i.e., conditionally independent of each other 
topic (de Finetti 1974). LSA’s assumption of orthogonal latent dimensions in a 
Euclidean space implies that each word can be located by a unique point in that 
semantic space. LDA’s exchangeability assumption, on the other hand, allows for 
words to have multiple “senses” – i.e., the same word may occur in two different 
topics. Rather than modeling a word as an average between two locations in a 
latent Euclidean space, a word is instead modeled as having been drawn from a 
discrete probability distribution over topics. This provides a natural solution to 
the polysemy problem (Griffiths et al. 2007). The basic structure of an LDA 
model is shown in Figure 6.  










z = topics D = # documents
Nd= # words in document d
w|z ~ Multinomial(φ)
z|d ~ Multinomial(θ)
φ ~ Dirichlet(β)  
θ~ Dirichlet(α)
 
Figure 6: A plate-notation 
representation of the Latent Dirichlet 
Analysis algorithm (Blei, Ng, et al. 
2003).  
In an LDA model, words are observed in a word-document matrix, as in LSA. 
Each word (w) is assumed to be drawn from a topic (z). A topic is accordingly 
defined as a multinomial distribution (φ) over words (i.e., a word is chosen at 
random by rolling a weighted w-sided die, where w is the total number of words 
in the corpus). Each document is similarly modeled as a multinomial distribution 
(θ) over topics. The parameters (i.e., the die-weights) for each multinomial 
distribution are drawn from a symmetric Dirichlet prior distribution – a 
multivariate distribution that is the conjugate prior to the multinomial 
distribution. Each Dirichlet distribution has a number of parameters equal to the 
number of parameters of its corresponding multinomial distribution. 
Nevertheless, early LDA models all assume that the Dirichlet priors are 
symmetric – i.e., all of the parameters are the same. The utility of this assumption 
has only recently been tested (Wallach and McCallum 2009). The 
“hyperparameters” defining each Dirichlet prior (α and β) are chosen by the 
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modeler, and are the primary means, along with choosing the number of topics, 
by which the form of the model might be controlled. These hyperparameters may 
be interpreted as smoothing parameters. In particular, if 0 < α < 1, topics are 
very document-specific, whereas for values of α > 1, topics are smoothed across 
documents. Similarly, if 0 < β < 1, words are very specific to topics (i.e., there is 
relatively little polysemy), whereas for values of β > 1, words are smoothed across 
topics. Thus, topic models may account for polysemy in a way that LSA cannot. 
LDA defines a family of probabilistic models, and must be fit to a specific corpus 
using Bayesian inference algorithms. We are interested in finding the most 
probable hypothesis, h, (i.e., the most appropriate model), given the observed 






dhp =                                          (1) 
Using the notation specific to the LDA model, Bayes’ theorem may be expressed 










                                 (2) 
This guarantees that the topics that are inferred by LDA are appropriate to the 
corpus being analyzed. Furthermore, the presence of the Bayesian priors ensures 
that the model is not over-fit to the corpus data – a limitation that had been 
encountered by previous attempts to generate a probabilistic form of LSA 
(Hofmann 2001). The flexibility of LDA’s representation therefore circumvents 
the problems encountered by LSA as a result of its distributional assumptions. 
This comes at the cost of computational efficiency, since explicit computation of 
LDA’s posterior distribution (i.e., the distribution that we would like to determine 
in order to be able to fit topics to the data) is intractable. To see why this is, we 
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must expand the expression above into its constituent parts. The numerator is 
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Here, V is the total number of words in the corpus and T is the total number of 
topics. C1 is a term whose value is a function only of the hyperparameter values. 
It serves as a normalizing parameter. As can be seen from this expression, the 
Dirichlet distribution may be interpreted as a “virtual count” – i.e., the 
hyperparameters may be interpreted as presumed data that has already been seen 
and added to the observed data. The Dirichlet prior therefore may be said to 
reflect one’s prior beliefs regarding the propensity of a particular topic or word in 
the data. The denominator is not analytically tractable, and may be expressed as 
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The original implementation of LDA inferred the posterior distribution for its 
test corpus using a technique known as variational inference (Blei et al. 2003). 
Nevertheless, variational inference has not been widely adopted by the topic 
modeling community because it is difficult to implement and because it lacks a 
theoretical guarantee that it will converge to the global maximum of the posterior 
distribution. Gibbs sampling, a Markov-Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method, 
adopted from statistical physics, possesses such a guarantee and, although 
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potentially slower4, is currently in widespread use among topic modelers 
(Griffiths and Steyvers 2004). Gibbs sampling for LDA proceeds following 
Algorithm 1: 
Algorithm 1: LDA Implementation 
1. Initialize topic assignments randomly for all word tokens 
2. repeat 
3.      for d=1 to D do 
4.           for  i=1 to Nd do 
5.                draw zdi from P(zdi|z-di ,w,α,β) 
6.                assign zdi and update count vectors  
7.           end for 
8.      end for 
9. until Markov chain reaches equilibrium 
 
Here, D is the total number of documents and Nd is the number of word tokens 
in each document, zdi is the topic assigned to word token i in document d. The 
non-normalized form of P(zdi|z-di ,w,α,β) is derived in (Griffiths and Steyvers 
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4 Recent work by (Goodman, Mansinghka et al. 2008) has focused on generating a probabilistic programming 
language whose purpose is to enable fast Bayesian inference of the sort required for these analyses. Such 
research could significantly increase the adoption of MCMC-type algorithms as they become more easy, 
and faster, to implement. This could increase the rate of adoption of MCMC over variational inference 
even further. 
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In this expression, n(a)-b,c  is a count vector – i.e., a count of the number of times 
all tokens with identity a (e.g., all words with identity wi or all tokens in document 
d), excluding token b are assigned to topic c. n(.)-b,c  denotes that all tokens 
assigned to topic c should be considered, regardless of word or document 
identity, with the exception of token b. V is the total number of unique words in 
the corpus, and T is the total number of topics. As can be seen from the form of 
the above expression, each token’s probability of being assigned to a given topic 
is proportional to the number of times that that word appears in that same topic, 
and to the number of times a word from that document is assigned to that topic. 
This defines a Markov chain, whose probability of being in given state is 
guaranteed to converge to the posterior distribution of the LDA model as fit to 
the corpus after a sufficiently large number of iterations. Evaluating Markov 
chain convergence is currently an open area of research. It is therefore standard 
practice for a Markov chain to be run for multiple iterations in order to ensure 
convergence. These initial iterations are known as a “burn-in” period. 
Throughout this thesis, burn-in length is set to 1000 iterations – a value 
frequently used in the topic modeling literature (Griffiths and Steyvers 2004). 
The ability to fit the probability distribution underlying the LDA model to a 
specific corpus neatly solves the problem inherent in the statistical distribution 
assumption underlying LSA. Once the LDA model has been defined, variants 
may be utilized, given the nature of the problem being solved. In particular, the 
LDA model as outlined above is still sensitive to the arbitrary document 
boundaries imposed by the court recorder. Furthermore, documents vary 
significantly in length – some might only be two words (e.g., “Thank you”) 
whereas others might be significant monologues. One possible approach would 
be to attempt to group documents together by their temporal ordering – this 
would enable groups of documents to pool statistical power. This is the approach 
taken by the work of (Quinn et al. 2006), who built a topic model of US Senate 
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proceedings with the goal of identifying agenda-setting behavior. Quinn’s model 
explicitly incorporated time as an explanatory variable, using techniques 
pioneered by (Pole et al. 1994; Blei and Lafferty 2006). In practice, this approach 
serves to smooth topics across time such that they rise and fall in a continuous 
fashion. The temporal element of the analysis enables insight into how agendas in 
the US Senate are built and changed. (Fader et al. 2007) used the resulting dataset 
to identify influential members of the US Senate using a technique knows as 
“MavenRank”. Influence was operationalized as “lexical centrality” – a metric of 
similarity between a given speaker’s utterances and all other utterances by 
speakers using that topic. (Fader et al. 2007) present results indicating that lexical 
centrality is associated high-status positions within Senate committees. 
Preliminary tests of MavenRank on FDA panels suggests that an individual’s 
influence under the lexical centrality scheme is strongly correlated with their air-
time in that topic (i.e., the number of utterances that they express). Findings in 
social psychology dispute the relation between actual influence and air-time 
(Bottger 1984) suggesting that MavenRank captures procedural sources of 
influence instead of actual influence. Furthermore, MavenRank is unable to 
determine influence across topics, and therefore cannot address questions 
regarding why one topic might come to prominence within a given committee 
meeting. Indeed, Fader et al. treated specific topics as standing in fixed 
association with specific committees – an assumption that makes sense given the 
standing committees in the US Senate, but is inappropriate for the more flexible 
committees to be found in FDA and other engineering systems. Furthermore, in 
applying their technique, Quinn et al. fit a model to several different simultaneous 
Senate discourses. Data on FDA panels is much more linear, since it represents 
one conversation rather than several years’ worth of speeches5. Therefore the 
                                                 
5  On the importance of linearity in speech, see (Gibson 2005). 
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approach of Quinn et al. is not directly applicable to the problem addressed in 
this thesis. 
The Author-Topic Model 
A variant of LDA, the Author-Topic (AT) model, can been used to generate a 
distribution over topics for each participant in a meeting (Rosen-Zvi et al. 2004). 
Given that the literature suggests that each speaker possesses an institutional or 
role-based signature in his or her word choice, we would like to have the identity 
of the speaker inform the selection of topics. We therefore use a variant of 
Rosen-Zvi et al.’s Author-Topic (AT) Model (2004), which creates probabilistic 
pressure to assign each author to a specific topic. Shared topics are therefore 
more likely to represent common jargon. The Author-Topic model provides an 
analysis that is guided by the authorship data of the documents in the corpus, in 
addition to the word co-occurrence data used by LSA and LDA. Each author (in 
this case, a speaker in the discourse) is modeled as a multinomial distribution over 
a fixed number of topics that is pre-set by the modeler. Each topic is, in turn 
modeled as a multinomial distribution over words. A plate-notation 
representation of the generative process underlying the Author-Topic model is 
found in Figure 7.  
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Figure 7: A plate notation 
representation of  the Author-Topic 
model from (Rosen-Zvi et al. 2004). 
Authors are represented by a 
multinomial distribution over topics, 
which are in turn represented by a 
multinomial distribution over all 
words in the corpus. 
As an LDA variant, the Author-Topic model is populated using a Markov-Chain 
Monte Carlo Algorithm that is designed to converge to the distribution of words 
over topics and authors that best matches the data. Information about individual 
authors is included in the Bayesian inference mechanism, such that each word is 
assigned to a topic in proportion to the number of words by that author already 
in that topic, and in proportion to the number of times that specific word appears 
in that topic. Thus, if two authors use the same word in two different senses, the 
AT Model will account for this polysemy. Details of the MCMC algorithm 
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derivation are given in (Rosen-Zvi et al. 2004). The AT model was implemented 
in MATLAB by the author, based on the Topic Modeling Toolbox algorithm 
(Griffiths and Steyvers 2004). Gibbs sampling for AT proceeds following the 
algorithm in Algorithm 2: 
Algorithm 2: AT Model 
Implementation Algorithm 
1. Initialize topic assignments randomly for all word tokens 
2. repeat 
3.      for d=1 to D do 
4.           for  i=1 to Nd do 
5.                draw zdi & xdi from P(xdi,zdi|z-di, x-di w,α,β) 
6.                assign zdi & xdi and update count vectors  
7.           end for 
8.      end for 
9. until Markov chain reaches equilibrium 
 
Here, D is the total number of documents and Nd is the number of word tokens 
in each document, zdi is the topic assigned to word token i in document d, and xdi 
is the author assigned to word token i in document d. The form of P(xdi,zdi|z-di, x-
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As can be seen from the form of the above expression, each token’s probability 
of assignment to a given topic is proportional to the number of times that that 
word appears in that same topic, and to the number of times a word from that 
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author is assigned to that topic. This defines a Markov chain, whose probability 
of being in given state is guaranteed to converge to the posterior distribution of 
the AT model as fit to the corpus after a sufficiently large number of iterations.  
Under the special case where each document has one unique author, the AT 
model is equivalent to LDA. Similarly, under the special case where each 
document has one non-unique author, the AT model is equivalent to an LDA 
model where each author may be treated as one document. As will be shown 
below, the multiple authorship feature of the AT model may be used to 
determine a given speaker’s idiosyncratic word choice, a useful feature when 
many panel members share procedural language that may not necessarily be 
related to their decisions.  
Hyperparameter Selection 
Like LDA, the AT model requires the selection of two parameters. Ideally, we 
would like to determine which parameters used for the AT model best fit the 
corpus data. We must simultaneously be wary of over-constraining the analysis 
with the assumptions underlying the AT model. A popular metric for goodness-
of-fit used within the machine learning literature is cross-entropy (Manning and 
Schütze 1999). Cross-entropy is a metric of the average number of bits required 
to describe the position of each word in the corpus and is closely related to 
perplexity. Both perplexity and cross-entropy are closely related to log-likelihood, a 
measure of how well a given model predicts a given corpus. Therefore, lower 
perplexity indicates a more parsimonious model fit. Lower perplexity also 
indicates that the assumptions underlying the model are descriptive of the data. 












                    (7) 
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In this expression, N is the total number of word tokens. The expression in the 
numerator is the empirical log-likelihood (although log-likelihood is usually 
calculated using a natural logarithm). Thus, a natural interpretation of cross-
entropy is the average log-likelihood across all observed word-tokens. Perplexity 
is defined as
),(2 qpH . The lower a given model’s perplexity or cross-entropy, or 
the higher its log-likelihood, the more parsimonious is the model’s fit to the data. 
Each author’s topic distribution is modeled as having been drawn from a 
symmetric Dirichlet distribution, with parameter α. Values of α that are smaller 
than unity will tend to more closely fit the author-specific topic distribution to 
observed data – if α is too small, one runs the risk of overfitting. Similarly, values 
of α greater than unity tend to bring author-specific topic distributions closer to 
uniformity. A value of α=50/(# topics) was used for the results presented in this 
thesis, based upon the values suggested by (Griffiths and Steyvers 2004). For the 
numbers of topics considered in these analyses (generally less than 30), this 
corresponds to a mild smoothing across authors. Similar to α is the second 
Dirichlet parameter, β, from which the topic-specific word distributions are 
drawn. β values that are large tend to induce very broad topics with much 
overlap, whereas smaller values of β induce topics which are specific to small 
numbers of words. Following the empirical guidelines set forth by Griffiths and 
Steyvers (2004), and empirical testing performed by the author, we set the value 
of β = 200/( # words). Given that the average corpus generally consists of 
~25,000 word tokens, representing about m = 2500 unique words in about n = 
1200 utterances, the value of β is generally on the order of 0.1, a value close to 
that used in (Rosen-Zvi et al. 2004). Tests of the AT model with β=0.1 generated 
results that were qualitatively similar to those with “fitted” priors, but fitted priors 
presented a slightly lower cross-entropy value. Thus, topics tend to be relatively 
word-specific. As will be shown below, values of α tend to be on the order of 1 - 
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5, incorporating some amount of smoothing, so the topics are not entirely 
author-specific. This corresponds to a number of topics between 10 and 35, 
depending on the specific meeting being analyzed. Tests of the model with a 
fixed α=5 generated results that were also qualitatively similar to those with fitted 
priors, although added smoothing likely introduced some noise into analysis 
results, as reflected in a slightly higher cross-entropy for fixed priors for most 
meetings (Figure 8). The outliers are shorter meetings in which the fitted priors 
impose relatively more smoothing. 

































Figure 8: A comparison of  perplexity 
values for three different 
hyperparameter conditions tested. 
Fitted priors generally have slightly 
lower perplexity, particularly for 
longer meetings. 
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Smaller hyperparameter values than those presented above result in even lower 
perplexity values. This is because the number of topics must be increased in 
tandem. As topics become more specific to individual words and authors (i.e 
hyperparameter values decrease) the number of topics required to accurately 
model the corpus increases, and the model has a correspondingly higher 
resolution. This comes at the cost of sensitivity to spurious linkages between 
words that might co-occur a small number of times in the corpus, without 
necessarily corresponding with an intuitive sense of what constitutes a topic. 
Ultimately, the goal of this analysis is to determine which words, and potentially 
ideas, speakers might have in common. If hyperparameter values are too low (i.e., 
topics are too author-specific or word-specific), there will be very little overlap 
among speakers. This means that conditional independence assumptions 
underlying the AT model become very strong and topics come to be defined by 
small numbers of relatively infrequent words (in which case many topic are 
required to generate a meaningful model) or entirely by speaker identity. At this 
point, a topic ceases to become a meaningful construct. The analysis in this thesis 
therefore only uses cross-entropy/perplexity sparingly as a metric of model 
quality to differentiate between hyperparameter schemes that have already been 
established in the literature. We do not try to minimize global cross-
entropy/perplexity. This represents a modeling choice that departs from standard 
machine-learning methods – indeed it is interesting that there has been relatively 
little work within the topic modeling community on the appropriate choice of 
hyperparameters. Exceptions include hyperparameter optimization algorithms, 
such as those designed by (Wallach 2008) which will be discussed below. To the 
author’s knowledge, there has been no analysis of the co-selection of topics and 
hyperparameters. 
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Committee Filtering 
Our analysis primarily focuses on the voting members on an advisory panel. This 
decision was made because it is precisely these members whose evaluations will 
determine the panel recommendations. Other panel members, such as non-
voting guests and consultants, are also included in the analysis because, like the 
voting members, they play the role of resident experts. Panel members such as 
the executive secretary, and consumer, patient and industry representatives are 
not included as part of the committee in the following analyses because they play 
a relatively small role in panel discussion in the meetings examined. Inclusion of 
these members is straightforward, and examination of their roles is left to future 
research. 
The LSA approach demonstrates that it is often difficult to differentiate between 
panel members, especially since the majority of the speech during an FDA panel 
meeting is occupied by presentations from the sponsor and the FDA. A given 
voting member might speak relatively rarely. Furthermore, panel members share 
certain language in common including procedural words and domain-specific 
words that are sufficiently frequent as to prevent good topic identification. As a 
result, a large proportion of the words spoken by each committee member may 
be assigned to the same topic, preventing the AT model from identifying 
important differences between speakers. In a variant of a technique suggested in 
(Rosen-Zvi et al. 2005)6 this problem is solved using the AT model by creating a 
“false author” named “committee”. Prior to running the AT model’s algorithm, 
all committee voting members’ statements are labeled with two possible authors – 
the actual speaker and “committee”. Since the AT model’s MCMC algorithm 
randomizes over all possible authors, words that are held in common to all 
committee members are assigned to “committee”, whereas words that are unique 
to each speaker are assigned to that speaker. In practice, this allows individual 
                                                 
6 The author of this thesis would like to thank Dr. Mark Dredze for suggesting this approach 
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committee members’ unique topic profiles to be identified, as demonstrated 
below. In the unlikely case where all committee members’ language is common, 
half of all words will be assigned to “committee” and the other half will be 
assigned at random to the individual speakers in such a way as to preserve the 
initial distribution of that author’s words over topics.  
Preliminary testing of the AT Model  
Preliminary tests of the AT model held the number of topics constant at 10, for 
each meeting analyzed. Although this is not a realistic representation of the 
structure of different FDA panel meetings (discussed below), these initial tests 
provide insight into the capabilities of the AT Model when applied to this 
problem domain. 
Sample Output – Identifying Topics of Interest 
One preliminary use of the AT model is to identify the major topics of interest 
for each speaker. For example, Figure 9 shows sample output of the Author-
Topic model applied to the FDA Meeting held on March 4th, 2002. In particular, 
this is the author-specific topic distribution for one panel member. Note that a 
plurality of this panel member’s words is confined to the topic labeled 1. 
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Figure 9: Sample output from the 
Author-Topic model run on the FDA 
Circulatory Systems Devices Advisory 
Panel Meeting for March 4th, 2002. 
This chart is the per-speaker topic 
distribution for one of the panel 
members. 
Table 3 displays the top five most probable word stems for each topic:  
Table 3: The top five word-stems for 
one run of  the AT model on the 
corpus for the Circulatory Systems 





Top Five Word-Stems 
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1 'clinic endpoint efficaci comment base' 
2 'trial insync icd studi was' 
3 'was were sponsor just question' 
4 'patient heart group were failur' 
5 'devic panel pleas approv recommend' 
6 'think would patient question don' 
7 'dr condit vote data panel' 
8 'effect just trial look would' 
9 'lead implant complic ventricular event' 
10 'patient pace lead were devic' 
 
Within a clinical trial administered by the FDA, a device manufacturer must meet 
a certain set of clinical “endpoints”, often defined as a proportion of a population 
that is free from disease or adverse events (e.g., device failure). Such trials 
typically have different endpoints for device safety and efficacy, both of which 
must be met. From this table, we can see that this panel member’s major topic of 
interest involved questions of what was the appropriate clinical endpoint for the 
study in question (often debated in these panel meetings).  
The use of the AT model to identify topics that are salient to each speaker can be 
helpful in determining how agreement is reached. Consider the meeting of the 
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Circulatory Systems Devices Panel held on November 20, 2003. This meeting 
was convened to review a PMA for approval of the Taxus ® Paclitaxel Drug-
Eluting Stent, designed and marketed by Boston Scientific Corporation. Taxus 
was the second drug-eluting stent on the market, following the panel’s decision to 
approve Cordis Corporation’s Cypher Sirolimus-Eluting Stent one year prior. The 
ultimate outcome of the meeting was a consensus decision to approve the PMA. 
The vast majority of decisions to approve a device come with conditions of 
approval that the panel recommends to the FDA that the sponsor must meet 
before the device can be marketed. The conditions of approval for the Taxus 
stent were as follows: 
1. The labeling should specify that patients should receive an antiplatelet 
regimen of aspirin and clopidogrel or ticlopidine for 6 months 
following receipt of the stent. 
2. The labeling should state that the interaction between the TAXUS 
stent and stents that elute other compounds has not been studied. 
3. The labeling should state the maximum permissible inflation diameter 
for the TAXUS Express stent. 
4. The numbers in the tables in the instructions for use that report on 
primary effectiveness endpoints should be corrected to reflect the 
appropriate denominators. 
5. The labeling should include the comparator term “bare metal Express 
stent” in the indications. 
Each of these conditions may be traced to a particular voting member, or set of 
voting members, on the panel, using the AT model.  Table 4, below, outlines the 
primary topics for each voting member. The top five words, identifying each 
  91 
voting member’s preferred topic (out of 10 total), are identified, in addition to the 
topic proportion – the proportion of words spoken by that voting member in the 
corresponding topic. Finally, each topic is assigned to a condition of approval as 
listed above. 
Table 4: Results of  the Author-Topic 
Model applied to a transcript of  the 
Circulatory Systems Devices Panel 
Meeting of  Nov. 20, 2003. Each row 
of  this table corresponds to a 
different voting member. Topics 
correspond to conditions of  approval 








Cardiologist 'metal bare express restenosi 
paclitaxel' 
0.36 5  
 
Cardiologist  'physician stainless ifu steel plavix' 0.42 1 
Pharmacologist 'metal bare express restenosi 
paclitaxel' 





Statistician  'tabl detail denomin six number' 0.56 4  
Cardiologist 'metal bare express restenosi 0.23 5  
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paclitaxel' 
Cardiologist  'drug clinic present appear event' 0.23 2 
Cardiologist 'angiograph reduct nine think 
restenosi‘ 
0.12 <None> 
Electrophysiologist 'millimet length diamet coronari 
lesion' 
0.34 3  
Surgeon 'know bit littl take present' 0.23 <None > 
 
The above table shows a rough correspondence between topics of discussion and 
conditions of approval. This demonstrates that the AT model is able to generate 
author-specific topics that are meaningful to specific panel meetings. AT 
therefore overcomes another key limitation of LSA.  
Sample Output – Identifying Roles 
Aside from examining topics of interest to specific committee members, we 
would like to be able to examine role-based behavior. In particular, how do 
different panel voting members interact with one another? One preliminary 
insight into speaker roles may come from comparing author-specific topic 
distributions. Panel members who speak often and focus on one aspect of the 
discourse potentially display a depth of expertise and will be more likely to have 
their words assigned to a topic focused on that speaker. If they focus on several 
aspects of the discourse in concert with other speakers (e.g., if they engage in a 
discussion), they will tend to have their words assigned to a number of topics 
related to their areas of focus and potentially display a breadth of expertise. If 
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they do not speak often, but are focused in their area of discourse, their words 
will likely be assigned to topics defined by other speakers. Finally, if they speak 
rarely their words will be assigned uniformly at random to all topics. These 
different types of speakers are summarized in Table 5. 
Table 5: Different types of speakers 
identified by the AT model. A 
frequent, focused speaker tends to 
drive topic formation, whereas a rare 
speaker tends to be assigned to topics 
defined by others. Multi-focus, or 
interdisciplinary, speakers may serve as 
mediators. These sample results have 
been generated from actual panel 
meetings. 
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Generation of Social Networks 
We may use the output of the Author-Topic model to gain insight into the social 
structure of a given committee. Since the results of the Author-Topic model 
assign each word to a topic, we may compare topic distributions across speakers. 
In particular, if two speakers’ words are assigned to the same topic frequently, we 
say that they are “linked”. The definition of a link is another modeling choice. 
Early versions of this algorithm considered two authors to be linked if, in a model 
with ten topics, they had at least one topic in which they both spoke more than 
20% of the time. In the current version, speakers are linked together if they 
 Frequent Speaker Rare Speaker 
Focused 
Speaker 
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commonly use the same topics of discourse. In particular, we construct an 
Author-Topic matrix, A, with entries equal to 1 where that author uses that topic, 
and entries equal to 0 otherwise. This matrix, when multiplied by its transpose (A 
* A’) yields a linkage pattern among speakers. This may be interpreted as a social 
network (Wasserman and Faust 1994). A more rigorous definition of linkage 
between speaker-pairs is to be found below. Using authors as nodes, and the links 
derived from their topic distributions as edges, we may generate an author-topic 
graph. Because we are only interested in the voting members (and committee 
chair) we analyze only the subgraphs consisting of the nodes and edges linking 
these members, such as that shown in Figure 10. 
 
Figure 10: A graph of the meeting of 
the FDA Circulatory Systems Devices 
Legend:
Red = Voted against Device Approval
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Advisory Panel Meeting held on 
March 5, 2002. Node size is 
proportional to the number of words 
spoken by the corresponding speaker. 
Random seed = 613. Graphs were 
generated using UCINET. 
 
Different schemes for determining topic membership yield different networks. 
For example, the binomial statistical test might be seen as a more principled way 
of determining topic membership. The binomial statistical test operates by 
examining the cumulative distribution of the binomial probability mass function, 
given by  
 










== 1)Pr(                             (8) 
Under this scheme, an author is assigned to a topic if the cumulative probability 
that that author used k out of n words in a given topic is less than 0.05/b, where 
b is the Bonferroni significance level correction factor. Given a authors, b = a * 
(a-1) / 2, since one comparison is being made for each pair of authors. Unlike the 
uniform 20% cutoff used above, the binomial cutoff accounts for the total 
number of words a given speaker contributes to a given topic. Therefore panel 
members who speak rarely are less likely to be linked. A sample social network 
from this scheme is shown in Figure 11, for the same meeting as in Figure 10. 
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Figure 11: Social network of the FDA 
Circulatory Systems Devices Advisory 
Panel Meeting held on March 5, 2002. 
Threshold value is determined using 
the binomial test described above. 
Node size is proportional to the 
number of words spoken by the 
corresponding speaker. Random seed 
= 201.657. 2100th draw from MCMC 
algorithm. Graphs were generated 
using UCINET. This iteration shows 
the presence of two separate 
discussion groups. Note that voting 
members 5 and 6, both bridging 
members in Figure 10, are now 
disconnected. This is due to their 
small number of words contributed. 
Legend:
Red = Voted against Device Approval
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As above, each social network generated using this scheme is the result of one 
MCMC iteration. Multiple iterations, when taken together, form a probability 
distribution over a set of possible Author-Topic assignments, and therefore, 
connectivity patterns. We can expect that different iterations of the MCMC 
algorithm will yield drastically different graphs. For example, the results of a 
second draw from the same MCMC chain that yielded Figure 11 is shown in 
Figure 12. 
 
Figure 12: A second iteration of  the 
meeting of  the FDA Circulatory 
Systems Devices Advisory Panel 
Legend:
Red = Voted against Device Approval
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Meeting held on March 5, 2002. 
Threshold value is determined using 
the binomial test described above. 
Node size is proportional to the 
number of  words spoken by the 
corresponding speaker. Random seed 
= 201.657. 2200th draw from MCMC 
algorithm. Graphs were generated 
using UCINET 
The high variability among draws from the MCMC algorithm again suggests that 
links should be differentially weighted – some links appear in virtually all 
iterations, whereas other links appear in relatively few iterations. Averaging over 
multiple MCMC iterations enables a social network to be created with weighted 
links, where the weight of each link is proportional to its frequency of occurrence 
among iterations. Examples of this may be found in Figure 13 and Figure 14, 
corresponding to constant and binomial threshold conditions, respectively.  
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Figure 13: Average of 200 graphs for 
the meeting of the FDA Circulatory 
Systems Devices Advisory Panel 
Meeting held on March 5, 2002.  A 
heavy line indicates a strong link 
(linked in >100 graphs). A light line 
indicates that the speakers are linked 
more frequently than the global 
average of all speakers. Spurious links 
have been eliminated. 
 
Legend:
Red = Voted against Device Approval
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Figure 14: Average of 200 iterations 
for the meeting of the FDA 
Circulatory Systems Devices Advisory 
Panel Meeting held on March 5, 2002. 
Iterations use a binomial threshold 
value for each of ten topics.  Heavier 
lines indicate stronger links (linked in 
>100 iterations), whereas lighter lines 
indicate weaker links (> than the 
global average). All links shown are 
stronger than the global average of all 




Red = Voted against Device Approval
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Despite differences in the locations of rare speakers, Figure 13 and Figure 14  
have similar overall structures. For example, both figures display a structure that 
tends to group together those speakers who voted similarly. This is encouraging 
for testing hypotheses about voters who speak the same way tend to vote the 
same way.  
The difference in the two figures highlights the differences between the two 
threshold conditions. The constant threshold condition tends to favor speakers 
who speak infrequently, such as voting members 5 and 6. Because of their 
relatively small numbers of words, it is harder for these speakers to achieve 
statistical significance using the binomial test, and so they are less likely to be 
linked. On the other hand, the constant threshold condition requires more words 
to establish a link to a frequent speaker, compared to a binomial threshold.   
Comparison of multiple cases 
The case in the previous section demonstrated a preliminary method for how 
social networks can be built. Later in this section, we will discuss how to refine 
this method. Nevertheless, it is instructive to perform some preliminary analyses 
of the capabilities of these early networks. 
 
Grouping by medical specialty? 
Network representations of some meetings display voting along institutional lines 
more clearly than do others. For example, Figure 15 and Figure 16 show a strong 
grouping by medical specialty. In particular, surgeons and internal medicine 
experts (cardiologist and pharmacologists) seem to form two different parts of 
the same graph. 
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Figure 15: Average of 200 iterations 
for the meeting of the FDA 
Circulatory Systems Devices Advisory 
Panel Meeting held on January 13, 
2005. Iterations use a constant 
threshold value for each of ten topics.  
A heavy line indicates a strong link 
(linked in >100 iterations). A light line 
indicates that the speakers are linked 
more than the global average of all 
speakers. Remaining links have been 
deleted. 
Legend:
Red = voted against device approval





  104 
 
Figure 16: Average of 200 iterations 
for the meeting of the FDA 
Circulatory Systems Devices Advisory 
Panel Meeting held on January 13, 
2005. Iterations use a binomial 
threshold value for each of ten topics.  
Heavier lines indicate stronger links, 
whereas lighter lines indicate weaker 
links. All links shown are stronger 
than the global average of all speakers. 
Remaining links have been deleted. 
 
Both of these figures place Voting Member 8 in the most central position on the 
graph of committee voting members. Both graphs also show a potentially 
Legend:
Red = voted against device approval
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important role for Voting Member 6 who is graphically closer to the cardiologists 
while still voting with the other surgeons. It may be significant that Voting 
Member 6 was Canadian whereas all other surgeons were employed at hospitals 
in the United States. Furthermore, Figure 16 recognizes strong links between 
Voting Members 9 and 10 to Voting Member 8. This is consistent with a reading 
of the meeting transcript that indicates that Voting Member 8 shared many of the 
concerns of her colleagues, despite ultimately voting with the surgeon majority. 
Voting Member 12, who abstained from voting, is strongly linked to Voting 
Member 10, consistent with his background as a clinical trial designer who would 
be interested in both the clinical and the statistical elements of the analysis. It is 
interesting to note that both figures also display long “tails” of surgeons, who 
seem to have voted as a bloc.  
The above results indicate that, at least in some cases, medical specialty might 
have some predictive value for voting outcomes. Further analysis in Chapter 5 is 
aimed at attempting to confirm or deny this hypothesis. Of particular interest are 
those panel members who are linked across specialty boundaries. These 
individuals might possess a skill set or personal inclination that enables them to 
mediate between or learn from panel members in other specialties. This might be 
associated with a breadth of expertise. 
Selection of Number of Topics 
Without any knowledge of the content of a particular meeting corpus, it is 
difficult to choose an appropriate number of topics, T, a priori. Given 
hyperparameter values, as defined above, we may use perplexity as a metric for 
choosing T. Ideally, T would be chosen so as to be as small as possible (i.e., 
maximum dimensionality reduction) while still constituting a good model fit.  
The number of topics is chosen independently for each transcript as follows: 35 
AT models are fit to the transcript for t = 1 … 35 topics – given the 
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hyperparameter values as defined above, we found that 35 topics was an 
appropriate upper bound since,  as the number of topics increases, model cross-
entropy becomes asymptotically smaller. When fixed values of α are used, there is 
a unique minimum in the function relating perplexity to number of topics. 
Griffiths and Steyvers (2004) report a similar unique minimum for fitted values of 
α with fixed values of β, although they tested topics in increments of 100 – their 
analysis did not focus on finding a model that fit a comparatively precise number 
of topics within the neighborhood of the minimum value. In principle, given a 
sufficiently large number of topics, the perplexity would begin to increase at a 
relatively mild slope as the model starts over-fitting. Lacking such a unique 
minimum here, we choose the minimum number of topics such that the cross-
entropy values are statistically indistinguishable from larger numbers of topics. 
Thus, for each model, 20 independent samples are generated from one randomly 
initialized Markov chain after a burn-in of 1000 iterations. Sample independence 
is guaranteed by introducing a lag of 50 iterations between each sample (lags as 
large as 100 iterations were tested, yielding qualitatively similar results). We find 
the smallest value, t0, such that the 95
th percentile of all samples for all larger 
values of t is greater than the 5th percentile of t0. Given fitted priors of the sort 
recommended by Griffiths and Steyvers (2004), the asymptotic behavior 
displayed in Figure 17 is typical of AT Model fits. We set the value of T = t0 + 1 
so as to ensure that the model chosen is well beyond the knee in the curve, and 
therefore in the neighborhood of the minimum perplexity.  
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Figure 17: Perplexity vs. number of 
topics for the meeting of the FDA 
Circulatory Systems Devices Panel 
held on July 9, 2001. T, the number of 
topics, is equal to 28, using the 
procedure described above. 
Horizontal lines indicate the 5th and 
95th percentiles for perplexity for a 27 
topic model fit. 
 
Once the number of topics has been chosen, a T-topic AT Model is again fit to 
the transcript. Ten samples are taken from 20 randomly initialized Markov chains, 
such that there are 200 samples in total. These form the basis for all subsequent 
analysis. 
Future work in parameter selection could focus on incorporating these 
parameters into a fully Bayesian framework. For example, (Wallach 2008) 
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presents a hyperparameter optimization algorithm7 that, when used with the AT 
model on FDA panel meeting transcripts, generates non-symmetric 
hyperparameter values of α  that are roughly two orders of magnitude smaller 
than those used in this analysis. Values of β remain roughly similar to those 
presented here. In order to minimize perplexity for these hyperparameter values, 
the number of topics must be increased by roughly one order of magnitude to 
about 300 per meeting. These topics are extremely specific, such that there is 
virtually no overlap between authors. This one extreme implementation of the 
AT model takes the modeling assumptions to its limits and, although perplexity is 
absolutely minimized, the modeling assumptions so dominate the analysis as to 
render it useless for the applications intended in this thesis – namely comparison 
of topic overlap between speakers. 
Selection of Network Cutoff  
Network Construction 
We would like to develop a principled way to determine what constitutes a link 
within a given model iteration. As noted above, we would like to link together 
speakers who commonly use the same topics of discourse. In particular, we 




ii XzZPXzZPXXP )|(*)|()( 2121  
(9) 
We would like to be able to construct an Author-Author matrix, ∆, with entries 
equal to 1 for each linked author pair, and entries equal to 0 otherwise. Note that 
this is different from the author-topic matrix, A, noted above. 
                                                 
7  Wallach’s algorithm requires a prior over hyperparameter values. The results of this test used an “improper 
prior” – i.e., a prior set equal to zero. This is equivalent to a fully data-driven hyperparameter selection 
process that, empirically, has a tendency to over-emphasize the independence of authors for the purposes 
of the analyses performed in this work. 
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Author-Author Matrix Determination 
The AT model outputs an Author-Topic matrix, A, that gives the total number of 
words assigned to each topic for each author. This information must be reduced 
to the ∆ matrix identified above. The form of the author-topic model makes an 
explicit assumption regarding an author’s prior distribution over topics. This 
value is expressed by the hyperparameter α. Given the number of topics fit to a 
particular model, we may use the value of α to generate a set of a priori author-
specific topic distributions. These, in turn, can be input into the equation above 
in order to generate a prior distribution for any given author-pair’s link 
probability. Such a distribution is shown in Figure 18 



























Figure 18: A priori probability 
distribution for links between speakers 
in the April 21, 2004 meeting with 28 
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topics. The median of this distribution 
is 0.0356; whereas 1/28 = 0.0357. The 
assumption of a symmetric Dirchlet 
prior distribution implies that this 
distribution holds for all speakers until 
it is updated with data observed from 
the transcripts.  
In practice, the median value of this distribution becomes arbitrarily close to 1/(# 
topics). Therefore, within one iteration we assign a link if the observed 
probability that a given author pair discusses the same topic is linked exceeds 
1/(# topics). In other words, it is more likely than not that the author-pair is 
linked. If there are 10 topics, we would expect every author-pair to have a 10% 
probability of being linked, a priori. We consider an author pair to be linked within 
a given model iteration if that pair’s joint probability exceeds what we would 
expect under a uniform distribution. This scheme allows network construction to 
adapt to changing numbers of topics. 
As before, we average over multiple MCMC iterations to enable a social network 
to be created with weighted links, where the weight of each link is proportional to 
its frequency of occurrence among iterations. Nevertheless, the variability among 
draws from the MCMC algorithm suggests that links should not be weighted. 
Histograms of the distribution of these link frequency values tend to show a 
bimodal structure (see Figure 19) suggesting that a description of author pairs as 
either connected or not connected is appropriate.  
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Figure 19: Sample histogram of 
linkage frequency for an FDA 
Advisory Panel meeting of April 21, 
2004. The horizontal axis is the link 
weight (i.e., the frequency with which 
author-pairs are connected over 200 
samples from the AT model). The 
vertical axis is the link frequency of 
links with the weight specified by the 
abcissa (i.e., the number of author-
pairs that are connected with the 
frequency specified by the abcissa). 
Note the existence of two modes 
located at the extremes of the 
distribution.  
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The final challenge in constructing a network is determining where to establish 
the cutoff beyond which we accept that a pair of speakers is linked.  
Bonferroni Cutoff Criterion 
Two authors are considered to be linked in a network if they are more likely to be 
connected by an edge in a given sample iteration than not. Since there are 200 
samples from which a link might be inferred, we would like to establish a cutoff 
value that is consistent across networks. The largest committee in our sample of 
37 FDA advisory panel meetings possesses 15 potential voting members (not 
including the committee chair). Therefore, the largest network has 15*14/2 = 105 
potential links among voting members. Each potential link must be tested in 
order to determine if it occurs more frequently than would be expected by 
chance. Lacking any prior information on link probabilities, we assume that a 
given speaker has no predisposition towards either linking or not linking. 
Therefore, we would expect that a randomly chosen pair of speakers would be 
linked 100 times out of 200.  We would like to know if a given pair’s link 
frequency is higher than what we would expect under a uniform distribution 
across conditions of linkage and no linkage. The binomial test may be used for 
precisely this sort of analysis. Furthermore, given that we are testing up to 105 
different independent potential links, the p-value for this test should be subject to 
a Bonferroni correction. Using a binomial test, and a family-wise error rate of 
p=0.05, a given author pair must be linked at least 125 times out of 200 samples 
to be considered more frequently linked than we would expect by chance. This is 
the criterion that we use for all of the results presented in Chapter 5.  
Sample Networks  
The results of the analysis below anecdotally support the assertion that language 
and medical specialty are correlated. Nevertheless, some meetings display voting 
along institutional lines more clearly than do others. For example, Figure 20 and 
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Figure 21 show a strong grouping by medical specialty. Such clustering 
relationships are reminiscent of work in social psychology, in particular Dynamic 
Social Impact Theory (Nowak, Szamrej et al. 1990; Latane 1996). 
 
Figure 20: Graph of the FDA 
Circulatory Systems Advisory Panel 
meeting held on December 5, 2000. 
This meeting yielded a consensus 
approval of the medical device under 
analysis. Node shape represents 
medical specialty. The committee chair 
is in black.  
Legend: 
Red = Voted against Device Approval 
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Figure 21: Graph of the FDA 
Circulatory Systems Advisory Panel 
meeting held on October 27, 1998. 
This meeting yielded an approval of 
the medical device under analysis, with 
only one dissenter (in red). Node 
shape represents medical specialty. 
The committee chair is labeled and did 
not vote. The voter in black was not 
present for the vote. 
Grouping by Votes 
In situations where the panel’s vote is split, the method described in this paper 
can often isolate voting cliques (see Figure 22 and Figure 23). In some meetings, 
medical specialty and vote are aligned. This is the case in Figure 22. In this 
Legend:
Red = Voted against Device Approval
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meeting, all surgeons voted against device approval, whereas most cardiologists 
voted in favor. Radiologists’ votes were split evenly between the two. In others, 
such as Figure 23, there is a weaker correspondence. Both graphs show members 
of the same voting coalition to be connected. It is interesting that the device 
analyzed in the meeting represented by Figure 23 would not have been used by 
the vast majority of the medical specialties represented on the panel. That panel 
members interacted more frequently across boundaries on this device suggests a 
context-dependence for specialty grouping. Furthermore, both of these meetings 
were quite long, (approximately 10 hours) suggesting that panel members may 
have taken more time to learn from one another in the face of uncertain data. 
 
 
Figure 22. Graph of the FDA 
Circulatory Systems Advisory Panel 
meeting held on April 21, 2004. This 
meeting yielded an approval of the 
medical device under analysis, 
although the panel was split (blue, in 
favor; red against). Node shape 
Legend:
Red = Voted against Device Approval
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represents medical specialty. The 
committee chair is in black. 
 
Figure 23: Graph of  the FDA 
Circulatory Systems Advisory Panel 
meeting held on June 6, 1998. This 
device was not approved. Node shape 
represents medical specialty. The 
committee chair is in black. Non-
approval votes are in red; approval 
votes are in blue. In this meeting, vote 




Red = Voted against Device Approval
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In many of the cases for which graphs were generated, connectivity patterns 
could be understood using vote or specialty information alone. Chapter 5 will 
present an analysis exploring the relation between network connectivity and 
cohesion by vote or specialty. 
Other Factors  
On June 23, 2005 the Circulatory Systems Devices Panel held a meeting to 
determine whether a particular device should be approved for a Humanitarian 
Device Exemption. Such a meeting almost surely appeals to a sense of personal 
ethical responsibility that transcends medical specialty. In situations such as these, 
we might expect that individual votes and connectivity patterns will be more 
idiosyncratic and exhibit less coherence. Figure 24 shows the connectivity pattern 
for this meeting. Note that this graph cannot be as easily partitioned by vote or 
by medical specialty confirming the idea that the evaluation is independent of 
medical specialty and suggesting that voting blocs are not operative in this special 
case. That voting blocs are not connected in this graph suggests that dialogue may 
not be effective in changing preferences in the face of ethical or value-based 
decision-making. 
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Figure 24: Graph of the FDA 
Circulatory Systems Advisory Panel 
meeting held on June 23, 2005. Node 
color represents the vote (red is 
against humanitarian device 
exemption, blue is in favor of 
humanitarian device exemption, black 
is abstention. The committee chair is 
also black. Node shape represents 
medical specialty. 
Explicitly Representing Uncertainty in Graphs 
Future work can focus on explicit representation of link uncertainty between 
speakers. For example, given the prior background link distribution shown in 
Figure 18, we might ask how much more likely is a particular link to occur given 
its author-pair-specific distribution. An example of a prior link distribution 
Legend:
Red = Voted against Device Approval
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compared to its posterior is shown in Figure 25, for a very strongly linked pair of 
authors. 





























Figure 25: Comparison of  prior and 
posterior distribution of  link 
probabilities for two strongly-linked 
voting members during the April 21, 
2004 meeting. An ideal observer 
would place the link probability 
threshold around 0.04, indicating that 
a joint probability greater than this 
value would signal a link with very 
high likelihood. 
Given a pair of probability distributions we would like to determine how likely it 
is that a random sample is drawn from the posterior distribution, as opposed to 
the prior distribution. If the posterior distribution is treated as a signal and the 
prior distribution is treated as noise, we may formulate this problem as one of 
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signal detection. Solving this problem first requires setting a threshold, Θ. An ideal 
observer, i.e., one who assigns equal weight to false positives as to false negatives, 
would set Θ at the point of intersection between the curves representing the 
posterior and prior distributions. All observations that are greater than Θ would 
be considered evidence of a link. Given Θ (which might be calculated using the 
distributions described above), we can calculate the likelihood-ratio or signal-to-noise 
ratio of a given link. This is simply the probability of a correct detection divided 



















LR                                  (10) 
LR1,2 may serve as an edge weight on a graph between nodes representing 
speakers 1 and 2. For values of LR1,2 > 1, a link is more likely than not. Examples 
of such graphs are shown below in Figure 26 and Figure 27.  
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Figure 26: Weighted graph 
representation of the meeting held on 
March 5, 2002. Link weights reflect 
the likelihood that a given edge is due 
to sharing a topic compared to a 
background prior distribution. Note 
that this graph has a similar 
connectivity pattern to that shown in 
Figure 13, although it is somewhat 
denser due to low-likelihood links 




Red = Voted against Device Approval
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Figure 27: Weighted graph 
representation of the meeting held on 
March 5, 2002. Link weights reflect 
the likelihood that a given edge is due 
to sharing a topic compared to a 
background prior distribution. Note 
that this graph has a similar 
connectivity pattern to that shown in 
Figure 15, although it is somewhat 
denser due to low-likelihood links 
(e.g., those near 1). 
The graphs shown above are qualitatively very similar to those using the 
Bonferroni cutoff criterion and add apparently more detail. Nevertheless, more 
precise or explicit representation of uncertainty may be misleading. For example, 
a link that is 20 times stronger between two speakers does not necessarily imply 
Legend:
Red = Voted against Device Approval
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an affinity that scales proportionally. Furthermore, a very weak link, with log-
likelihood near 1.0, is likely to be due to noise. The above method of weighting 
graph links may prove useful in future research. Still, our analysis is more 
concerned with the presence or absence of links than their weights. Therefore, all 
subsequent results rely on the Bonferroni cutoff criterion. Nevertheless, future 
work could focus on refining the signal-detection scheme described above.  
 
Comparison across time 
Having established a means of grouping voters in a social network, we would 
now like to be able to include a temporal aspect in the analysis so as to be able to 
examine patterns of influence. Early attempts to do so focused on the idea that 
each FDA meeting may be divided into sections that coincide with natural breaks 
in the meeting. Examples of such include lunch, and coffee breaks. These breaks 
provide natural stopping points for an analysis. In addition, it is precisely during 
these breaks that committee members may share information off-the-record that 
would otherwise remain unshared. Thus comparing pre- and post-break graphs 
might provide insight into the evolution of committee decisions. All graphs 
shown in this section use a linkage threshold of 20% with ten topics. Figure 28, 
Figure 29 and Figure 30 show the social networks of the January 13, 2005 
meeting for the amount of time between each break: 
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Figure 28: First segment of the 
January 13, 2005 Circulatory Systems 
Devices Panel Meeting. At this point 
in the meeting, voting members had 
not yet expressed any preferences 
regarding voting. Rather, committee 
members were listening to the open 
public hearing and sponsor 
presentations. Data include utterances 
1-377 of 1671 total utterances. 
 
Legend:
Red = voted against device approval
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Figure 29: Second segment of the 
January 13, 2005 Circulatory Systems 
Devices Panel Meeting. This graph 
shows that, at this point in the 
meeting, Voting Members 5, 7, 8, 10, 
11 and 12 had begun discussing the 
statistical elements of the clinical trial 
design. Five of the six surgeons 
present have not yet expressed 
utterances. Data include utterances 
378-589 of 1671 total utterances. 
Legend:
Red = voted against device approval
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Figure 30: Third, and final, segment of 
the January 13, 2005 Circulatory 
Systems Device Panel Meeting. This 
graph shows that, after lunch, the 
surgeons in the room, who were 
previous silent, seemed to align in 
favor of device approval. Voting 
Members 8, 9, 10 and 12 seemed to 
maintain their relative positions 
between the second and third 
segments. Data include utterances 
590-1671.  
The above figures show a small group of voters engaging in a discussion of 
interest – forming a coalition, as it were – while those who remain silent 
Legend:
Red = voted against device approval
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eventually come to dominate the voting outcome through strength of numbers. It 
is particularly interesting that these two groups may be roughly divided by 
medical specialty, with exchange between representatives of each specialty group 
having appeared by the third segment. 
 
We may perform a similar analysis on the meeting analyzed previously – i.e., the 
meeting of the Circulatory Systems Devices Panel of March, 5th, 2002. This 
meeting is divided into “before lunch” and “after lunch” segments, as shown in 
Figure 31 and Figure 32. 
 
Figure 31: Before-lunch segment of 
the March 5th, 2002 Circulatory 
Systems Devices Panel Meeting. This 
graph shows that, at this point in the 
Legend:
Red = voted against device approval
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meeting, voting members had largely 
aligned themselves into blocs that 
would later vote similarly. Data 
include utterances 1-703 of 1250 total 
utterances. 
 
Figure 32: After-lunch segment of  the 
March 5th, 2002 Circulatory Systems 
Devices Panel Meeting. This graph 
shows that, by the second half  of  the 
meeting, those who would later vote 
against device approval had become 
more strongly linked to those who 
would later support device approval. 
This pattern perhaps reflects attempts 
by the approval voters to convince the 
Legend:
Red = voted against device approval
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non-approval voters to vote 
differently. Data include utterances 
704-1250 of  1250 total utterances. 
These graphs indicate a strong grouping by vote prior to lunch, followed by 
communication across these groups afterwards. Voting seemed to occur along 
the lines established early in the meeting. 
Finally, we examine a meeting held on April 21, 2004. This meeting was originally 
divided into four parts. Given that the voting members did not speak during the 
first two quarters of the meeting (leading to a fully disconnected graph), we 
present only the last two parts of the meeting, displayed in Figure 33 and Figure 
34.  
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Figure 33: Before-lunch segment of 
the April 21st, 2004 Circulatory 
Systems Devices Panel Meeting. This 
graph shows well-defined coalitions 
having been formed relatively early in 
the meeting. It is interesting that 
voting  patterns seem to largely 
respect the boundaries of particular 
medical specialties (i.e., surgeons vs. 
cardiologists). Data include utterances 
399-876 of 1822  total utterances.  
 
Legend:
Red = Voted against Device Approval
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Figure 34: After-lunch segment of the 
April 21st, 2004 Circulatory Systems 
Devices Panel Meeting. This graph 
shows that the well-defined coalitions 
of the before-lunch segment have 
broken down – particularly the anti-
device coalition. This may well be due 
to attemtps by members of one 
coalition to influence the other, 
leading to cross-coalition dialogue.. 
Data include utterances 877-1822 of 
1822  total utterances. 
Legend:
Red = Voted against Device Approval
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The first meeting segment shows the formation of two coalitions that ultimately 
voted oppositely. It is interesting that the pro-approval coalition is composed 
largely of cardiologists, whereas the anti-approval coalition is composed largely of 
non-cardiologists. Furthermore, the bridging members, Voting Members 4 and 8 
were outliers within their own group. Both served as chairs of other meetings, 
and are therefore perhaps more likely to listen broadly and to work to achieve 
consensus among panel members. The second meeting segment shows the 
breakdown and fragmentation of the anti-approval coalition and the 
consolidation of the pro-approval coalition prior to voting which may again 
indicate that, later in the meeting, attempts at dialogue across groups occurred but 
did not achieve consensus in this case. Because we do not know an individual’s 
preference midway through the meeting, we cannot tell if this effect holds during 
meetings that did reach consensus. 
Extraction of time dynamics using the above method is not generalizable across 
meetings. The reason for this is that the locations of the lunch and coffee breaks 
are not always timed to coincide with speech from voting members. In many 
meetings, the lunch break occurs before any panel member has an opportunity to 
speak. It is difficult to tell, from this representation, how influence passes in these 
committee meetings. Furthermore, a representation that separates post-break 
from pre-break implicitly assumes that no words spoken before the break carry 
over – this is clearly incorrect. Finally, there may be significant dynamics that 
occur on a shorter time-scale than depicted above. Although future work could 
focus on further developing this technique using methods such as Dynamic 
Network Analysis (Carley 2003), this thesis presents a different method of 
incorporating time into the analysis. This will be presented below. 
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Directed Graphs  
The conversation analysis literature in sociology (e.g., Gibson 2008) notes that, 
within small groups, influence is often linked to capacity to affect a topic shift. 
This is because of  the linear nature of  speech – two people cannot typically speak 
at the same time if  both are to be understood. Speaking order is therefore related 
to agenda control. For example, a more influential speaker may change the 
subject, whereas a less influential speaker will remain on the subject introduced by 
the higher-status speaker.  
Given an infrastructure for examining topic overlap among speakers, we can take 
advantage of  the temporal aspect of  our data to develop insights about topic 
changing as follows:  
Consider a sample, s, from the posterior distribution of  the AT model. Within 
this sample, choose a pair of  speakers, x1 and x2, and a topic z. Given that 
utterances are temporally ordered, this defines two separate time-series. Figure 35 
shows two time series for two different speakers in the meeting held on March 4, 
2002.  
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Figure 35: Time series for two 
speakers on topic #13 during the 
meeting held on January 13, 2005. 
This chart clearly shows that x1 speaks about topic z before x2 does. Based on this, 
we can say that x1 leads x2. These time series can be used to generate the topic-specific 
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,,, δδ                     (11) 
where fi,t
s (d) is the number of  words spoken by author i and assigned to topic z in 
document d, in sample s. The cross-correlation function for the data shown in 
Figure 35 is shown in Figure 36. 
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Figure 36: Cross-correlation of the 
two time series shown in Figure 35. 
Figure 36 clearly shows that the maximum value of  the cross-correlation function 
is less than zero. This is a quantitative indication that x2 lags x1. The location of  





zi ffm ∗= . In 
principle, there may be multiple peaks in the cross-correlation function, as in 
Figure 37.  
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Figure 37: A cross-correlation 
function with two peaks, representing 
two speakers who are equally involved 
in leading conversation on this topic. 
For each sample, s, from the AT Model’s posterior distribution, we examine the 
cross-correlation function for each author pair, {xi, xj}, in topic z. Let there be k 
peaks in the cross-correlation function. For each peak, if  mk > 0, we say that 
author i lags author j in topic z, at point mk (i.e., 1,,, =k
s
mzjil ). Similarly, we say that 
author i leads author j in topic z at point mk (i.e., 1,,, −=
s
mzji k




l . For each sample, s, we define the polarity of  authors i and j 
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If  most of  the peaks in the cross-correlation function are greater than zero, then 
the polarity = 1; if  most of  the peaks are less than zero, then the polarity = -1; 
otherwise, the polarity = 0. 
We are particularly interested in the topic polarities for author-pairs who are 
linked in the graph methodology outlined above – i.e., where ∆i,j = ∆j,i =1. Using 
the polarity values defined above, we are interested in determining directionality 













,,, ))|(*)|(*()(          (12) 
This expression weights each topic polarity by its importance in the joint 
probability distribution between xi and xj, and is constrained to be between -1 and 
1 by definition. The set of  200 ds(ei,j) defines a distribution, three types of  which 
are shown below: 
The net edge direction, d(ei,j) is determined by partition of  the unit interval into three 
equal segments. In particular, we examine the proportion of  the ds(ei,j) that are 
greater than 0. If  more than 66% of  the ds(ei,j) > 0 then d(ei,j) = 1 (the arrow 
points from j to i) – an empirical example of  this case is shown in Figure 38.  
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Figure 38: Edge direction distribution 
for two speakers, one of  who clearly 
leads the other. Both speakers were 
voting members in the meeting held 
on January 13, 2005. 
 
If  less than 33% of  ds(ei,j) > 0 then d(ei,j) = -1 (the arrow points from i to j) – an 
empirical example of  this case is shown in Figure 39. 
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Figure 39: Edge direction distribution 
for two speakers, one of  whom clearly 
lags the other. Both speakers were 
voting members in the meeting held 
on January 13, 2005. 
Otherwise, d(ei,j) = 0 (the arrow is bidirectional) – an empirical example of  this 
case is shown in Figure 40.  
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Figure 40: Edge direction distribution 
for two speakers, neither of  whom 
clearly lags the other. Both speakers 
were voting members in the meeting 
held on January 13, 2005.  
 
The result is a directed network, examples of  which are seen in Figure 41 and 
Figure 42. 
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Figure 41: Directed network 
representation of  the FDA Circulatory 
Systems Advisory Panel meeting held 
on January 13, 2005. Node size 
increases with the number of  words 
spoken by that author; node shape 
represents medical specialty. Non-
approval votes are red; approval votes 
are blue; non-voters are black. Each 
speaker’s top five words are listed, as is 
each edge’s link frequency. This 
diagram is generated using the dot 
algorithm (Gansner and North 1999). 
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Figure 42: Directed network 
representation of the FDA Circulatory 
Systems Advisory Panel meeting held 
on July 9, 2001. Node size increases 
with the number of words spoken by 
that author; node shape represents 
medical specialty. Non-approval votes 
are red; approval votes are blue; non-
voters are black. This diagram is 
generated using the dot algorithm 
(Gansner and North 1999). 
These directed graphs address all identified limitations of  the LSA approach 
while simultaneously providing a computational platform for the analysis of  
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communication patterns in technical expert committee meetings. The next 
chapter focuses on analysis of  these graphs and presents results regarding 
decision-making on FDA panels.   
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C h a p t e r  5  
RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS  
ל רחאלו וישכעמ יל תשדוקמ תא ירה הל רמאו דחא אב ברד הימעטלו ייבא רמא ' רחא אבו םוי
םוי םירשע רחאלו וישכעמ יל תשדוקמ תא ירה הל רמאו יל תשדוקמ תא ירה הל רמאו רחא אבו 
 יא ךשפנ המ טג הכירצ הניא יעצמאמ טג הכירצ ןורחאמו ןושארמ םימי הרשע רחאלו וישכעמ
 אמקד יאוה האנת ישודיק ואל ךנהד ישודיק ארתבד יאוה הרזח יא ישודיק ואל ךנהד ישודיק
דחו דח לכמ אטיג יעביתו הרזח עמשמו האנת עמשמ אנשיל יאה אמיתד והמ אטישפמק "ל  
Abaye said: According to Rav, if [a man] came and said to [a woman]: “Behold, you are 
betrothed to me from now and after thirty days,”and then another man came and said to [the 
same woman]: “Behold, you are betrothed to me from now and after twenty days,” and then 
another man came and said to her: “Behold, you are betrothed to me from now and after ten 
days,” she requires a divorce from the first and from the last, but from the intermediate she does 
not require a divorce. Whatever you consider, if [each man’s statement] is a stipulation, the first 
man’s betrothal [is valid]. If, [each man’s statement] is a retraction, the last man’s betrothal [is 
valid]; the other mens’ betrothals are not. This is obvious; [but] you might have interpreted [Rav 
to mean that] this language can carry the meaning [of] a stipulation, and can [also] carry the 
meaning [of] a retraction. Thus [the woman] would require a divorce from each and every one. 
[Abaye] informs us. –Babylonian Talmud, Kiddushin, 59b-60a, trans. Hebrew and Aramaic 
“It is not that the rabbis went to the depth of peoples’ minds that they either all mean a 
stipulation or they all mean a retraction. Rather, the implication of the words was uncertain to 
them. Therefore, even if one of them says that he meant one thing, and the other says he meant 
the opposite, we only pay heed to the primary indication and law of the language. For the 
intention of the one who made the betrothal isn’t known to the witnesses except from the language 
and what it indicates.” – Rabbi Shlomo ben Aderet, b. 1235 - d. 1310, Chiddushei 
HaRashba.  trans. Hebrew, Rabbi B. Ganz, on socially determined limits of verbal ambiguity. 
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Sources of Influence on FDA Panels  
One of the major goals of this work is to attempt to identify potential flows of 
communication on FDA panels, and their implications for committee behavior. 
In order to better understand these, we first examine the backgrounds of 




3. Medical Specialty 
4. Age (number of years since doctoral-level degree granted) 
5. h-Index8 
The first four attributes were collected using a combination of Google searches 
and information stored at http://www.vitals.com; whereas h-Index for a given 
panel member in a given year was provided by the ISI Web of Science.  
With the exception of medical specialty, all of the variables listed above fall into 
the category of “attribute-based status characteristics”, as defined in the “small-
groups” strand of literature in sociology (e.g., as represented in Berger et al. 1972). 
This body of literature predicts that these status characteristics might be 
associated with different voting behaviors. One sort of behavior that we might 
see on FDA panels is “air-time” – i.e., the amount of time that a given speaker 
speaks. Research in social psychology has shown that perceived influence is 
                                                 
8 H-Index is a metric of academic prestige associated with journal citation behavior. “A scientist has index h if h 
of [his/her] Np papers have at least h citations each, and the other (Np − h) papers have at most h citations each.” (Hirsch 
2005). Deeper analysis of the impact of other demographic variables on h-index (cf. the analysis performed 
in Kelly & Jennions 2006) is shown in Appendix 2. 
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associated with air-time (Bottger 1984). This is to be contrasted with actual 
influence, which Bottger finds is associated with problem-solving expertise. 
Results shown in Table 6 indicate that several variables have a significant effect 
on air-time: 
Table 6: 4-way ANOVA showing the 
effects of Gender, Medical Specialty, 
h-Index, and Age on air-time for our 
sample of 37 meetings. In this 
analysis, air-time has been normalized 
and a logit transform has been applied 
to enable comparisons across 
meetings. When race is included as an 
explanatory variable, it fails to reach 
significance (p=0.20), suggesting no 
identifiable effect of race. Medical 
Specialty captures most of the 
variance in air-time, followed by h-
Index, gender and age. 







Gender 5.81 1 5.81 14.24 0.0002 
Medical 
Specialty 
9.69 7 1.38 3.39 0.0016 
h-Index 7.19 1 7.19 17.64 <0.0001 
Age 2.61 1 2.61 6.40 0.012 
Error 137.78 338 0.41  
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Total 168.44 348  
 
Independent Tukey Honestly-Significant Difference (HSD) tests of multiple 
comparisons show that women use significantly more air-time than do men; 
however, this effect does not exist for the subset of 17 meetings in which a voting 
minority existed. Table 7 shows the same ANOVA analysis on this subset of 
meetings: 
Table 7: 4-way ANOVA showing the 
effects of Gender, Medical Specialty, 
h-Index, and Age on air-time for the 
subset of 17 meetings in which there 
was a minority. In this analysis, air-
time has been normalized and a logit 
transform has been applied to enable 
comparisons across meetings. Here, 
most of the variance is captured by h-
Index followed by Medical Specialty 
and age. Gender fails to reach 
significance as an explanatory variable. 







Gender 0.0022 1 0.0022 0.93 0.34 
Medical 
Specialty 
0.039 6 0.0065 2.73 0.015 
h-Index 0.043 1 0.043 18.22 <0.0001 
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Age 0.013 1 0.013 5.28 0.023 
Error 137.78 338 0.41 
Total 168.44 348  
 
 
Empirical Finding 1: Gender, Medical Specialty, h-Index, and Age are all 
significant variables associated with a panel member’s air-time. Women 
tend to have more air-time than men do, although this effect is not visible 
in meetings with voting differences. 
Bottger found that, in the most effective teams, air-time and actual influence 
covary. We might therefore expect that, in meetings where there is not consensus, 
members of the voting majority would tend to have a higher air-time than do 
members of the voting minority. Figure 43 shows that this is not the case.  





















Figure 43: A Kruskal-Wallis test 
shows no significant difference 
between the air-time proportions of 
majority and minority voters (p=0.86) 
for the 17 meetings in which a split-
vote existed. 
Empirical Finding 2: There is no observably significant effect between 
vote and air-time. 
Finally, we might examine the impact of many of the status characteristics 
outlined above on voting behavior. Although vote is a dichotomous variable, and 
therefore does not meet the ANOVA assumptions, one may argue that, with a 
sufficiently large number of datapoints, ANOVA still provides useful results with 
a sufficiently large number of degrees of freedom for error (Lunney 1970; see 
Table 8). 
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Table 8: 4-way ANOVA showing the 
effects of Gender, Medical Specialty, 
h-Index and Age on voting outcome 
for the 17 meetings in which there was 
a voting minority. In this analysis, 
voting outcome is a dichotomous 
variable, thereby violating the 
ANOVA assumptions. Only gender 
has a significant effect on voting 
outcome. 







Gender 1.442 1 1.442 7.76 0.006 
Medical 
Specialty 
0.5096 6 0.085 0.46 0.84 
h-Index 0.039 1 0.039 0.21 0.65 
Age 0.097 1 0.097 0.52 0.47 
Race 0.51 3 0.17 0.91 0.42 
Error 29.72 160 0.19 
Total 32.31 172  
 
 
The above table shows no significant effect of any of the variables tested on 
voting outcome, with the exception of gender. Table 9 shows an independent 
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analysis of the effect of gender on voting outcome, with the result that women 
are more frequently in the voting majority than men are.  
Table 9: A chi-square test examining 
the impact of gender on voting 
outcome for the 17 meetings in which 
a minority existed shows a significant 
result (χ2=8.29;dof=1;p=0.0040) with 
women more likely to be in the 
majority. 
 Majority Minority TOTAL 
Male 100 41 141 
Female 33 2 35 
TOTAL 133 43 176 
 
Empirical Finding 3: There is no observably significant effect of medical 
specialty, h-Index, age or race on voting behavior. Women are more likely 
to be in the voting majority than men are.  
Medical Specialty as an Organizing Factor 
We now turn to the role of medical specialty as an organizing factor on the FDA 
Circulatory Systems Advisory Panel. Unlike the other characteristics discussed in 
(Berger et al. 1972), medical specialty is typically not associated with status in the 
sociology literature. Indeed, Table 10 shows that medical specialty alone is not a 
strong predictor of voting behavior: 
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Table 10: There is no significant 







Statistician Other TOTAL 
Abstention 2 2 1 1 2 8 
Voting 
Minority 
15 16 6 2 4 43 
Voting 
Majority 
33 53 15 12 20 133 
TOTAL 50 71 22 15 26 184 
 
Empirical Finding 4: There is no observably significant effect between 
medical specialty and vote. 
We have already noted the statistically significant role of medical specialty as a 
control variable when measuring air time. Figure 44 shows a boxplot for the four 
most strongly-represented specialties on the panel: surgeons, cardiologists, 
electrophysiologists and statisticians. Visual inspection shows that surgeons and 
electrophysiologists speak less frequently than do cardiologists and statisticians. A 
Tukey HSD test for multiple comparisons shows that surgeons speak less 
frequently than do cardiologists and statisticians, and that cardiologists speak 
more frequently than do electrophysiologists.  
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Figure 44: Box plots for the four most 
strongly-represented specialties. Note 
that more “clinical” specialties 
(surgeons and electrophysiologists) 
tend to speak less than the more 
“medical” specialties (cardiologists 
and statisticians).  
The mediating effect of medical specialty is perhaps most apparent when it is 
examined using the graph-based methodology outlined in chapter 3. We have 
already noted some graphs where individual voters tend to group by medical 
specialty. This is because, in these meetings, members of the same specialty use 
common terminology. This strongly suggests that, in these meetings, the subject 
of discussion is mediated by the specialties present. We would like to formalize 
this intuition in order to determine if it is a phenomenon that is widespread 
across meetings: 



















Specialty (1=Surgeon; 2=Cardiologist; 3=Electrophysiologist; 4=Statistician)
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Consider a graph, ∆, generated by the method outlined in chapter 4. One such 
graph may be generated for each of the 37 meetings that we analyze. We would 
like to be able to determine, on a given graph, how likely members of the same 
medical specialty are to be linked to one another. Suppose that graph ∆ has n 
edges, m of which connect a pair of speakers who have the same medical 
specialty. We may therefore define specialty cohesion as m/n – the proportion of 
edges in graph ∆ connecting members of the same medical specialty. A high 
specialty cohesion might indicate that members of the same medical specialty are 
more likely to link than are members of different medical specialties – on the 
other hand, it might just indicate that the meeting is homogenous – if there is 
very little diversity on a panel, then we might expect cohesion to be high by 
definition. We would therefore prefer to compare the observed specialty 
cohesion to the cohesion of graphs that have similar properties to ∆. We can do 
this by examining specialty cohesion percentile: For each graph, ∆, representing a 
meeting, 1000 random graphs are generated having a number of nodes, and a 
graph density, equal to those found in ∆. Each node is similarly assigned a 
medical specialty as in ∆. Specialty cohesion is calculated for each of these 
random graphs, generating a meeting-specific distribution. Specialty cohesion 
percentile is defined as the proportion of the resultant graphs that have lower 
specialty cohesion than ∆. 
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Random Graph Background Distribution
Empirical Specialty Cohesion Percentile Distribution
 
Figure 45: Histogram of Specialty 
Cohesion Percentiles for the 37 
meetings in our sample. The empirical 
specialty cohesion percentile 
distribution's cumulative distribution 
function is significantly less than that 
of the background distribution (one-
sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov test; 
p=0.0045) indicating that the 
empirical distribution has more 
probability density concentrated near 
unity and away from zero. 
Figure 45 shows the empirical distribution of specialty cohesion percentiles for 
the 37 meetings analyzed (in red). This is contrasted with the specialty cohesion 
percentile distribution for 1000 random graphs – a uniform distribution. We may 
see, by inspection, that the empirical specialty cohesion percentile distribution has 
a right skew – i.e., probability mass is concentrated near 1 and away from 0. This 
suggests that specialties are more likely to group together than we might expect 
under conditions of chance. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of 
distributions finds that the empirical cumulative distribution function (CDF) is 
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significantly less than the uniform background CDF (p=0.0045), indicating that 
the skew shown in Figure 45 is statistically significant. Plots of the CDFs are 
shown in Figure 46.  






























Figure 46: Cumulative Distribution 
Plot of Specialty Cohesion Percentiles 
for the 37 meetings in our sample. 
The empirical specialty cohesion 
percentile distribution's cumulative 
distribution function is significantly 
less than that of the background 
distribution (one-sided Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test; p=0.0045) indicating 
that the empirical distribution has 
more probability density concentrated 
near unity and away from zero. 
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These results provide support for the notion that members of the same medical 
specialty tend to preferentially link to one another, but not in a way that totally 
precludes links to other specialties.  
Empirical Finding 5: Panel members of the same medical specialty are 
significantly more likely to be linked than would be expected under 
chance. 
Anecdotal experience also shows a relation between voting behavior and linkage 
patterns. If people who vote the same way also share linguistic attributes, then 
this suggests that their attention may be directed towards something that drives 
their decision outcome. This further suggests the possibility of agreement on a 
relatively small number of reasons for either approval or non-approval. On the 
other hand, the absence of links between members who vote the same way 
suggests that there may be a high diversity of reasons for why individuals vote a 
certain way, combined with attempts by some panel members to convince others 
who might disagree. In a similar manner to how we define specialty cohesion, we 
define vote cohesion as the proportion of edges in a graph that connect two panel 
members who vote the same way. Vote cohesion percentile is the proportion of 
random graphs, out of 1000 samples, that have lower vote cohesion than a graph 
representing a given meeting. There are 11 meetings in which there is a voting 
minority that has at least two people in it. These are used to generate a second 
meeting-specific distribution found in (in red) in Figure 47. This is contrasted 
against the vote cohesion percentile distribution for 1000 random graphs – a 
uniform distribution. 
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Random Graph Background Distribution
Empirical Vote Cohesion Percentile Distribution 
 
Figure 47: Histogram of Vote 
Cohesion Percentiles for the 11 
meetings with a minority of size 2 or 
greater. The empirical vote cohesion 
percentile distribution's cumulative 
distribution function is significantly 
less than that of the background 
distribution (one-sided Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test; p=0.015) indicating that 
the empirical distribution has more 
probability density concentrated near 
unity and away from zero. 
We may see, by inspection, that the empirical vote cohesion percentile 
distribution has a right skew – i.e., probability mass is concentrated near 1 and 
away from 0. This suggests that people who vote alike are more likely to group 
together than we might expect under conditions of chance. A Kolmogorov-
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Smirnov test for equality of distributions finds that the empirical cumulative 
distribution function (CDF) is significantly less than the uniform background 
CDF (p=0.015), shown in Figure 48. These results provide support for the 
notion that panel members who vote similarly tend to be linked.  






























Figure 48: Cumulative Distribution 
Plot of Specialty Cohesion Percentiles 
for the 11 meetings with a minority 
with two or more voting members. 
The empirical vote cohesion percentile 
distribution's cumulative distribution 
function is significantly less than that 
of the background distribution (one-
sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov test; 
p=0.015) indicating that the empirical 
distribution has more probability 
density concentrated near unity and 
away from zero. 
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Empirical Finding 6: Panel members who vote the same way are 
significantly more likely to be linked than would be expected under 
chance. 
A scatter plot of specialty cohesion percentile vs. vote cohesion percentile for the 
11 meetings analyzed shows that the two quantities are correlated (Spearman rho 
= 0.79, p=0.0061). This is a relatively tight correlation, suggesting strongly that 
specialty cohesion and voting cohesion increase together. In other words, 
meetings in which individuals’ language links them by specialty are also meetings 
in which they are linked by vote. Of the 11 meetings observed, five have 
particularly high specialty cohesion and high vote cohesion, suggesting that these 
factors are dominant in these particular meetings.  















































Spearman's Rho = 0.79
p = 0.0061
 
Figure 49: Scatter plot of Vote 
Cohesion percentile vs. Specialty 
Cohesion percentile for 11 meetings in 
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which there was a minority of two or 
more. Vote and specialty cohesion 
percentiles are positively associated 
(Spearman Rho =0.79; p=0.0061). 
Each datapoint is labeled by its 
corresponding meeting ID, as 
catalogued in Appendix 3. Datapoints 
are also color-coded by the 
proportional size of the minority in 
each meeting, suggesting that this 
effect holds independent of 
proportional minority size. 
Empirical Finding 7: Vote cohesion percentile and specialty cohesion 
percentile are significantly positively associated for the subset of 11 
meetings with at least two members in the voting minority. 
Directed Graph Results 
The Effects of Panel Member Speaking Order  
Chapter 4 outlined a methodology for creating directed graphs by taking 
advantage of temporal ordering among topics. Influential panel members, who 
initiate topics that others follow, are more likely to be near the “top” of the graph 
(i.e., a low indegree) whereas panel members who are not followed tend to be 
near the “bottom” (low outdegree). This perhaps reflects a tendency for members 
of the voting minority to speak later in the meeting, compared to members of the 
voting majority. Figure 50 shows the difference between the median speaking 
order locations of voting majority and voting minority members. Voting minority 
members tend to speak later (p=0.0008) than do members of the voting majority.  










































Figure 50: Kruskal-Wallis non-
parametric ANOVA finds a significant 
difference between the median 
speaking order rank of voting majority 
and voting minority voting members 
in the 17 meetings in which there was 
a voting minority (abstentions were 
not included); p=0.0008. Voting 
minority members speak later than 
majority members do. 
When meetings with a voting minority of only one member are excluded, we also 
find a significant difference between the median speaking order locations of 
members of the majority and the minority (p=0.011). A boxplot of this result is 
shown in Figure 51. 


















Figure 51: Kruskal-Wallis non-
parametric ANOVA finds a significant 
difference between the median 
speaking order rank of voting majority 
and voting minority voting members 
in the 11 meetings in which there was 
a voting minority with two or more 
voting members (abstentions were not 
included); p=0.011. Voting minority 
members speak later than voting 
majority members do.  
Empirical Finding 8: Members of the voting minority tend to speak later 
than do members of the voting majority. 
Members of the voting minority tend to have a lower graph outdegree than do 
members of the voting majority (p=0.045), shown in Figure 52.  
























Figure 52: Kruskal-Wallis non-
parametric ANOVA finds a significant 
difference between the outdegree of 
voting majority and voting minority 
panel members in the 17 meetings in 
which there was a majority 
(abstentions were not included); 
p=0.045. There is no observable effect 
for indegree (p=0.67) or undirected 
degree (p=0.37).  
Examining the subset of 11 meetings in which there was a voting minority of size 
two or larger, we find that this effect also holds, but is only marginally statistically 
significant (p=0.058), shown in Figure 53.  
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Figure 53: Kruskal-Wallis non-
parametric ANOVA finds a significant 
difference between the outdegree of 
voting majority and voting minority 
panel voting members in the 11 
meetings in which there was a majority 
of size two or larger (abstentions were 
not included); p=0.058.  
Empirical Finding 9: Members of the voting minority tend to have a lower 
graph outdegree than do members of the voting majority. 
There is an association between outdegree and speaking order (Spearman rho=-
0.35; p=1.15 x 10-6), and between indegree and speaking order (Spearman 
rho=0.45; p=5.9 x 10-11) for the 17 meetings with a voting minority, something 

























  166 
ordering, which is in turn shaped by procedural constraints. This association also 
holds for the subset of 11 meetings with a minority of two or more (Outdegree 
rho = -0.27; p=0.0026); (Indegree rho = -0.48; p=5.9 x 10-8). Furthermore, an 
analysis of covariance shows no significant difference between the correlations 
between location in speaker order and meetings with a minority of one compared 
to meetings with a minority of two or more (p=0.49 for outdegree; p=0.34 for 
indegree).  
Empirical Finding 10: Outdegree is negatively and significantly associated 
with location in the speaking order, and indegree is positively and 
significantly associated with location in the speaking order. 
An ANOVA identifies speaking order as capturing the main effect in voting 
behavior, whereas the effect due to outdegree is not significant (see Table 11).. 
Table 11: 2-way ANOVA Table 
showing effect of Outdegree and 
Speaking Order on vote (majority vs. 
minority) for those 17 meetings in 
which there is a minority. Although 
the ANOVA assumptions are not 
met, an effect of Speaking Order is 
still evident (cf. Lunney 1970). The 
absence of an effect due to outdegree 
suggests that the variance in speaking 
order accounts for the variance in 
voting behavior as well as in 
outdegree.  







Outdegree 0.076 1 0.076 0.043 0.51 





1.5 1 1.5 
 
8.7 0.0036 
Error 30 173 0.18 
Total 32 175  
 
 
This result also holds for the subset of 11 meetings with a voting minority of at 
least two voting members, as shown in Table 12.  
Table 12: 2-way ANOVA Table 
showing effect of Outdegree and 
Speaking Order on vote (voting 
majority vs. voting minority) for those 
11 meetings in which there is a 
minority with at least two members. 
Although the ANOVA assumptions 
are not met, an effect of Speaking 
Order is still evident. The absence of 
an effect due to Outdegree suggests 
that the variance in speaking order 
accounts for the variance in voting 
behavior as well as in outdegree. 









0.082 1 0.082 0.28 0.60 




1.44 1 1.44 4.91 0.029 
Error 34.6 118 0.29 
Total 36.6 120  
 
 
Empirical Finding 11: Location in the speaking order seems to account for 
the variance in voting behavior that is associated with outdegree. 
Recall that empirical finding 2 shows that vote and air-time are not associated. 
Instead, some of the above results might seem to indicate that the outcome of a 
meeting depends on a procedure that could equalize air-time, but that might have 
other effects on voting behavior. To further explore this idea, we examined the 
subset of meetings in which there was a minority of at least one person. These 
meetings were then further subdivided into meetings in which the device was 
approved (n=7) and meetings in which the device was not approved (n=10). In 
meetings in which the device was not approved, we found that members of the 
voting majority (i.e., those who voted against device approval) spoke significantly 
earlier than did members of the voting minority (p=0.0025; see Figure 54) 
 









































Figure 54: Members of the voting 
minority (in favor of device approval) 
speak significantly later than do 
members of the voting majority 
(against device approval) in the 10 
meetings in which the panel voted not 
to approve the devices (p=0.0025) 
In meetings in which the device was approved, there was no significant difference 
between members of the voting majority and voting minority (p=0.12), although 
there is a trend towards members of the voting minority speaking later (see 
Figure 55). 









































Figure 55: Members of the voting 
minority (against device approval) do 
not speak significantly later than do 
members of the voting majority (in 
favor of device approval) in the 7 
meetings in which the panel voted not 
to approve the devices (p=0.12). By 
inspection, there is a non-significant 
trend for the voting minority to speak 
later than does the voting majority. 
Empirical Finding 12: Members of the voting minority spoke significantly 
later in meetings in which the panel did not approve the devices than did 
members of the voting majority. This trend was not present in meetings in 
which the panel did approve the device. 
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An opposite trend was found when examining outdegree. In meetings in which 
the device was not approved (n=10), we found that there was no significant 
difference between the normalized outdegrees of members of the voting majority 




























Figure 56: Members of the voting 
minority (in favor device approval) do 
not have significantly smaller 
outdegrees than do members of the 
voting majority (against device 
approval) in the 10 meetings in which 
the panel voted not to approve the 
devices (p=0.27). 
In meetings in which the device was approved (n=7), there was a marginally 
significant difference between members of the voting majority and voting 
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Figure 57: Members of the voting 
minority (against device approval) 
have marginally significantly smaller 
outdegrees than do members of the 
voting majority (in favor of device 
approval) in the 7 meetings in which 
the panel voted to approve the devices 
(p=0.056). 
Empirical Finding 13: Members of the voting minority had a significantly 
smaller outdegree in meetings in which the device was approved. This 
trend was not present in meetings in which the panel did not approve the 
device. 
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Analysis shows that use of directed graphs can help identify which voting 
members are likely to be part of the voting minority. This is accomplished by 
analyzing “graph sinks”, i.e., nodes with zero outdegree and nonzero indegree. 
Graph sinks are more likely to be members of the voting minority than are other 
nodes (see Table 13). 
Table 13: Analysis of the 17 meetings 
with a voting minority indicates that 
members of the minority are more 
likely to be graph sinks than are 
members of the majority (χ2 = 4.92; 
dof=1; p=0.026). 
 Sink Non-Sink TOTAL 
Voting Minority 13 30 43 
Voting Majority 20 113 133 
TOTAL 33 143 176 
 
This result also holds for the subset of meetings in which there is a majority 
including at least two voting members, as shown in Table 14.  
Table 14: Analysis of the 11 meetings 
with a voting minority including at 
least two members indicates that 
members of the voting minority are 
more likely to be graph sinks than are 
members of the voting majority (χ2 = 
4.66; dof=1; p=0.031). 
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 Sink Non-Sink TOTAL 
Voting Minority 11 26 37 
Voting Majority 10 67 77 
TOTAL 21 93 114 
 
Empirical Finding 14: Members of the voting minority are more likely to 
be graph sinks than are members of the voting majority. 
These results are understandable in light of the speaking-order effect on FDA 
panels identified above. In particular, we find that panel members who speak last 
are more likely to be in the voting minority than are panel members who don’t 
speak last (see Table 15). 
Table 15: Analysis of the 17 meetings 
with a voting minority shows that 
members of the voting minority are 
more likely to the last speaker than are 
members of the voting majority (χ2 
=5.22; dof=1; p=0.022)  
 Last Speaker Other TOTAL 
Voting Minority 8 35 43 
Voting Majority 9 124 133 
TOTAL 17 159 176 
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Although a voting minority member is almost twice as likely to be the last speaker 
as is a voting majority member in the subset of 11 meetings in which there is a 
voting majority including at least two panel members, this result is not statistically 
significant, as shown in Table 16. On the other hand, singleton voting minority 
members are significantly more likely to be the last speaker than are members of 
the much larger voting majority, as shown in Table 17. 
Table 16: Analysis of the 11 meetings 
with a voting minority of size two or 
more shows that members of this 
voting minority are not more likely to 
the last speaker than are members of 
the voting majority (χ2 =0.94; dof=1; 
p=0.33) 
 Last Speaker Other TOTAL 
Voting Minority 5 32 37 
Voting Majority 6 71 77 
TOTAL 11 103 114 
 
Table 17: Analysis of the 6 meetings 
with a voting minority of size one only 
shows that members of the voting 
minority are more likely to the last 
speaker than are members of the 
voting majority (χ2 =12.36; dof=1; 
p=0.00044). Of the three voting 
minority members who are the last 
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speaker, two are graph sinks and one 
is a graph isolate (outdegree and 
indegree are both 0). 
 Last Speaker Other TOTAL 
Voting Minority 3 3 6 
Voting Majority 3 53 56 
TOTAL 6 56 62 
 
Empirical Finding 15: Members of the voting minority are more likely to 
be the last speaker to ask questions of the sponsor and FDA, than are 
members of the voting majority, especially for meetings in which there is a 
singleton voting minority.  
We therefore have two competing heuristics that might be used to evaluate 
whether a given voter is likely to be in the minority. This is a binary classification 
task, whose efficacy we can measure using the “F-score”, a commonly used 
metric in the information retrieval literature. The F-score is defined as the 




























Table 18 shows precision, recall and the F-score for the two conditions 
examined.  
Table 18: Table of Precision, Recall, 
and F-Score for the data shown 
above. The graph sink method has a 
consistently higher precision and F-
score, and is lower on recall only in 
the case of 17 meetings. 
17 Meetings with a minority of 
size 1 or larger 
11 Meetings with a minority of 
size 2 or larger 
 
Graph Sinks Last Speaker Graph Sinks Last Speaker 
Precision 0.30 0.19 0.30 0.14 
Recall 0.40 0.47 0.52 0.45 
F-score 0.34 0.27 0.36 0.21 
  
We note that precision and F-score are both higher for the graph sink heuristic 
across both conditions. Recall is higher for the last speaker condition only when 
the six meetings with a voting minority of size one are included. 
Empirical Finding 16: Using F-score as an evaluation criterion, the graph 
sink heuristic provides a superior classification of minority members when 
compared to the last speaker heuristic. 
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The Effects of Lead Reviewers  
Speaking order is an important variable associated with voting behavior. Thus we 
would also like to examine those at the start of the speaking order – namely, the 
lead reviewers.  Lead-reviewers are panel members designated by FDA to review 
a given device in more depth prior to the panel proceedings. They always speak 
first or immediately after another lead reviewer. A panel meeting may have as 
many as two lead reviewers. Although lead reviewers speak more than do other 
voting members across the set all subsets of meetings9, lead reviewers are not 
significantly more likely to be in the minority when compared to other voting 
members10. Although lead reviewers have a significantly or marginally-
significantly larger outdegree11 and a significantly smaller indegree12 than do other 
panel members, lead reviewers in the minority do not have a significantly 
different outdegree or indegree from lead reviewers in the majority13.  
Empirical Finding 17: Although lead reviewers have a significantly higher 
air-time and outdegree, and a significantly lower indegree than other panel 
members, their overall voting behavior is not significantly different. 
There is at least one lead reviewer in the majority for all but one meeting for 
which lead reviewers were assigned (n=35). The one outlier was a meeting in 
which the lead reviewer was a specialty isolate – i.e., the only surgeon on a 
committee largely composed of cardiologists. This individual was also a graph 
                                                 
9 (n=37;. p=0.031 by a Kruskal-Wallis analysis); (n=17; p=0.0004 by a Kruskal-Wallis analysis); (n=11; 
p=0.0115 by a Kruskal-Wallis analysis) 
10 (n=37;.χ2=0.27; dof=1; p=0.87); (n=17;.χ2=0.0029; dof=1; p=0.95); (n=11;.χ2=0.15; dof=1; p=0.70) 
11  (n=37;. p=2.1 x 10-5 by a Kruskal-Wallis analysis); (n=17; p=0.011 by a Kruskal-Wallis analysis); (n=11; 
p=0.079 by a Kruskal-Wallis analysis) 
12  (n=37;. p=1.31 x 10-5 by a Kruskal-Wallis analysis); (n=17; p=0.0017 by a Kruskal-Wallis analysis); (n=11; 
p=0.0026 by a Kruskal-Wallis analysis) 
13  (n=37;. p=0.32 by a Kruskal-Wallis analysis); (n=17; p=0.22 by a Kruskal-Wallis analysis); (n=11; p=0.42 
by a Kruskal-Wallis analysis) 
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isolate (i.e. indegree and outdegree = 0). Furthermore, for meetings where there is 
at least one lead reviewer in the voting minority, the voting minority tends to be 






























Is at Least One Lead Reviewer in the Minority?
 
Figure 58: Kruskal-Wallis non-
parametric ANOVA finds a significant 
difference between proportional 
voting minority size in the 35 
meetings in which there was a voting 
minority and at least one lead reviewer 
in the voting minority (p=0.0006). 
Similar results are obtained when 
focusing on the subset of 17 meetings 
with a voting minority (p=0.027). 
There is insufficient data to obtain a 
similar result for the subset of 11 
meetings with a voting minority of 2 
or more (p=0.33), although the 
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direction of the trend remains the 
same.  
Furthermore, with only one exception, in cases in which there was at least one 
lead reviewer in the voting minority, there was a second lead reviewer in the 
voting majority. The exception was the meeting held on July 9, 2001 (Meeting ID: 
16) in which the lead reviewer was a surgeon on a committee comprised largely of 
cardiologists. Therefore, the proportional size of the voting minority is also larger 
when lead reviewers disagree14. 
Empirical Finding 18: The proportional size of the voting minority is larger 
when lead reviewers do not vote with the majority within a given meeting, 
and when there is disagreement among lead reviewers. 
Furthermore, we find that meeting length is negatively correlated with the 
proportion of lead reviewers in the voting majority (Spearman Rho = -0.37, 
p=0.027).  
Empirical Finding 19: Meetings are longer when more lead reviewers are 
in the voting minority. 
Although, in general, members of the voting minority are more likely to be graph 
sinks, we find that, as meetings get longer, the maximum outdegree of a member 
of the voting minority increases – i.e., a voting minority member is more likely to 
reach the “top” of the graph (Spearman rho = 0.50; p=0.04).  Figure 59 shows 
the relation between the maximum outdegree of a member of the voting minority 
and meeting length. This is consistent with the anecdotal time dependence seen 
in Chapter 3 wherein graphs of later of meeting subsections showed increasing 
connectivity across voting blocs. 
                                                 
14 (p=0.0015; n=35), (p=0.029; n=16), (p=0.20; n=10, ns) 
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Spearman rho = 0.50
p=0.04
 
Figure 59: Maximum normalized 
outdegree is significantly associated 
with meeting length (Spearman 
rho=0.50; p=0.04). Datapoints are 
labeled by the meeting ID assigned in 
Appendix 3. There is no significant 
association between location of first 
minority member in the speaking 
order and meeting length (p=0.50). 
Empirical Finding 20: Meeting length is significantly positively associated 
with the maximum normalized outdegree among voting minority 
members, but not with maximum location in the speaking order. 
Under such conditions, voting minorities also become larger – indeed, the 
maximum outdegree of a voting minority member is strongly associated with the 
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proportion of voting members in the minority (Spearman rho = 0.62, p=0.0082; 
see Figure 60) 







































































Spearman rho = 0.62
p=0.0082
 
Figure 60: Maximum normalized 
outdegree is significantly associated 
with voting minority proportional size 
(Spearman rho=0.62; p=0.0082) for 
the 17 meetings in which there is a 
minority. Datapoints are labeled by the 
meeting ID assigned in Appendix 3. 
Empirical Finding 21: Maximum normalized outdegree is significantly 
associated with proportional voting minority size.  
This is generally consistent with the observation that as meeting length increases, 
so does the size of the voting minority (see Figure 61).  
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Figure 61: Plot of Meeting Length vs. 
voting minority proportional size. 
Meeting length is significantly 
positively associated with voting 
minority proportional size (Spearman 
Rho = 0.53; p=7.1 x 10-4). Decisions 
that are likely to have been clear or 
ambiguous are labeled.  
Empirical Finding 22: Meeting length is significantly positively associated 
with proportional voting minority size. 
One possible interpretation of this result is that longer meetings are associated 
with difficult decisions, perhaps due to complex devices or procedures, poor data 
quality or other sources of ambiguity about the device. Longer meetings typically 
involve more committee deliberation, which is more likely to be necessary when 
there is no consensus on how best to interpret the available data. In these cases, 
  184 
minority voters tend to be more randomly distributed in the graphs and 
procedural effects seem minimal. 
Chair effects 
The results shown above do not include the impact of the committee chair in the 
analysis. Using the directed graphs developed in the previous chapter, we can 
determine the impact of the committee chair on the meeting by examining 
his/her role in facilitating communication. Figure 62 shows a directed graph from 
the meeting held on June 23, 2005.  
 
Figure 62: Directed Graph 
representation of meeting held on 
June 23, 2005. Luo's hierarchy metric 
= 0.35. 
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We may quantify the impact that the committee chair has upon the meeting by 
determining, for each graph, the proportion of edges which are part of a cycle. 
This is a metric of the hierarchy in the graph (Luo et al., 2009). We display this 
metric for the graph without the chair (e.g., Figure 62) and with the chair (e.g., 
Figure 63).  
 
Figure 63: Directed Graph 
representation of meeting held on 
June 23, 2005, with the committee 
chair included. Luo's hierarchy metric 
= 0.78. 
The difference in this metric between graphs with and without the chair therefore 
quantifies the impact of the chair on the meeting. For the meeting held on June 
23, 2005, this value is 0.78-0.35 = 0.43. This suggests that the chair is significantly 
changing the topology of the meeting structure – in particular, it seems that the 
chair is connecting members at the “bottom” of the graph to those at the “top”. 
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Other meetings display different behavior by the chair. Consider the meeting held 
on October 27, 1998 (in Figure 64 and Figure 65).  
 
 
Figure 64: Directed Graph 
representation of meeting held on 
October 27, 1998. Luo's hierarchy 
metric = 0. 
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In this meeting, the committee chair served to connect the two disparate clusters 
on the panel. Nevertheless, the chair is not creating any new cycles on the graph. 
This is reflected in the fact that the hierarchy metric for both of these meetings is 
equal to 0. 
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Figure 65: Directed Graph 
representation of meeting held on 
October 27, 1998, with the committee 
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chair included. Luo's hierarchy metric 
= 0. 
Given that both meetings have a hierarchy of 0, the difference between them is 
also 0. In general, we can examine the difference in hierarchy for a given meeting. 
A histogram of these is shown in Figure 66. This histogram is bimodal.  





















Figure 66: Distribution of chair 
impacts for the set of 37 meetings 
analyzed. This distribution shows a 
bimodal structure.  
Empirical Finding 23: Inclusion of the Committee Chair in directed 
graphs leads to a bimodal distribution of the extent to which the chair 
changes the structure of the graph. These two modes may correspond to 
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different sorts of behavior by the Chair in his/her interactions with panel 
members during the meeting. 
This bimodal structure is particularly pronounced when we focus on the subset 
of meetings in which there is a voting minority. Among these meetings, the 
bimodality seems to be associated with meeting date (p=0.005). This effect is 




















Kruskal-Wallis One Way ANOVA
shows a significant (p=0.005) difference
between these two groups
No                                                Yes
 
Figure 67: The impact of the 
committee chair seems to be 
associated with meeting date. The 
vertical axis represents the number of 
days since January 1st, 1900. 
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Empirical Finding 24: Committee chair impact is significantly positively 
associated with meeting date for meetings in which there is a voting 
minority. 
A closer analysis of the meetings associated with this distribution is instructive 
(see Figure 68). We see that the impact of the chair seems to be increase markedly 
around March 2002.  



















































Figure 68: Impact of chair vs. meeting 
date for each of the 17 meetings in 
which there was a voting minority. 
Note that after March 4, 2002, chair 
impact seems to increase for most 
meetings. Each meeting is labeled by 
its corresponding ID.  
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Using this date as a cutoff, we find that meetings prior to March 4, 2002 are 
significantly shorter than meetings after March 4, 2002 (p=0.0004, by a Kruskal-
Wallis test). This is largely because half-day meetings were no longer held after 
this date (see Figure 69). 
 






































































Figure 69: Half-day meetings were not 
held after March 4, 2002. These later 
meetings are marked in red, whereas 
earlier meetings are in blue. Each 
meeting is labeled by its 
corresponding ID. 
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Concerns about bias on FDA Panels 
(Sherman 2004) identifies two potential sources of “bias” on FDA Panels. These 
may be broadly construed as financial and intellectual. Up until now, we have 
been largely studying intellectual factors, e.g., those related with medical specialty. 
A financial conflict of interest arises when a panel member in some way receives 
funding from either the device sponsor or one of its competitors. We would 
expect conflicts of interest to arise when panel members who possess the 
appropriate expertise yet lack a financial conflict are not available (McComas, 
Tuite & Sherman 2005). Indeed, we find that panel members with conflicts of 
interest have a higher h-index and therefore, or academic expertise, than do panel 
members without a conflict (p=0.002, by a Kruskal-Wallis test).  
Empirical Finding 25: Panel members with conflicts of interest tend to 
have a significantly higher h-index than do panel members without a 
conflict. 
Concerns regarding the effects that panel members with conflicts of interest 
might have on panel operations have been raised frequently with regards to FDA 
panels, particularly in the news media. A study by Lurie et al. (2006) found no 
significant relation between committee voting outcomes and conflict of interest 
on a subset of panels in the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER), 
and only a small relation between individual voting outcome and conflict of 
interest. One limitation of Lurie’s work is its inability to account for influence 
patterns – in particular, a given panel member may influence the vote of another 
through direction of attention. The method presented in chapter 3 and applied in 
this chapter allows an analysis of this potential effect. If an individual with a 
conflict of interest is influencing other panel members, then that individual would 
have a relatively high outdegree. We find that this is not the case (p=0.66 using a 
Kruskal-Wallis test)  
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Empirical Finding 26: Panel members with conflicts of interest do not 
have higher outdegrees than panel members without conflicts of interest. 
A possible concern is that when panel members with conflicts of interest are in 
influential positions (e.g., they have a high outdegree), the panel will follow them. 
We find that there is no significant difference between the outdegrees of panel 
members with conflicts who are in the voting majority and the outdegrees of 
panel members with conflicts who are in the voting minority (p=0.38). 
Empirical Finding 27: Panel members with conflicts of interest, who are in 
the voting majority do not have higher outdegrees than panel members 
with conflicts of interest who are in the voting minority. 
We find that, across our sample of 37 meetings, members with conflicts of 
interest are in the voting majority in 45 times out of 49 total conflicts (i.e, 92% of 
the time). After January 2002, panel members were required to report not only 
the presence or absence of a conflict of interest, but also its direction (i.e., with 
the sponsor or one of the sponsor’s competitors). In the 15 meetings since the 
beginning of 2002, there were 34 total conflicts of interests, of which 30 (88%) 
were in the voting majority. This finding is offset by the fact that of those 34 
conflicts of interest, 13 (38%) voted against their conflict of interest. There were 
14 meetings in which there was at least one panel member with a reported 
direction of conflict of interest. Of these, there were four meetings in which there 
was only one member with a conflict. In each of these four meetings, this 
member either voted against the conflict reported or was not allowed to vote at 
all. In each case, the panel’s voting outcome went against the reported conflict. 
There were five meetings in which there were multiple conflicts of interest that 
went in the same direction. In all but one of these meetings, the panel voted 
unanimously in favor of the direction consistent with the conflict. Finally, there 
were five meetings in which the conflicts of interest were “balanced” – i.e., 
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members representing both directions were present. In these meetings, there 
were a total of 15 panel members with conflicts of interest. Seven of these voted 
in the direction of their conflict, and eight voted against the direction of their 
conflict. This evidence suggests that conflicts of interest may be  minimized when 
there is only one member on the panel with a reported conflict or when there are 
opposing reported conflicts on the panel. When there are multiple panel 
members with consistent conflicts of interest, unanimous support for those 
conflicts might result. More data is required to rigorously test this finding. 
This chapter presented 27 empirical findings derived from an application of 
statistical analysis and the methodology outlined in Chapter 4 to a set of 37 
transcripts of the FDA Circulatory Systems Devices Advisory Panel Meetings. 
Implications of these findings are discussed in Chapter 7. The next chapter 
presents a quantitative model that attempts to replicate in silico the empirical 
findings outlined here, with a goal of deepening our theoretical understanding if 
decision-making on committees of technical experts.  
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C h a p t e r  6  
MODEL DEFINITION AND INITIAL RESULTS  
“The meaning of a representation can be nothing but a representation. In fact 
it is nothing but the representation itself conceived as stripped of irrelevant 
clothing. But this clothing can never be completely stripped off: it is only 
changed for something more diaphanous. So there is an infinite regression here. 
Finally the interpretant is nothing but another representation to which the 
torch of truth is handed along; and as representation, it has its interpretant 
again. Lo, another infinite series.”  
– Charles Sanders Peirce (1934-48), Collected Papers, 1.339, on modeling 
This chapter examines the role of expertise and one way that it might generate 
some of the empirical results observed in Chapter 4. To this end, we present a 
computational model whose purpose is to explore theoretical bases for the kinds 
of results found in Chapter 4. If the model can reproduce these empirical results 
and provide a potential explanation for the observed data, the underlying theory 
provides one potential explanation for the observed data. The results presented in 
this chapter are preliminary and subject to future investigation. The model 
presented here relies heavily on the literature in social psychology and, in 
particular, is a modification of the DISCUSS model, presented by Stasser (1992).  
DISCUSS was originally developed to explain the discrepancy between shared 
and unshared information first observed by Stasser and Titus (1985). Although 
successful at replicating and explaining these findings (Stasser 1992), DISCUSS 
was not used to explain later findings regarding the nature of expertise (Stasser et 
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al. 1995). Indeed, the original version of the model treats all decision-makers as 
equivalent except for their initial information distributions.  
In addition to incorporating expertise our version of DISCUSS must also be  
adapted to the case of the FDA panels. Thus, we must more closely examine 
FDA panel procedures. In particular, we would like the model to capture salient 
elements of the FDA panel process. The model presented in this chapter largely 
focuses on stages 5-8 of the panel process described in Chapter 3 (panel 
questions and later). Stages 1-4 (including sponsor and FDA presentations) are 
considered to be information revelation stages and fit into a pre-discussion phase 
as will be shown below.  
The model takes as input the following variables: 
Table 19: Model Input Variables 
Name Type Range 
Number of Speakers  Integer 4 – 15 
Device Complexity 
(Number of Topics) 
Integer 10 – 30 
Device Quality Real -1 – 1 
Device Ambiguity Real 0 – 1 
Specialty Membership Logical Matrix 0 or 1; matrix has as 
many rows as speakers 
and as many columns as 
specialties. There may be 
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as many as 8 specialties. 
Mean Breadth of 
Expertise 
Real 0 – 1 
Dispersion in Breadth of 
Expertise 
Real 0 – 1 
Mean Depth of Expertise Real 0 – 1 
Dispersion in Depth of 
Expertise 
Real 0 – 1 
Speaker Hierarchy Real 0 – 1 
Process Openness Real 0 – 1  
 
The purpose of the model is to generate a simulated discourse between panel 
members – this discourse is then used to generate sample networks, whose 
properties can be compared to the data shown in Chapter 5.  
Figure 70 shows a schematic of the model: 








































Figure 70: Schematic of the model 
outlined in this chapter. 
As shown above, the model may be divided into four phases, which are then 
further subdivided into modules. 
Phase 1: Background Generation 
In this phase, conditions of “empirical reality” are determined based upon model 
input. Properties of the device and its associated domains of knowledge and 
expertise are generated from model inputs. 
Module 1: Generate Ground Truth, Breadth and Depth 
In this module, properties of the device are generated from the summary statistics 
used as input. In particular, we conceive of a device as having a finite set of 
features, or topics, which might describe it. The number of topics, n, required to 
describe a given device is equal to its complexity as defined in Table 19. Consistent 
with the DISCUSS model, these topics may be thought of as items of 
information that are necessary to fully describe whether a given device should or 
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should not be approved. Although there are formal problems with this 
assumption (Watanabe 1985), we consider it to be sufficient for modeling 
purposes. Future work might circumvent these concerns by introducing a 
structure relating topics to one another (Richards 2008). Each one of m specialties 
has a different perspective on a topic, which is recorded as an entry in an a n x m 
matrix.  Each perspective is assumed to embody information that is either pro- or 
anti- device approval. The intuition is that a device has a given quality ranging 
between -1 and 1, which describes, overall, whether it should or should not be 
approved. Furthermore, the data describing that device has an associated amount 
of ambiguity such that if the data is very ambiguous, different topics will give very 
different signals, whereas if the data is very unambiguous, different topics will 
give similar signals. For each feature, we would like to generate a number 
between -1 and 1 that describes whether and how strongly its associated topic 
supports or opposes device approval. We therefore construct a probability 
distribution that meets these requirements. 
To do this, we use a beta distribution, which is defined by two parameters, α and 










βα xxxf                          (13) 
As can be seen from this expression, the range of a beta distribution is between 0 
and 1. Furthermore, the mean of a beta distribution is given by the expression 
α/(α+β). We would like to scale this range to be between -1 and 1. Therefore, 








Q                                               (14) 
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Further examination of the form of the beta distribution shows that for values of 
α and β less than 1, the beta distribution resembles an inverted-U, whereas for 
values of α and β near 1, the beta distribution resembles a uniform distribution. 
As α and β increase, the distribution has an increasingly large peak around the 
mean value. We take advantage of this property of the beta distribution to 
operationalize data ambiguity (A), which is defined on the interval 0 – 1. We first 




= At eA                                                         (15) 
This generates a number between one and infinity. We then use this effect to 
capture ambiguity as follows: 
 βα +=tA                                                       (16) 
Therefore as ambiguity goes to one, At goes to one, leading to a widely-dispersed 
distribution. Similarly, as A goes to 0, At goes to infinity, tending towards a 
distribution that is tightly concentrated around the mean. Solving these two 
equations simultaneously, we can determine values for α and β as follows:  
α = Q At                                                                                                        (17) 
β  = At –  α                                                       (18) 
Given these values of α and β, we then generate n random draws from a 
beta(α,β) distribution. Finally, these values are scaled onto the interval -1 – 1, 
defining a Ground Truth value for each topic/specialty pair, that fits the criteria 
described above. In particular, we define a Ground Truth matrix, GT, having m 
rows and n columns, such that for specialty i and topic j, GTi,j ~ beta(α,β). 
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Ground Truth is then re-scaled such that it is between -1 and 1, by multiplying 
each entry by two and subtracting one. 
A similar method is used to assign values of breadth and depth to each speaker. 
In particular, each of these quantities is drawn from beta distributions with the 
parameters defined in Table 19 (Mean Depth/Breadth; and Dispersion in 
Depth/Breadth). With the exception of the re-scaling procedures used on the 
quality parameter and Ground Truth values, the transformations of the depth and 
breadth parameters are the same as those used for Ground Truth (e.g., 
αbreadth=Mean_Breadth * Breadth_Dispersiont; βbreadth= Breadth_Dispersiont - 
αbreadth, where Breadth_Dispersiont is the result of the application of the 
transform in Equation 15 to the Breadth Dispersion shown in Table 19). 
Module 2: Assign Medical Specialties to Topics 
Each specialty is assigned a number of topics, representing information that 
members of that specialty are capable of knowing a priori. Each topic is assigned 
to each specialty with probability equal to 1/n. In addition, each topic is 
sequentially assigned to a given specialty in a deterministic fashion, such that the 
set of all topics is assigned sequentially among specialties. For example, if there 
are five topics and three specialties, then topic 1 is sequentially assigned to 
specialty 1, topic 2 to specialty 2, topic 3 to specialty 3, topic 4 to specialty 1, and 
topic 5 to specialty 2. As a result, each topic will be assigned to at least one 
specialty, and possibly more. Since each speaker is also assigned to a medical 
specialty, this forms the basis for an initial information distribution.  
Phase 2: Pre-Discussion Phase 
In this phase, preliminary information about each voting member is assigned 
prior to discussion. 
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Module 3: Assign Initial Information  
A given speaker knows a given topic in his/her specialty in equal proportion to 
that speaker’s depth. Recall that depth for each speaker is generated from a beta 
distribution with mean and dispersion parameters as shown in Table 19 and as 
transformed above. Furthermore, any speaker is capable of expertise. A speaker 
does not start with any knowledge about a topic outside this specialty.  
Module 4: Assign Initial Valence 
Each speaker is assigned a valence value for each topic about which s/he is 
knowledgeable. We may think of this value as the cognitive salience of that topic 
for that speaker, encoding its support or opposition to device approval. A beta 
distribution is generated for each author-topic-specialty triple. For author a seeing 
topic t from the perspective of specialty s, the mean of this distribution is the 
absolute value of Ground Truth – |GTs,t|. The dispersion, d, is a function of 





−= adepthed  as per equation 15. Thus, as depth 
increases, that speaker’s initial valence is more likely to be close to Ground Truth. 
Each speaker’s preference is the sign of the sum of their valences across all 
topics/specialty pairs in which they are knowledgeable.  
Module 5: Assign Speaking Propensity 
As in DISCUSS, speakers are assumed to generate an utterance with probability 
proportional to their location in a speaking hierarchy (cf. Stephan and Mishler 
1952). In the DISCUSS model, if a speaker at the top of the hierarchy speaks 
with probability p, then the second speaker speaks with probability kp, the third 
with probability k2p, etc, where k is the Speaker Hierarchy value defined in Table 
19. Unlike the DISCUSS model, we assume the existence of two “lead 
reviewers”. These are the first two speakers in the hierarchy, both of whom speak 
an equivalent amount, and three times more frequently than all other speakers. 
The lead reviewers each generate a number of utterances proportional to device 
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complexity and ambiguity throughout the meeting. In particular, the number of 
utterances for a lead reviewer is equal to 4 * Complexity * Ambiguity. Given that 
complexity ranges between 10 and 30, this allows the total number of utterances 
to go as high as 120, a number that is approximately equal to the total number of 
utterances empirically observed in the longest meetings. The remaining speakers 
follow the hierarchy defined in DISCUSS.  
 Module 6: Determine Speaking Order  
In FDA panel meetings, speakers ask questions in a fixed order, followed by a 
period of open discussion. This order is determined by the direction in which the 
chair decides to go around the table in soliciting panel questions, and is therefore 
jointly dependent on seating location and the chair’s procedural choice. Chwe 
(2003) notes that this is a form of ritual common knowledge. Lead reviewers 
always speak first, followed by the remaining panel members. This speaking order 
operates in the first part of the discussion phase, below.  
Phase 3: Pre-Discussion Phase 
The discussion phase consists of two modules: Structured Panel Discussion and 
Open Panel Discussion. The length of each of these depends on the Openness 
parameter shown in Table 19. Openness is defined as the maximum number of 
utterances in the Open Panel Discussion phase divided by the maximum number 
of utterances in the Structured Panel Discussion phase.  
Module 7: Structured Panel Discussion 
In this module, each speaker sequentially generates a finite set of utterances. The 
topic of each utterance is chosen with probability proportional to the absolute 
value of its valence, summed across all specialty perspectives with which that 
author is familiar for that topic. As in DISCUSS, we could allow for an advocacy 
parameter which might bias discussion of topics to those that support a given 
speaker’s current preference. In particular, we can assume that speakers only 
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discuss those topics that support their current preferences. The benchmark 
model implemented below does not make this assumption.  
Each utterance has the potential ability to influence other panel members to 
change their salience. Once a topic is discussed, each listener evaluates whether to 
adopt that topic’s valence. With a finite probability, the listener adopts the 
salience of the speaker in that topic, t. The probability that a given listener will 
adopt the salience of a given speaker, a, is inspired by Latane’s Social Impact 













∝                   (19) 
where Ut,a is the number of utterances spoken by speaker a in topic t and Ba is a 
bias parameter. If the speaker and the listener share the same specialty, then B is 
equal to unity. Otherwise, Ba is equal to the breadth of the speaker. A speaker will 
adopt a topic’s valence in proportion to the number of times that speaker has 
mentioned that topic (i.e., the speaker’s perceived expertise in that topic) and in 
inverse proportion to the square of the distance of that topic’s valence from 
Ground Truth (i.e., the speaker’s actual expertise in that topic). The definition of 
perceived expertise presented here is limited to topic-specific air-time, as inspired 
by Bottger (1984). Future work might incorporate a notion of perceived expertise 
that changes members’ contributions are judged valuable by others (such as panel 
members in other specialties). 
Normalizing over all speakers yields the probability that a given listener adopts 
the valence of a given speaker. Preferences are then updated for all speakers. 
Otherwise, the listener retains his/her original valence value. This module 
terminates when all speakers have generated their assigned number of utterances.  
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Module 8:  Open Panel Discussion 
This module is equivalent in nature to the Structured Panel Discussion module 
with the exception that speakers are chosen at random in proportion to their 
speaking propensity as defined in Module 6. This module terminates if the panel 
has reached a near- (i.e., minority of size 1) or full-consensus, or if each speaker 
has used up their full set of utterances.   
Phase 4: Post-processing 
Once the discussion phase has terminated, networks are generated from the 
simulated discourse. Since, in this model, documents are assigned 
deterministically to topics, there is no need to create a distribution over networks 
for each meeting. Instead, two authors are linked if they both generate at least 
one utterance in the same topic.  
Model Benchmarking 
Although the model presented in this chapter is a sparse representation of the 
actual dynamics within FDA panels, we may explore whether its outputs reflect 
the data shown in Chapter 4. 1000 samples were drawn from the model, while 
allowing mean depth, mean breadth, dispersion in depth, dispersion in breadth 
and openness to vary. These parameters were all drawn from uniform 
distributions on the unit interval. Hierarchy was set to 0.99, consistent with panel 
procedures that attempt to allocate approximately equal amounts of time to all 
voting members. So as to enable a direct comparison, the distribution of 
specialists and the number of panel members were chosen according to the 37 
meetings tested previously (i.e., one sample from the model would have the same 
number of panel members and the same distribution of specialties as a randomly 
chosen Circulatory Systems Devices Panel meeting).  
As in Chapter 5 there is a tight correlation between simulated medical specialty 
cohesion and simulated vote cohesion (Spearman Rho = 0.57; p=8.97 x 10-16) for 
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the subset of meetings in which there was a voting minority consisting of at least 
two members. A scatter plot is shown in Figure 71.  


















































Figure 71: Plot of Simulated Specialty 
Cohesion vs. Simulated Vote 
Cohesion. Spearman Rho = 0.57; 
p=8.97 x 10-16. Proportional minority 
size (including abstentions) is 
represented in color.  
Modeling Result 1: Simulated vote cohesion percentile and simulated 
specialty cohesion percentile are significantly positively associated. 
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As in Chapter 4, we find that members of the simulated voting minority tend to 
speak later than do members of the simulated voting majority (p<0.0001, see 
Figure 72).  

















Figure 72: Members of the simulated 
voting minority tend to speak later 
than do members of the simulated 
voting majority (p<0.0001). 
Another way in which we might verify the model fit is to examine the extent to 
which the specialty cohesion, specialty cohesion percentile, vote cohesion, and 
vote cohesion percentile distributions fit the observed data. Kolmogorov-
Smirnov tests show that the model generates distributions that are not 
significantly different from those observed in the empirical data (see Table 20).  
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Table 20: Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests 
show no significant differences 
between the empirical and simulated 
distributions for vote cohesion and for 
specialty cohesion. 
Distribution Tested Probability that data is consistent with hypothesis of 
no significant difference (p-value) 




Vote Cohesion 0.18 
Vote Cohesion Percentile 0.11 
 
One further test would be to examine the proportion of simulated meetings that 
reached consensus, those that have a voting minority consisting of just one 
member, and those that have a voting minority with more than one member. 
Recall that, in the empirical case, there were 11 meetings with at least two 
members in the voting minority, and there were 6 meetings with only one 
member in the voting minority, out of a total of 37 meetings. Table 21 shows that 
the empirical and simulated distributions are significantly different (p=4.54 x10-5).  
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Table 21: A chi-square test shows that 
the simulated data distribution of 
panel meeting outcomes does not 
match the empirical distribution (χ2 











811 41 148 1000 
Empirical 
Data 
20 6 11 37 
TOTAL 642 143 252 1037 
 
In general, we find that there are larger voting minorities in the empirical data 
than in the simulated data. One possible explanation for this is that simulated 
panel members are not reviewing devices that are as uncertain. We correct for 
this by constraining device quality to vary between -0.33 and 0.33, ensuring that 
those devices reviewed in the simulation do not have any “easy answers”. This is 
consistent with the role of the panels in reviewing only difficult devices. An 
additional 1000 samples from the model were drawn, yielding results that are 
consistent with the empirical data. Table 22 shows that under these conditions, 
the two distributions examined above are not significantly different. 
Table 22: A chi-square test shows that 
the simulated data distribution of 
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panel meeting outcomes does not 
match the empirical distribution (χ2 











639 85 276 1000 
Empirical 
Data 
20 6 11 37 
TOTAL 659 91 287 1037 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests continue to show no significant difference in vote 
and specialty cohesion percentile distributions, as shown in Table 23. 
Table 23: Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests 
show no significant differences 
between the empirical and simulated 
distributions for specialty and vote 
cohesion or for their percentiles. 
Distribution Tested Probability that data is consistent with hypothesis of 
no significant difference (p-value) 
Specialty Cohesion 0.36 




Vote Cohesion 0.91 
Vote Cohesion Percentile 0.12 
 
We also continue to observe that members of the voting minority speak later 
than do members of the voting majority (p<0.0001), and that there is a strong 
correlation between simulated voting cohesion percentile and simulated specialty 
cohesion percentile (Spearman Rho = 0.61; p=1.70 x 10-33). 
These parameters seem to fit the data reasonably well, with the exception of a 
tendency for the simulated data to have larger values of specialty cohesion 
percentile and vote cohesion percentile than does the empirical data. Therefore 
we set this as the benchmark from which we can test the effects of deviation of 
other parameters. Future work will focus on determining a mechanism by which 
the simulated percentile distributions may better fit the empirical data. 
Model Result 2: Proportional minority size, and specialty and vote 
cohesion, are functions of device quality. 
Deviations from the Benchmarked Model 
Random Speaking Order 
We find that, in the absence of a pre-set speaking order, there is no significant 
difference between the locations in the speaking order of members of the voting 
majority and the voting minority (p=0.69, see Figure 73).  
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Figure 73: In the absence of a pre-set 
speaking order, members of the 
simulated voting minority do not tend 
to speak later than do members of the 
simulated voting majority (p=0.69). 
Interestingly, when speaking order is randomized, Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests 
yield significant differences in vote and specialty cohesion percentiles when 
compared to empirical data (see Table 24). 
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Table 24: Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests 
show significant differences between 
the empirical and simulated 
distributions for specialty and vote 
cohesion percentiles.  
Distribution Tested Probability that data is consistent with hypothesis of 
no significant difference (p-value) 




Vote Cohesion 0.88 
Vote Cohesion Percentile 0.036 
 
In addition there is a stronger correlation between simulated voting cohesion 
percentile and simulated specialty cohesion percentile than that observed under 
pre-set speaking order conditions (Spearman Rho = 0.10; p=1.30 x 10-41). 
Modeling Result 3: Members of the simulated voting minority tend to 
speak later than do members of the simulated voting majority when only 
when speaking order is pre-set. Furthermore, simulated vote and specialty 
cohesion percentile distributions fit the data better when speaking order is 
pre-set. Correlation between specialty cohesion percentile and vote 
cohesion percentile is slightly stronger than under conditions of pre-set 
speaking order. 
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Advocacy 
Assuming full advocacy – i.e., that panel members only discuss topics whose 
valences are consistent with their preferences, changes the model’s results such 
that, under these conditions, the correlation between vote cohesion percentile 
and specialty cohesion percentile strengthens (Spearman Rho = 0.84; p<0.0001). 
In addition, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests show significant differences between 
empirical and simulated vote and specialty cohesion, and vote and specialty 
cohesion percentiles (see Table 25). 
Table 25: Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests 
shows significant differences between 
the empirical and simulated 
distributions for vote cohesion and 
specialty and vote cohesion 
percentiles. 
Distribution Tested Probability that data is consistent with hypothesis of 
no significant difference (p-value) 
Specialty Cohesion 0.87 
Specialty Cohesion 
Percentile 
1.01 x 10-5 
Vote Cohesion 2.36 x 10-5 
Vote Cohesion Percentile 0.041 
 
Modeling Result 4: The model better explains the empirical data 
distributions when no advocacy among panel members is assumed, 
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although correlation between specialty cohesion percentile and vote 
cohesion percentile is stronger than under conditions of non-advocacy. 
Expertise and Meeting Parameters 
A 5-way Analysis of Variance, shown in Table 26, demonstrates that complexity, 
mean breadth, mean depth, depth dispersion, openness, and meeting profile 
(number and diversity of panel members) are all significant variables affecting 
specialty cohesion percentile. 
Table 26: 6-way Analysis of Variance 
showing the impact of Complexity, 
Mean Breadth, Mean Depth, Depth 
Dispersion, Openness and Ambiguity 
on Specialty Cohesion Percentile 







Complexity 1.23 1 1.23 10.92 0.001 
Mean 
Breadth 
2.87 1 2.87 25.53 <0.0001 
Mean Depth  5.39 1 5.39 47.99 <0.0001 
Depth 
Dispersion 
2.14 1 2.14 19.03 <0.0001 
Openness 1.12 1 1.12 10.00 0.0016 
Ambiguity 14.26 1 14.26 126.87 <0.0001 
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Error 116.60 994 0.11 
Total 136.94 999  
 
 
Modeling Result 5: Simulated complexity, mean breadth, mean depth, 
depth dispersion, openness and ambiguity all have a significant effect on 
simulated specialty cohesion percentile. 
We find that specialty cohesion percentile decreases with mean breadth and 
openness, and increases with mean depth, depth dispersion, complexity and 
ambiguity.  
A 2-way ANOVA, shown in Table 27, shows that complexity and ambiguity are 
both significant predictors of voting cohesion percentile.  
Table 27: 2-way Analysis of Variance 
showing the impact of Complexity 
and Ambiguity on Vote Cohesion 
Percentile 







Complexity  1.41 1 1.41 14.72 0.0002 
Ambiguity 4.89 1 4.89 51.05 <0.0001 
Error 30.18 315 0.096 
Total 37.01 317  
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Modeling Result 6: Simulated complexity and ambiguity have a significant 
effect on simulated voting cohesion percentile. 
Vote cohesion percentile increases with complexity and ambiguity. 
Given that both specialty cohesion percentile and vote cohesion percentile 
depend on ambiguity and complexity, we may use this information to further 
fine-tune the model. For example, an analysis of covariance (see Figure 74) shows 
that the correlation between specialty cohesion percentile and vote cohesion 
percentile is significantly weaker when ambiguity is greater than 0.5 (p=1.26x10-5).  
 
Figure 74: Analysis of Covariance Plot 
showing the effect of ambiguity on 
correlation between Specialty 
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Cohesion Percentile and Vote 
Cohesion Percentile 
A similar analysis shows that the correlation between specialty cohesion 
percentile and vote cohesion percentile is significantly weaker when complexity is 
greater than 20 topics (p=0.0078, see Figure 75).   
 
Figure 75: Analysis of Covariance Plot 
showing the effect of complexity  on 
correlation between Specialty 
Cohesion Percentile and Vote 
Cohesion Percentile 
Modeling Result 7: Association between specialty cohesion percentile and 
vote cohesion percentile is stronger when ambiguity is less than 0.5 and 
when complexity is less than 20 topics.  
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Panel’s Ability to Reach Consensus 
We have noted above that the panel’s ability to reach consensus depends on 
device quality. Other factors include diversity, complexity, mean breadth, and 
ambiguity, all of which are significant predictors of proportional minority size 
(see Table 29). 
Table 28: 5-way Analysis of Variance 
showing the impact of Diversity, 
Complexity, Mean Breadth, Mean 
Breadth, Quality and Ambiguity on 
proportional minority size.  







Diversity 0.095 1 0.095 5.66 0.018 
Complexity 0.20 1 0.20 12.05 0.0005 
Mean 
Breadth 
0.28 1 0.28 16.79 <0.0001 
Quality 0.79 1 0.79 47.03 <0.0001 
Ambiguity 0.71 1 0.71 42.12 <0.0001 
Error 16.69 994 0.017 
Total 18.89 999  
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In particular, proportional minority size increases with diversity and ambiguity, 
and decreases with complexity, mean breadth, and quality.   
Modeling Result 8: Simulated proportional minority size is significantly 
associated with diversity, complexity, mean breadth, quality and 
ambiguity. 
Panel’s Ability to Correctly Decide 
The simulated panel correctly decided the correct outcome in 778 of the 1000 
meeting samples drawn from the model. As expected, mean depth, quality and 
ambiguity are all significant predictors of whether the voting outcome is correct 
(see Table 29). 
Table 29: 5-way Analysis of Variance 
showing the impact of Complexity, 
Mean Depth, Openness, Ambiguity 
and Quality on correct vote outcome. 
Although correct vote outcome is a 
dichotomous variable, the analysis is 
still qualitatively instructive (Lunney 
1970). 









8.38 36 0.23 1.55 0.021 
Complexity 1.71 1 1.71 11.38 0.0008 
Mean Depth 2.60 1 2.60 17.35 <0.0001 
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Depth 
Dispersion 
1.02 1 1.02 6.8 0.0093 
Openness 0.68 1 0.68 4.55 0.033 
Ambiguity 4.62 1 4.62 30.82 <0.0001 
Quality 8.19 1 8.19 54.67 <0.0001 
Error 143.42 957 0.15 
Total 172.72 999  
 
 
Modeling Result 9: Simulated meeting profile, complexity, mean depth, 
depth dispersion, openness, ambiguity and quality are all significantly 
associated with the panel’s capacity to reach a correct decision. 
In particular, as complexity, depth, depth dispersion, and quality increase (or 
move away from zero, in the case of quality), the panel is more likely to reach a 
correct decision, whereas as ambiguity and openness increase, the panel is less 
likely to make a correct decision. The significant effect of meeting profile may be 
understood as a control variable. In some configurations, the panel always 
generated the right answer (e.g., meetings 5 and 29), whereas in others, the panel 
was often incorrect (e.g., meeting 36, in which the panel was correct only 60% of 
the time). The interesting question of why these profiles yielded these outcomes 
is left to future work. 
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Preliminary Modeling Conclusions and Future Work 
The model presented in this chapter is still in its infancy, and fails to explain many 
facets of the operations of FDA panels. Nevertheless, we may derive many 
insights from this analysis. In particular, the fit of the model to some aspects of 
the data, even using randomized parameters, suggests that some major elements 
on FDA panels are captured. These, and their implications, are discussed in 
Chapter 7.  
  
C h a p t e r  7  
CONCLUSIONS 
"...natural languages are perfect in so far as they are many, for the truth is 
many-sided and falsity consists in reducing this plurality into a single definite 
unity." 
– Umberto Eco, The Search for the Perfect Language, (1997), trans. 
Italian. James Fentress, on the benefits of diversity  
Committees of experts are essential to engineering systems because of their ability 
to aggregate information from multiple domains of expertise – a necessary 
function when system complexity is large. This has the potential to enable better 
decision-making about a complex problem. Assuming a perfect flow of 
communication, we can expect diverse committees to pool their knowledge to 
make far better decisions than individuals possible with the information available 
(Hong & Page 2004). Even with less than perfect information flow, improved 
outcomes over individuals are likely. The literature indicates that communication 
flows on these committees are crucial to optimal decision-making. In particular, 
committee members with the appropriate expertise must be given the 
opportunity to express their views (Bottger 1984). Furthermore, their advice must 
be appropriately received and interpreted by the majority of committee members. 
The literature suggests that the correct procedural interventions could create 
conditions under which communication for information sharing could be 
optimized. In particular, if at all possible, members with appropriate expertise 
must be identified as such early in the decision-making process (e.g, through the 
assignment of lead reviewer status). In the case that there is a disagreement 
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regarding whose expertise is valid, the literature suggests that a decision might be 
made on other bases, with committee members potentially defaulting to other 
decision-making schemes, such as those controlled by idiosyncratic beliefs and 
values. Furthermore, different perspectives might be incommensurable, leading to 
a persistent disagreement and a split-vote on the panel. The literature suggests 
that, in the presence of clear, unambiguous data, role- and preference ambiguity 
inherent in the decision-making process is reduced since panel members would 
likely be able to agree on the interpretation of a significantly well-defined data 
artifact.  
Better understanding the role of information flow on committees of technical 
experts requires a methodology that can used to study real-world committee 
decision-making. The method developed in this thesis is based upon the Author-
Topic model (Rosen-Zvi et al. 2004), and is able to extract meaningful directed 
social networks from transcripts of the FDA Circulatory Systems Devices Panel 
Meetings. These networks represent the flow of communication, and potentially 
information, among panel members.  
Empirical Results and Their Implications 
Analysis of the networks generated from the methodology described in Chapter 4 
has yielded 27 empirical results, with the following implications: 
Air-Time on FDA Panels 
1. Gender, Medical Specialty, h-Index, and Age are all significant variables 
associated with a panel member’s air-time. Women tend to have more air-
time than men do, although this effect is not visible in meetings with 
voting differences. 
Although there is an effect for gender on air-time, it goes in a direction opposite 
than that predicted by (Berger et al. 1972), with female speakers using more air-
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time than do male speakers, and seems to disappear entirely for meetings in 
which there is a voting-difference present. Air-time increases with h-index 
(Spearman’s Rho=0.26). After correcting for h-index variation, air-time decreases 
with age, although the effect is very weak (Spearman’s Rho=-0.06). Finally, when 
controlling for the variables outlined above, we find no effect of race on air-time. 
These results suggest that FDA panel procedures are largely free from the status 
effects predicted in the “small-groups” sociology literature. One possible 
explanation of this may be found in Festinger’s (1954) theory. In the presence of 
a clear task requiring expertise, generalized status effects might become less 
important with panel members instead focusing perceived expertise on measures 
that are directly relevant to the task at hand (e.g., h-index and other metrics of 
academic or clinical experience). 
2. There is no observably significant effect between vote and air-time. 
This implies that the FDA process seems to allow those in the voting minority an 
equivalent amount of time to speak as those in the voting majority. Viewed 
within the context of Bottger’s (1984) distinction between perceived influence 
(based on air time) and actual influence (based on expertise) we see that the two 
are quite independent. Bottger predicts that performance should increase as 
expertise and air-time covary; however, given that all FDA panel members are 
acknowledged experts in their respective fields, this lack of covariance is not 
surprising and might be attributed to a procedure whose goal is to ensure that 
many different, but valid, viewpoints are heard in a public forum. Indeed, these 
findings suggest that in a structured task, such as on FDA panels, perceived 
expertise may not be equivalent to air time, For example, a priori perceived expertise 
might be explained by a procedural variable (e.g., speaking order). Under such 
circumstances, where each panel members has an opportunity to talk, a posteriori 
perception of expertise could match actual expertise. 
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3. There is no observably significant effect of medical specialty, h-Index, age 
or race on voting behavior. Women are more likely to be in the voting 
majority than men are. 
The prevalence of women in the voting majority, coupled with the additional air-
time used by women when consensus meetings are included may be due to the 
role of women as information integrators on committees (Johnson & Eagly 
1990), and suggests future work in determining the balance on a committee 
between broad integrators versus deep specialists. 
Empirical findings 1 - 3 seem to suggest that FDA panel procedures are 
successful in avoiding both perceived and actual bias associated with commonly 
expected attribute-based status characteristics. The absence of a difference in air-
time between majority and minority members further contributes to the 
perception of the panel meeting as a fair and balanced process, in which minority 
and majority members may equally express their views. It is particularly 
interesting that there is no significant impact of h-index on vote (p=0.66, using a 
Kruskal-Wallis non-parametric one-way ANOVA), which could be explained in 
that the FDA panel process might weight academic publication record against 
other sources of expertise, such as clinical experience. 
Medical Specialty as a Mediating Variable 
4. There is no observably significant effect between medical specialty and 
vote.  
Medical specialty, and technical training in general, is not a status characteristic as 
defined in the sociology literature. Specialties are different areas from which a 
panel may draw upon a diversity of expertise. Associated with these specialties are 
different standards for evaluating expertise and different speaking habits (cf. 
empirical finding 1). Social scientists might term these as different “professional 
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cultures” or “institutions” (e.g., Douglas 1986, Trice 1993). Empirical finding 4 
suggests that medical specialty is a cross-cutting categorization that influences 
behavior in a more subtle way.  
5. Panel members of the same medical specialty are significantly more likely 
to be linked than would be expected by chance. 
(Brown 1986; Douglas 1986) note that members of a common professional 
institution are likely to share common language and jargon. This may explain 
empirical finding 5, which finds that panel members with the same medical 
specialty tend to be linguistically linked. This indicates that the majority of 
communication on most FDA panels likely occurs between members of the same 
medical specialty. Nevertheless, the presence of some probability mass that is less 
than or equal to 0.5 may indicate meetings where some panel members made 
stronger attempts to communicate across specialty boundaries. 
6. Panel members who vote the same way are significantly more likely to be 
linked than would be expected by chance. 
This finding suggests that panel members who vote the same way share the same 
language. One possible explanation of this phenomenon is that these panel 
members are focusing their attention on a common area, such as a component of 
the device or an aspect of the sponsor’s data. One strategic interpretation is that 
different panel members may have similar preferences a priori, and would 
therefore focus on a device’s common shortcomings or merits to signal their 
preferences. It is more likely that within each voting group, a relatively small 
number of device features might attract the attention of a number of panel 
members, causing them to vote a certain way for that reason. Common language 
could suggest a common direction of attention and therefore, common 
  229 
preferences. This might arise as panel members successfully learn from one 
another. 
7. Vote cohesion percentile and specialty cohesion percentile are 
significantly positively associated for the subset of 11 meetings with at 
least two members in the voting minority. 
In cases of mild ambiguity, where a small number of potential interpretations of 
the data are possible, (Douglas 1986) notes that institutional membership acts to 
direct one’s attention to a given framing of a situation or problem. This framing 
mechanism could potentially serve as an antecedent to preference formation. If 
such is the case, then a correlation between vote cohesion percentile and specialty 
cohesion percentile would be expected. We may use this insight to explain 
empirical finding 7 by assuming that a medical specialty directs a given voter’s 
attention to a certain interpretation of the data, thereby creating conditions under 
which members of a given medical specialty will pay attention to the same things. 
Within the medical community, Kaptchuk (2003) calls this phenomenon 
“interpretive bias”. This common perception of the data leads to a propensity to 
vote in a manner consistent with that perception. This is further supported by the 
fact that when specialty cohesion is low, voting cohesion also tends to be low. In 
these situations, it is likely that the data is difficult to interpret, e.g., due to mixed 
signals from a device that has a high risk but high potential reward, or sparse or 
ambiguous data. Under such conditions, many possible interpretations of the data 
might be possible within each specialty, suggesting that voters could rely on 
idiosyncratic beliefs. Medical specialties would have a weaker effect on an 
individual’s perception since the data might not match any situation previously 
encountered. Specialty cohesion would be lower because panel members from 
the same specialty would have different perceptions of the data. Under these 
circumstances, individual expertise becomes particularly valuable, although it is 
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unclear whose expertise is most appropriate. Panel members who vote the same 
way would likely do so for different reasons, thus leading to low vote cohesion.  
This finding cannot account for those meetings in which the panel reached 
consensus or only had one member in the voting minority. In these cases, voting 
cohesion has no meaning, whereas specialty cohesion runs the gamut of values. 
Low specialty cohesion during a consensus meeting might indicate learning across 
medical specialty boundaries, ultimately leading to a common interpretation.  
Agenda-Setting and the Effects of Speaking Order 
8. Members of the voting minority tend to speak later than do members of 
the voting majority. 
One interpretation of this finding might be the presence of framing and agenda-
setting effects, such as identified in (Cobb & Elder 1983). This would seem to 
suggest that those panel members who speak first are more likely to influence 
other panel members, because later speakers must respond to the problem as it 
has already been framed by the first speakers. Later speakers are less likely to have 
influence over defining the issues discussed in the panel meeting and their 
opinions are therefore more likely to be in the minority. This suggests the 
possibility that vote might be influenced by what have been called “ritual” 
elements in the literature (e.g. Chwe 2003; Douglas and Wildavsky 1982). In 
particular, speaking order typically begins with the lead reviewers and then 
proceeds sequentially around the table in a direction chosen by the committee 
chair. Choice of seating location is jointly determined before the meeting by the 
committee chair and FDA executive secretary (FDA 1994).  
9. Members of the voting minority tend to have a lower graph outdegree 
than do members of the majority. 
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10. Outdegree is negatively and significantly associated with location in the 
speaking order, and indegree is positively and significantly associated with 
location in the speaking order. 
11. Location in the speaking order seems to account for the variance in 
voting behavior that is associated with outdegree. 
Taken together, empirical findings 9-11 suggest that panel members who speak 
later are less likely to be repeated even in the presence of multiple rounds of 
discussion. If empirical finding 9 suggests the presence of an order-based 
hierarchy, then empirical finding 10 finds that it extends beyond the simple 
speaking order of the first round of panel questioning and throughout the 
meeting.  All of the information above points to the role of speaking order as an 
important procedural variable, potentially embodying a form of perceived 
expertise. The FDA Policy and Guidance Handbook (1994) emphasizes the role 
of the FDA Executive Secretary and the committee chair in choosing the seating 
order of different panel members, suggesting that this is one possible lever by 
which control over the decision-making process could potentially be exercised. 
Ideally, seating order would correlate with actual expertise. This is often the case 
when expert lead reviewers are chosen to speak first. In other cases, it may not be 
clear a priori, which expertise is most relevant. In these situations, it is important 
to be aware of the potential procedural consequences of seating order. 
12. Members of the voting minority spoke significantly later in meetings in 
which the panel did not approve the devices than did members of the 
voting majority. This trend was not present in meetings in which the 
panel did approve the device. 
One possible explanation of this effect might be that there is not enough 
statistical power to differentiate between voting minority and voting majority 
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groups due to the smaller number of meetings in which there was a voting 
minority and the device was approved. Another possible explanation might be 
that negative comments about a device are weighted more strongly than are 
positive comments as per Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) Prospect Theoretic 
bias in which “losses loom larger than gains”. If negative opinions are expressed 
relatively early in the panel discussion, this might predispose the panel to vote 
against device approval. If such is the case, then one way to counteract such a 
bias might be choose speaking order to insure that members who are likely to 
contributed negative comments speak later15. This would best enable both 
positive and negative comments to be expressed, ensuring a balanced process. 
More data is necessary to test this hypothesis. 
13. Members of the voting minority had a significantly smaller outdegree in 
meetings in which the device was approved. This trend was not present in 
meetings in which the panel did not approve the device. 
This suggests that, in meetings in which the device was approved, members of 
the voting minority seemed to exercise less influence over topic selection than did 
members of the voting majority. On the other hand, in meetings in which the 
device was not approved, members of the voting majority and the voting 
minority tend to have the same amount of influence.  
Together, empirical results 12 and 13 suggest that when there is a minority and 
devices are approved, the voting minority (i.e., those who voted against the 
device) has less influence over topic selection and so may not need to be located 
later in the speaking order. On the other hand, when there is a minority and 
devices are not approved, the voting minority (i.e., those who voted in favor of 
the device) have more influence over topic selection despite their location later in 
                                                 
15 The author would like to thank Dr. Susan Winter for suggesting this interpretation. 
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the speaking order. One might simply interpret this data in terms of a disparity 
between perceived and actual expertise. We would expect that minority panel 
members would have less actual influence (and hence, a lower outdegree) in a 
panel meeting in which the majority and the minority are equally distributed 
throughout the speaking order (i.e., the procedure does not embody perceived 
expertise). On the other hand, when procedural effects seem to locate the voting 
minority at the end of the speaking order (as is the case in non-approval 
meetings), we notice that the actual influence of the majority and the minority are 
statistically indistinguishable. In such cases, it might be that perceived expertise 
and actual influence do not covary. 
Another interpretation would seem to suggest an opposite effect to that discussed 
after empirical finding 12. Those who are in favor of device approval seem to 
have an outdegree that is at least as high as those who oppose device approval, 
even when they are located at the end of the speaking order. On the other hand, 
those who are opposed to device approval seem to have a lower outdegree, even 
when they are not significantly later in the speaking order. One way of 
interpreting this result is that it might suggest a predisposition towards approval 
on FDA panels, particularly since panel members might choose to impose 
conditions of approval rather than rejecting the device wholesale. Examining the 
direction of causation underlying these effects is an area for future work. 
14. Members of the voting minority are more likely to be graph sinks than are 
members of the voting majority. 
Even in situations in which voting minority members aren’t linked to one 
another, they are still likely to be graph sinks. This suggests that independent 
meaning may be derived from graph sink status. For example, voting minority 
members may not agree with the voting majority for different reasons which 
other voting members do not repeat. 
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15. Members of the voting minority are more likely to be the last speaker to 
ask questions to the sponsor and FDA, than are members of the voting 
majority, especially for meetings in which there is a singleton voting 
minority. 
16. Using F-score as an evaluation criterion, the graph sink heuristic provides 
a superior classification of voting minority members when compared to 
the last speaker heuristic. 
Empirical findings 12 and 13 follow as consequences of the effects of speaking 
order. On the other hand, empirical finding 14 shows that introducing topic-
related information can aid in classifying minority members, and may point to a 
dynamic on the panels wherein members of the voting minority may be unable to 
convince other panel members to adopt their perspectives. The examination of 
graph sinks is a better method for determining voting minority membership than 
is examining the last speaker. In the case of the 17 meetings with a minority, 
precision is higher using the graph sink heuristic, suggesting that graph sinks 
capture a higher proportion of minority members than do last speakers. This 
makes sense given that there can be multiple sinks per meeting, but only one last 
speaker. On the other hand, recall is higher using the last speaker heuristic, 
suggesting that a randomly chosen member of the minority is more likely to be 
correctly classified using the last speaker method. This can be explained by the 
fact that a meeting with only one minority member might have multiple sinks, 
introducing a potential source of noise, perhaps due to valence effects (i.e., the 
tendency not to oppose the majority for reasons of maintaining one’s reputation 
– cf. Ashworth & Bueno de Mesquita, 2005). These additional sinks might not be 
influential, even though they vote with the majority. We find that F-score is 
higher for the graph sink heuristic, suggesting that the noise in the recall metric is 
more than offset by the advantages gained in the precision metric. This 
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conclusion is stronger in the subset of 11 meetings with a voting minority of 2 or 
more, where recall is also higher using the graph sink metric. This suggests that, 
for larger minorities, the graph sink metric becomes increasingly accurate in 
classifying voters.   
Framing and Ambiguity 
17. Although lead reviewers have a significantly higher air-time and 
outdegree, and a significantly lower indegree than other panel members, 
their overall voting behavior is not significantly different. 
This result is surprising in light of the effects of speaking order identified above 
and seems to contradict a major tenet of the agenda-setting literature – namely 
that those with the capacity to frame an issue can set the agenda and, therefore, 
strongly influence decision outcomes. One would expect lead reviewers to be 
more frequently in the majority; nevertheless, the lead reviewers’ probability of 
being in the majority is statistically indistinguishable from that of the rest of the 
panel (the values of χ2 are near zero, and the p-values are close to 1). One 
possible explanation of this result is that the FDA might choose lead reviewers 
that are representative of different perspectives on a given device, with the 
intention of fostering open communication. Thus, when lead reviewers disagree, 
it might be reflective of a wider split within the medical community. On the other 
hand, it might be that the panel’s vote distribution follows that of the lead 
reviewers present. We cannot determine the direction of causation from this 
analysis – nevertheless, it is clear that the votes of the lead reviewers are indeed 
correlated with the votes of the rest of the panel in some manner.  
18. The proportional size of the voting minority is larger when lead reviewers 
do not vote with the majority within a given meeting, and when there is 
disagreement among lead reviewers. 
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As stated above, the direction of causation underlying this result is unclear. One 
possible explanation, following the agenda-setting literature, is that there are 
multiple competing interpretations in situations in which lead reviewers disagree 
– each frame is a different description of the problem and leads to different 
conclusions regarding the appropriateness of approving the device. Another 
explanation is that the device or the data describing it is inherently ambiguous 
and that there is deep uncertainty regarding its suitability for approval. These two 
explanations are not necessarily contradictory, since the existence of multiple 
credible frames is much more likely as ambiguity increases (cf. March 1994). The 
increase in the proportional size of the majority may therefore be a reflection of 
this ambiguity as voting members preferentially adopt frames. Often, these are 
related to an individual’s medical specialty, which serves to direct that individual’s 
attention to a particular set of salient device characteristics. 
19. Meetings are longer when more lead reviewers are in the voting minority. 
One possible interpretation of this result is that as meeting length increases, the 
procedural components of the meeting become relatively less important – i.e., 
there is more open discussion. This might happen because of disagreement 
regarding how to interpret a given set of clinical trial data, or because of some 
other source of ambiguity (March 1994). The presence of multiple competing 
interpretations, possibly advanced by the presence of lead reviewers who disagree 
with other prominent panel members (or other lead reviewers) supports the 
notion that that ambiguity is a driver of dissensus on FDA panels. As the panel 
works to reconcile these different perspectives, meetings may take more time.  
20. Meeting length is significantly positively associated with the maximum 
normalized outdegree among voting minority members, but not with 
maximum location in the speaking order. 
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As meetings get longer, more time is likely to be devoted to open, non-structured 
discussion. The hierarchy established by speaking order is therefore less likely to 
have as strong an impact on voting outcome. Furthermore, in some longer 
meetings, lead reviewers may be more likely to be in the voting minority. Thus, as 
meetings get longer, we see voting minority members begin to appear higher on 
the graph and to have a larger outdegree. 
21. Maximum normalized outdegree is significantly associated with 
proportional voting minority size. 
22. Meeting length is significantly positively associated with proportional 
voting minority size. 
Empirical results 17-22 show a set of four variables that are mutually correlated: 
meeting length, proportional voting minority size, maximum voting minority 
outdegree, and minority voting dissensus. Such clusters of correlated variables are 
indicative of a “natural mode” (Richards 2008b), and might suggest the presence 
of an underlying driver. One explanation is the presence of device ambiguity – as 
the data regarding a particular device becomes harder to read, it leads to the 
possibility for multiple possible interpretations of the data. These interpretations 
are often mutually inconsistent, and may require additional time to resolve. 
Alternatively, they might not be resolved at all, leading to a split vote on the 
panel. When different interpretations from different experts are equally probable, 
it is possible that lead reviewers will be chosen who reflect this dichotomy. 
Nevertheless, it is precisely under conditions of ambiguity that different 
interpretations, based upon different values, may dominate (March 1994). 
Impact of the Committee Chair 
23. Inclusion of the Committee Chair in directed graphs leads to a bimodal 
distribution of the extent to which the chair changes the structure of the 
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graph. These two modes may correspond to different sorts of behavior 
by the Chair in his/her interactions with panel members during the 
meeting. 
Among the many roles of the committee chair is to serve as a facilitator, 
ensuring that all of the panel members present are able to express their views. 
The chair’s role in “flattening” the structure of a given meeting’s graph could 
suggest a particular facilitation strategy, wherein the committee chair tries to 
elicit the opinions of voting members who speak later, and might otherwise 
be less influential. When the chair does not act to significantly change the 
graph structure, the chair may be taking on the role of a synthesizer – 
gathering the opinions of the other voters to answer FDA questions, but not 
causing any of the other members to repeat what has already been said. The 
histogram shown in Figure 66, suggests that there may be two different 
strategies that committee chairs could use during a meeting. 
24. Committee chair impact is significantly positively associated with meeting 
date for meetings in which there is a voting minority.  
The marked change in committee chair strategy has many potential explanations 
– one might be that the identity of the committee chair changed around this time, 
suggesting a change in personal style, but this would have to explain a consistent 
change across multiple chairs. Alternatively, prior to 2002, most of the meetings 
were chaired by women, whereas after March 2002 most chairs were men. There 
is literature to suggest that men and women utilize different leadership styles on 
committees (e.g., Johnson & Eagley 1990). Another explanation might be that 
there was a change in FDA policy regarding committee operations. For example, 
there was a change in conflict of interest reporting procedures that was 
concurrent with the shift shown in empirical result 22, but there is no obvious 
connection between these two events. Another possibility is that the types of 
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devices that came to the Circulatory Systems Devices Panel changed around this 
time – this could be reflected in the fact that there were no half-day meetings 
after 2002. Perhaps there was an increase in the difficulty of the devices that the 
panel reviewed (e.g., concurrent with the entrance on the market of drug-eluting 
stents, Left Ventricular Assist Devices and other potentially risky devices). Finally, 
we might hypothesize some combination of these ideas – that a change in FDA 
policy might have some way impacted upon chair style, and that this change in 
policy might have been driven by changing market conditions. Testing these 
hypotheses requires looking across multiple panels and committees, which we 
leave to future work.  
Conflicts of Interest 
25. Panel members with conflicts of interest tend to have a significantly 
higher h-index than do panel members without a conflict. 
This finding recognizes that panel members with conflicts of interest tend to have 
greater academic credentials than do other panel members. When a particular 
panel member is granted a waiver by the FDA despite their conflict of interest, 
the FDA recognizes the impossibility of entirely eliminating conflicts of interest 
on panels of experts. The need for specialized expertise often requires that 
individuals who have extensive experience with a device be consulted. On the 
other hand, it is precisely these individuals who are likely to have financial 
conflicts due to their previous work. (McComas et al. 2005) call this the “shared-
pool dilemma”.  
26. Panel members with conflicts of interest do not have higher outdegrees 
than panel members without conflicts of interest. 
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27. Panel members with conflicts of interest, who are in the voting majority 
do not have higher outdegrees than panel members with conflicts of 
interest who are in the voting minority. 
Procedures on the Circulatory Systems Devices Panel seem to be unaffected by 
the conflicts of interest outlined above. Indeed, there seems to be no evidence of 
systemic bias due to conflict of interest on this panel. Further investigation 
therefore focuses on the level of individual meetings. The evidence here suggests 
that conflicts of interest are minimized when there is only one member on the 
panel with a reported conflict or when there are opposing reported conflicts on 
the panel. When there are multiple panel members with consistent conflicts of 
interest, unanimous support for those conflicts might result. Although more data 
is required to rigorously test this finding, if this speculation is correct, it suggests a 
direction for future research on conflicts of interest. In particular, trends in the 
data seem to indicate that, where there is one panel member with an identified 
conflict, or when there are opposing conflicts on a panel, these conflicts are 
typically neutralized. This is reflected in the first part of empirical findings 26. 
One possible explanation for this phenomenon is that the prospect of appearing 
biased might cause panel members with conflicts of interest to become more 
aware of how their conflicts might drive their decision-processes. On the other 
hand, when consistent conflicts are distributed across many panel members, it is 
less likely that any one individual will question another’s conflict. Another 
explanation could be that a given device is unambiguously approvable or non-
approvable – under these circumstances, the conflicts of interest might simply be 
consistent with the device’s qualities. Future work will focus on testing these 
hypotheses further. 
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Synthesis of Empirical Results 
Because committee members have scarce attention resources (Cobb and Elder 
1982), procedure is necessary to ensure that the appropriate members are given 
ample time to speak. A sociologist would characterize these procedures as 
embodying a status hierarchy – nevertheless, we do not use the standard status 
assumptions that are found in the sociology literature. This is because empirical 
results do not agree with the hypothesis that some of these variables (e.g., race 
and gender) significantly impact of air-time in the direction predicted (i.e., women 
tend to speak more than men). Festinger’s theory of group decision-making 
(1954) suggests that these variables are not the source of significant differences 
because they are not perceived as directly relevant to a technical query. Panel 
procedures likely act to focus attention of panel members to the question at hand, 
potentially explaining the effects of h-Index, a metric reflecting recognized 
academic expertise. Panel procedures may represent a form of common 
knowledge (cf. Chwe 2003) that may encode assumptions regarding perceived 
expertise. Thus, procedural choices may modulate the flow of communication on 
a committee in ways that can enable or disable the covariance of actual influence 
and perceived expertise.  
A generalized relation between panel procedure and actual influence could be 
supported by the empirical observation that members of the voting minority tend 
to have a lower graph outdegree than do members of the voting majority. A 
covariance between actual influence and perceived expertise could be reflected in 
the fact that voting minority members also tend to be positioned later in the 
speaking order than do their voting majority counterparts. Nevertheless, this 
approach might lead to a situation in which some experts are marginalized – e.g., 
if the majority of committee members are unwilling to listen to an opinion that 
might have some merit but disagrees with their intuition. This effect would 
reduce some of the benefit from diversity shown by Hong and Page (2004). In 
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such circumstances, a respected mediator, such as the committee chair, might 
take action to promote the exchange and re-consideration of information that 
might otherwise be ignored by the majority. That such chair behavior indeed 
occurs on FDA panels is reflected in the “flattening” of the panel hierarchy as 
seen in our directed graphs by the committee chair.  
The above assumes that an expert committee member is able to determine 
whether another member is correct in his or her comments. This assumption may 
break down in the case of very different technical specialties, wherein a member 
from one specialty has limits in evaluating the contribution of a member from 
another specialty. This reflects a sort of cognitive limitation that can prevent a 
perfect flow of information, even in the face of clear procedure (Douglas 1986). 
This effect is reflected in the empirical observation that members of different 
medical specialties have different speaking habits. Furthermore, members of a 
given medical specialty seem to preferentially link to one another on FDA panels. 
Nevertheless, this effect is not incommensurable, as indicated by the fact that the 
empirical distribution tends to place more probability mass near 0.5 than does the 
simulated distribution. These results suggest that medical specialty plays a role as 
an informal constraint on communication (North 2006/1990), which may be 
circumvented by various mechanisms including cross-specialty understanding, or 
if another identity is evoked. On one hand, evocation of a common identity 
might further enable learning among panel members. On the other hand, as 
individuals’ language deviates from their assigned roles, panel members may not 
know how to evaluate the contributions of others. Furthermore, in the most 
uncertain meetings, in which there is a minority of size two or more, we find that 
when vote cohesion among specialists of a given type is high so is specialty 
cohesion. This suggests that, under conditions of high uncertainty, individuals 
might engage in role-based behavior (March 1994), relying on their medical 
specialty identification to determine what to talk about and how to vote. On the 
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other hand, if this identification is not found to be relevant (i.e., there is a low 
specialty cohesion percentile) vote cohesion percentile is also low. This suggests 
circumstances in which panel members’ voting behavior is not related to their 
expressed concerns, potentially indicating voting for idiosyncratic reasons. That 
voting cohesion percentile is low when specialty cohesion is low suggests that 
medical specialty is an organizing factor on these panels. For example, if one were 
to think of the data regarding a particular medical device as a correlation device 
(e.g., a coin flip, cf. Aumann 1974) indicating data quality, then an individual’s 
subjective interpretation of that data would be conditional on medical specialty. 
The strength of this conditional dependence is a decreasing function of 
ambiguity. 
Empirical results demonstrate that meeting length, minority size, minority 
outdegree, and propensity for the lead reviewers to disagree are correlated. This 
suggests the presence of an underlying explanation for this effect. We propose 
that these are all related to the difficulty of evaluation of a given device. For 
example, the data might be ambiguous or it might not be clear what constitutes a 
correct decision. This is a form of deep uncertainty that panels such as these 
occasionally face – the information necessary to make a clear choice may simply 
not be available because the right expertise may not be possessed by panel 
members, or because it may simply not exist. In such cases, committee members 
are likely to be unsure which role is appropriate, and may instead rely upon 
idiosyncratic opinions and values (March 1994). Meeting length would increase as 
panel members discuss different perspectives, whereas the added controversy 
could also result in larger and more influential minorities (i.e., more dissent).  
Modeling Results and Their Implications 
In Chapter 6, we presented a computational model that attempts to capture some 
of the dynamics described above. Although still preliminary, the model yields 
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nine results that may provide some theoretical insight into the empirical trends 
discussed above. 
1. Simulated vote cohesion percentile and simulated specialty cohesion 
percentile are significantly positively associated. 
As in the empirical data, this result suggests that medical specialty is an 
organizing factor in determine voting behavior on panels in which there is no 
consensus. The model posits that panel members from the same medical 
specialty are more likely to understand information that is consistent with 
their training, thereby shaping their voting behavior. 
2. Proportional minority size, and specialty and vote cohesion, are functions 
of device quality. 
This demonstrates that proportional minority size is associated with device 
quality; an intrinsic characteristic of the device being reviewed. 
3. Members of the simulated voting minority tend to speak later than do 
members of the simulated voting majority when only when speaking 
order is pre-set. Furthermore, simulated vote and specialty cohesion 
percentile distributions fit the data better when speaking order is pre-set. 
Correlation between specialty cohesion percentile and vote cohesion 
percentile is slightly stronger than under conditions of pre-set speaking 
order. 
These results suggest one possible mechanism by which the empirical speaking 
order effect on vote might be explained. In particular, speaking order and seating 
order may be chosen in advance as one means by which the FDA could exercise 
control over the process. Reasons why this might be the case were presented in 
the discussion of the empirical results. If such is the case, then speaking order 
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might represent a coordination mechanism by which FDA expresses common 
knowledge to panel members (Chwe 2003). Of course, other explanations that 
are not captured in the model are possible. Future work may focus on 
determining a mechanism of emergence of voting effects on speaking order. 
4. The model better explains the empirical data distributions when no 
advocacy among panel members is assumed, although correlation 
between specialty cohesion percentile and vote cohesion percentile is 
stronger than under conditions of non-advocacy. 
These results suggest that the model better represents reality under conditions of 
non-advocacy. This suggests the possibility that discussion on such panels is 
indeed motivated by learning or information sharing rather than strategic 
concerns. That specialty and voting cohesion are more strongly correlated under 
conditions of advocacy is not surprising, since panel members are less likely to 
share information. When specialties are relatively homogeneous in their 
preferences, this would reduce the possibility that information is shared across 
specialty boundaries, perhaps leading to a “group think” within each specialty. On 
the other hand, when specialties’ preferences are internally diverse, specialty 
groups would fragment since information sharing would be limited. Furthermore, 
links would be unlikely to form across specialty boundaries between members 
who vote the same way because simulated panel members with broad expertise 
might be unwilling to discuss relevant information. 
5. Simulated complexity, mean breadth, mean depth, depth dispersion, 
openness and ambiguity all have a significant effect on simulated specialty 
cohesion percentile. 
These simulated results suggest potential drivers of the results seen in the 
empirical data. In particular, we find that specialty cohesion percentile decreases 
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with mean breadth and openness, and increases with complexity, mean depth and 
depth dispersion. We may explain these findings by noting that panel members 
who share deep domain expertise will be more likely to discuss that shared 
knowledge with members of the same specialty. Members of other specialties 
may not be able to learn this specialized information and so will not be linked. 
This increases the propensity for panel members from the same specialty to link 
in a conversation while decreasing the propensity for links across specialties. A 
similar argument holds for depth dispersion. A high dispersion in depth increases 
the likelihood that at least one panel member will have a very high depth, and 
then share the resulting knowledge with other members of that specialty. Panel 
members have more topics to discuss with increasing complexity, and therefore 
are less likely to discuss all topics, potentially leading to a preferential discussion 
of those topics in their specialty – especially since they are more readily able to 
assimilate these topics from others, potentially creating a “hidden profile” effect 
of the sort described by Stasser and Titus (1985). They are also likely to speak 
longer, creating more of an opportunity for members from the same specialty to 
link. A similar argument holds for ambiguity – as ambiguity increases, panel 
members spend more time in discussion, enabling linkage between members of 
the same specialty. For very low values of ambiguity, panel members have 
relatively little to discuss and so do not require linkage within their specialty 
groups. Unambiguous device data leads to an early consensus. Furthermore, 
discussion time is curtailed. On the other hand, as mean breadth increases, panel 
members are more likely to link across specialty boundaries, reducing specialty 
cohesion. Finally, as openness increases, panel members are less constrained to 
follow a fixed speaking order. This reduces the degree to which initial speakers 
can cause later speakers to adopt favored topics. As a result, specialties may be 
less aligned since they will be less likely to share, and therefore discuss, common 
information in their specialties.  
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6. Simulated complexity and ambiguity have a significant effect on simulated 
voting cohesion percentile. 
These simulated results suggest that as complexity and ambiguity increase, vote 
cohesion increases. This is consistent with the previous argument because vote 
cohesion is only defined for those meetings in which there is a sizable voting 
minority. In these meetings, it is likely that discussion causes panel members who 
exchange information to align their preferences. If there is not enough time for 
this to occur, voting cohesion will be low.  As ambiguity and complexity increase, 
there is more information shared, since panel members are more able to discuss 
their specific unshared knowledge. This could lead to more learning, and 
ultimately, higher vote cohesion. Excluded are the cases in which the panel 
reaches consensus. These are typically associated with low ambiguity. Thus the 
association of high vote cohesion with high ambiguity and complexity suggests 
the formation of coherent subgroups on the panel that are unable to reach 
consensus. This could indicate the presence of multiple competing interpretations 
of the data.   
7. Association between specialty cohesion percentile and vote cohesion 
percentile is stronger when ambiguity is less than 0.5 and when 
complexity is less than 20 topics. 
This result suggests that in the presence of high complexity and ambiguity, the 
correlation between medical specialty and vote cohesion percentiles breaks down. 
Although specialty cohesion percentile and vote cohesion percentile are both 
positively associated with ambiguity and complexity, their association with each 
other decouples. One possible explanation is that, under these conditions, there 
are too many topics to discuss as well as conflicting signals from the data. Even 
though there is more time to discuss these issues, it is unlikely that panel 
members will cover enough ground to reach a consensus within their specialty. 
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This might suggest a high specialty cohesion – i.e., among members in a specialty 
that share similar topics – but a low vote cohesion, since there may be subgroups 
within specialties. If there is a breadth of expertise on the panel, learning across 
specialties would strengthen this trend, because the learning would be selective. 
Furthermore, the presence of conflicting signals suggests that a small difference 
in valence in one topic could a panel member’s vote. This would suggest high 
specialty cohesion but low vote cohesion.  
8. Simulated proportional minority size is significantly associated with 
diversity, complexity, mean breadth, quality and ambiguity. 
In particular, proportional minority size increases with diversity and ambiguity, 
and decreases with complexity, mean breadth, and quality.  This makes sense 
because, as diversity increases, there are more barriers to communication across 
specialty boundaries. This is either because there are more specialties which may 
not share knowledge with one another a priori. Furthermore, as ambiguity 
increases, different topics give different signals. Thus voting behavior is highly 
sensitive to the information accessed by a particular voting member. As 
complexity increases, there is more time for panel members to discuss different 
topics, leading to a higher likelihood of information sharing. Furthermore, there 
are more topics to discuss. As a result, it is more likely that a speaker will discuss a 
previously unmentioned topic, leading to a situation in which panel members 
could learn. As mean breadth increases, information is more likely to be 
communicated across specialty boundaries, leading to a common understanding 
of the data, and consequently, a higher probability of consensus. Finally, as quality 
moves away from zero, topics are more likely to display similar signals, leading to 
less reason for disagreement a priori. 
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9. Simulated meeting profile, complexity, mean depth, depth dispersion, 
openness, ambiguity and quality are all significantly associated with the 
panel’s capacity to reach a correct decision. 
In particular, as mean depth and depth dispersion increase, the available 
information also increases, and that information becomes more accurate and 
more likely to be correctly transmitted. Furthermore, as the absolute value of 
quality increases, and as ambiguity decreases, different topics display consistent, 
correct signals to all panel members, leading to a consensus on the correct 
outcome. As complexity increases, panel members are more likely to spend time 
in discussion, and therefore more likely to come to a correct conclusion. It is 
likely that very low values of complexity lead to short discussion times, suggesting 
that a panel’s decision might not be well-informed. For example, one panel 
member might have access to a depth of unshared expertise that other panel 
members ignore. This is interesting because it indicates that many “easy” 
decisions might require deeper consideration than they are given. Often, 
prolonged discussion may raise issues that might have otherwise gone unnoticed. 
A similar argument holds for the impact of openness. If openness is too high, 
then panel members will be unable to make extended arguments in a given topic. 
In the model, this manifests as repeated mention of a topic, increasing its 
probability of adoption. On the other hand, with a well-established structure, 
panel members have sufficient time to ensure that the full range of their topics is 
heard. Otherwise, the panel meeting might end early, with the panel having 
achieved total- or near-consensus with an uninformed perspective. 
These initial results serve as a benchmarking for the model that may be expanded 
upon in future work. The fit of the model to some aspects of the data, even using 
randomized parameters, suggests that some major elements on FDA panels are 
captured. These include the following: 
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1) The “technical” effects of ambiguity and complexity – It is interesting 
that the correlation between specialty cohesion percentile and vote 
cohesion percentile erodes under conditions of high ambiguity and 
complexity, as panel members speak about very different topics and draw 
different conclusions from the same topic. This is a finding that is 
generally consistent with the theories of March (1994). This suggests that 
a limit placed upon interpretation of empirical reality erodes as that reality 
becomes harder to discern. 
2) The “cognitive” effects of learning and medical specialty – The model is 
consistent with the notion that medical specialty is an organizing factor. 
Vote and specialty cohesion are correlated following model rules. The 
model assumes that communication between medical specialties can only 
occur via the mechanism of individuals who possess a breadth of 
expertise – i.e., a capacity to learn from and teach other in different 
medical specialties. The role of mean breadth in decreasing proportional 
minority size and specialty cohesion percentile points to another sort of 
learning on panels that, when combined with high depth, could enable 
better information aggregation across specialty boundaries. That mean 
breadth is not associated with voting cohesion percentile is a reflection of 
the fact that voting cohesion percentile may not exist in these cases – the 
panel may instead have reached consensus. The absence of an effect of 
breadth on correct voting outcome suggests that learning requires a depth 
of expertise on which to draw in order for information to be successfully 
transferred – absent the appropriate depth of expertise, breadth of 
expertise is not useful. Indeed, proximity to ground truth on a topic is a 
function of breadth and not depth. If there is no depth of expertise on 
the panel, breadth will not lead to the correct answer. 
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3) The “social” effects of speaking order and procedure – It is interesting 
that the model only matches the data when speaking order is pre-
determined, such that members in the voting minority already speak last. 
This provides one possible explanation for the observed behavior in the 
FDA panels. Nevertheless, other explanations, that do not assume an 
explicit pre-set ordering, are possible (see, e.g., Chwe 2000). It is not 
inconceivable that this result could instead have emerged due to another 
mechanism such as a tendency for late speakers to want to disagree e.g., 
due to resentment over being assigned a late position. Furthermore, a 
structured panel process with sufficient discussion time may be important 
in enabling panel members to express information that would otherwise 
be unshared. On the other hand, if much of the information discussed in 
the structured phase is already known by other panel members, or if 
ambiguity is very low, then a strict structure to the discussion might not 
be beneficial since there is little that panel members could learn. In such a 
case, open discussion would better serve the goals of the panel conveners 
by avoiding the repetition of shared information (potentially leading to a 
quick, but potentially uninformed, decision in favor of what this 
information represents). 
We may draw some concluding observations from the analysis that we have 
already performed. If the logic underlying our model is correct, the Circulatory 
Systems Devices Panel in the FDA may largely allow for learning and correct 
decision-making. Empirical results suggest that three major factors affect panel 
decision-making; namely, technology, procedure and training. In general, these 
are representative of three interacting layers, or orders (cf. Hayek 1952, Richards 
2009, see Figure 76): respectively, the technical, cognitive, and social. Within the 
technical layer, data are important – this is where data ambiguity and device 
quality can impact upon decision outcomes. Within the cognitive layer, direction 
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of attention is important – this is where learning may occur as modulated by the 
effects of medical specialty. Finally, within the social layer, dynamics of perceived 
expertise are strong – this is where speaking order becomes a determinant of 
voting behavior. No one of these layers on its own is sufficient to explain voting 
behavior. Instead, interactions among these layers cause complex social behavior 
of the sort required to successfully cope with a complex technical environment 
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Figure 76: Three interacting orders or 
layers. Each one constrains the layer 
immediately above it (cf. Polanyi 
1970). Thus very clear data would 
constrain the set of possible 
interpretations, etc. 
Today’s engineering systems must be able to adapt quickly to an increasingly 
complex world. Only by pooling knowledge from across many different domains 
can this be accomplished. Still, there has been little empirical research into how 
this occurs in real-world settings. We addressed this query by asking three 
questions that guide our research: 
1. How can we study, in a quantitative, consistent manner, the flow of 
communication among technical experts on committee decisions?  
2. How do technical experts’ decisions change as they learn and interact 
during the decision-making process?  
3. How might we design committee processes so as to enable desirable 
behaviour on the part of technical expert committees? 
The methodological contribution of this thesis answers question 1, providing a 
tool that may be used by future researchers to study verbal communication flows 
on expert committees. This tool is used to inform theory, which has been 
instantiated as a preliminary computational model, thus providing a first answer 
to question 2. As more data is gathered and analyzed, we will be even more able 
to answer question 2, providing insight into the decision- and learning-processes 
of technical experts. Finally, this chapter provides a preliminary framework for 
question 3. Together, these diverse sources of information can be combined to 
lead us to a deeper understanding of committee decision-making on technical 
expert committees, and ultimately, to the better design of engineering systems. 
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A p p e n d i x  2  
IMPACT OF DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES ON H-INDEX 
We identify the effect of demographic variables on h-Index, a measure of 
academic expertise independent of panel dynamics. Results of this analysis are 
found in Table 30. 
Table 30: 4-way ANOVA showing the effects of 
Age, Medical Specialty, Gender, and Race on h-
index for our sample of 37 meetings. All variables 
reach significance. 







Age 8528.97 1 8528.97 51.79 <0.0001 
Medical 
Specialty 
23317.9 7 3331.12 20.23 <0.0001 
Gender 2381.26 1 2381.26 14.46 0.0002 
Race 2356.5 3 785.49 4.77 0.0029 
Error 55333.8 336 164.68 
Total 98491.4 348  
 
 
  269 
These results show that age, medical specialty, gender, and race all contribute 
significantly to explaining the variance in h-index. Independent Tukey honestly-
significant difference tests of multiple comparisons show that men have a 
significantly higher h-index than do women, and that white panel members have 
a significantly higher h-index than do black panel members. These results are 
known trends in the h-index, and are consistent with the analysis in (Kelly and 
Jennions 2006). 
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1 '7/28/1997' PLC CO2 Heart Laser 
2 '7/29/1997' Spectranetics Laser Sheath 
3 '9/15/1997 - 
morning' 
Alliance Monostrut Valve 
4 '9/15/1997 - 
afternoon ' 
Medtronic Freestyle Aortic Root Bioprosthesis   
5 '9/16/1997' Toronto SPV® Valve, Model SPA-101 
6 '4/24/1998' PLC CO2 Heart Laser 
7 '6/29/1998' Ambu CardioPump 
8 '10/27/1998' Eclipse Holmium Laser 
9 '6/23/1999 - 
morning' 
Guidant Endovascular Technologies, EBT Abdominal Aortic Tube 
Bifurcated Endovascular Grafting System   
10 '6/23/1999 - 
afternoon' 
Medtronic AneuRx, Inc.  AneuRx Bifurcated Endovascular Prosthesis 
System   
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11 '6/24/1999' Medtronic Jewel AF Arrhythmia Management Device   
12 '6/19/2000' Cordis Checkmate System  
13 '9/11/2000' Beta-Cath™ System intravascular brachytherapy device 
14 '12/5/2000' Model 7250 Jewel® AF Implantable Cardioverter Defibrillator System  
15 '4/23/2001' Sulzer IntraTherapeutics IntraCoil Self-Expanding Peripheral Stent 
16 '7/9/2001' Eclipse PMR Holmium Laser System   
17 '7/10/2001 - 
morning' 
Guidant Corporation P010012, Contak CD, and EasyTrak Lead System   
18 '7/10/2001 - 
afternoon' 
Medtronic Corporation P010015, Medtronic InSync Atrial 
Synchronous Biventricular Pacing Device and Attain Lead System   
19 '9/10/2001 - 
morning' 
AMPLATZER® Septal Occluder  
20 '9/10/2001 - 
afternoon' 
The CardioSEAL® Septal Occlusion System with QwikLoad™  
21 '9/11/2001' CryoLife, Inc.  P010003, BioGlue Surgical Adhesive  
22 '3/4/2002' Thoratec Corporation's HeartMate VE Left Ventricular System   
23 '3/5/2002' InSync® ICD System  
24 '9/9/2002' Gore EXCLUDER® AAA Endoprosthesis  
  272 
25 '9/10/2002' NMT Medical P000049/S3, CardioSEAL STARFlex Septal Occlusion 
System with Qwik Load   
26 '10/22/2002' Cordis Corporation  P020026, CYPHER Sirolimus-Eluting   Coronary 
Stent System 
27 '3/6/2003' CryoCath Technologies' 7 French Freezor Cardiac Cryoablation 
Catheter   
28 '4/10/2003' Cook Zenith AAA Endovascular Graft  
29 '5/29/2003' Cardima, Inc. REVELATION_ Tx and NavAblator Catheter System   
30 '10/2/2003' Spectranetics CVX-300 Excimer Laser System   
31 '11/20/2003' TAXUS ® Drug Eluting Stent   
32 '4/21/2004' Cordis Precise Nitinol Stent System 
33 '6/8/2004' World Heart Novacor N100PC and N100PC(q) left ventricular assist 
system 
34 '7/28/2004' Guidant Cardiac Resynchronization Therapy Defibrillators, P010012, 
Supplement 26 
35 '1/13/2005' GORE TAG Thoracic Endoprosthesis  
36 '6/22/2005' Acorn CorCap™ Cardiac Support Device (CSD) 
37 '6/23/2005' Abiomed, Inc. H040006: AbioCor Implantable Replacement Heart 
 




















1 0.4 0.859 0.5333 0.541 0.22 0.00 0.22 
2 0.2 0.566 N/A N/A 0.00 1.00 1.00 
3 0.3684 0.829 N/A N/A 0.00 1.00 1.00 
4 0.4545 0.883 N/A N/A 0.00 1.00 1.00 
5 0.625 0.966 N/A N/A 0.00 1.00 1.00 
6 0.5 0.832 N/A N/A 0.00 1.00 1.00 
7 0.2222 0.922 0.5 0.899 0.33 0.00 0.33 
8 0.3636 0.975 N/A N/A 0.14 1.00 0.86 
9 0.25 0.507 N/A N/A 0.00 1.00 1.00 
10 0.3846 0.882 N/A N/A 0.00 1.00 1.00 
11 1 0.644 N/A N/A 0.00 1.00 1.00 
12 0.1765 0.913 N/A N/A 0.00 1.00 1.00 
13 0 0.713 N/A N/A 0.00 1.00 1.00 
14 1 0.968 N/A N/A 0.00 1.00 1.00 
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15 0.2727 0.797 N/A N/A 0.00 0.00 0.00 
16 0.6667 0.959 1 1 0.22 0.00 0.22 
17 0.25 0.534 0.625 0.667 0.25 0.00 0.25 
18 0.1429 0.326 N/A N/A 0.00 1.00 1.00 
19 0.2667 0.792 N/A N/A 0.00 1.00 1.00 
20 0.25 0.735 N/A N/A 0.10 1.00 0.90 
21 1 0.983 N/A N/A 0.00 1.00 1.00 
22 0.3125 0.614 0.6875 0.674 0.20 1.00 0.80 
23 0.2857 0.537 0.3571 0.487 0.50 1.00 0.50 
24 0.2308 0.44 N/A N/A 0.10 1.00 0.90 
25 0.08 0.058 N/A N/A 0.14 0.00 0.14 
26 0.2 0.362 N/A N/A 0.00 1.00 1.00 
27 0.6364 0.996 0.8182 0.987 0.27 1.00 0.73 
28 0.3333 0.53 N/A N/A 0.00 1.00 1.00 
29 1 0.967 N/A N/A 0.00 0.00 0.00 
30 0.0769 0.194 N/A N/A 0.10 0.00 0.10 
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31 0.3846 0.862 N/A N/A 0.00 1.00 1.00 
32 0.2 0.774 0.6 0.911 0.40 1.00 0.60 
33 0.2143 0.436 N/A N/A 0.09 0.00 0.09 
34 0.0909 0.302 N/A N/A 0.00 1.00 1.00 
35 0.7 0.989 0.7 0.949 0.20 1.00 0.80 
36 0.2632 0.494 0.4737 0.277 0.36 0.00 0.36 

















1 7.67 28 232 0.3 1 
2 2.67 9 148 N/A 1 
3 3.00 13 152 N/A 2 
4 5.10 14 129 N/A 2 
5 3.10 16 158 N/A 2 
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6 7.25 19 341 N/A 2 
7 9.17 23 259 0.3333 2 
8 8.00 18 207 0 3 
9 3.92 14 217 N/A 2 
10 4.45 9 155 N/A 2 
11 3.67 14 165 N/A 3 
12 7.08 21 304 N/A 2 
13 7.08 20 292 N/A 4 
14 5.98 24 203 N/A 4 
15 8.08 17 212 N/A 4 
16 7.35 20 300 0 4 
17 4.65 16 173 0 1 
18 3.37 11 135 N/A 1 
19 3.93 12 128 N/A 4 
20 5.00 14 128 0.2222 4 
21 2.97 11 155 N/A 5 
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22 7.67 18 260 0.2222 5 
23 7.42 18 236 0.4 5 
24 7.92 23 228 0 5 
25 7.25 18 263 0.0833 4 
26 11.62 22 302 N/A 5 
27 7.42 19 244 0.1 5 
28 7.03 28 207 N/A 5 
29 7.55 20 269 N/A 5 
30 6.45 19 198 0 5 
31 7.53 22 305 N/A 5 
32 10.33 28 300 0.4 5 
33 7.15 22 176 0.3 5 
34 8.38 23 208 N/A 5 
35 8.28 25 299 0.0909 6 
36 9.70 21 295 0.3333 6 
37 8.87 25 257 0.3571 6 
 


























1 14 17 3 0.18 0.70 0.68 -0.02 
2 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
3 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
4 7 7 0 0.00 0.50 0.39 -0.11 
5 10 16 6 0.38 0.83 0.94 0.11 
6 4 11 7 0.64 0.50 0.85 0.35 
7 2 2 0 0.00 0.11 0.09 -0.02 
8 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
9 0 11 11 1.00 0.00 0.61 0.61 
10 2 4 2 0.50 0.15 0.21 0.06 
11 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
12 9 15 6 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.10 
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13 5 10 5 0.50 0.63 0.77 0.14 
14 0 2 2 1.00 0.00 0.29 0.29 
15 3 9 6 0.67 0.27 0.53 0.26 
16 2 2 0 0.00 0.20 0.15 -0.05 
17 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
18 6 6 0 0.00 0.67 0.50 -0.17 
19 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
20 15 20 5 0.25 0.94 0.91 -0.03 
21 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
22 0 7 7 1.00 0.00 0.33 0.33 
23 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
24 0 7 7 1.00 0.00 0.35 0.35 
25 5 19 14 0.74 0.19 0.56 0.37 
26 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
27 0 7 7 1.00 0.00 0.41 0.41 
28 2 7 5 0.71 0.29 0.50 0.21 
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29 3 7 4 0.57 1.00 1.00 0.00 
30 9 20 11 0.55 0.53 0.87 0.34 
31 13 13 0 0.00 0.68 0.57 -0.12 
32 0 8 8 1.00 0.00 0.32 0.32 
33 8 8 0 0.00 0.47 0.42 -0.05 
34 12 12 0 0.00 0.80 0.52 -0.28 
35 12 21 9 0.43 0.80 0.91 0.11 
36 4 13 9 0.69 0.19 0.52 0.33 
37 12 35 23 0.66 0.35 0.78 0.42 
 
